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
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Foreword

The preparation of an annual history covering the significant activities of Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, is a current Department of the Army requirement. This year's report emphasizes major policies and developments, while routine matters are either listed in the chronology or omitted entirely. Moreover, to make the narrative more comprehensive and cohesive, and to facilitate both the preparation and the reproduction, the top secret material has been incorporated in the report.

The history was prepared by the staff of the Historical Section, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Headquarters, USAREUR. The authors have written a historical narrative that will be useful to the staff officer in preparing plans, in developing staff studies, and for briefing and orientation purposes. In addition, the report presents valuable historical source material for future research and writing.

Instead of using the system of indicating security classification by paragraph, as described in paragraph 58c, AR 380-5, this history is classified by the footnotes. That portion of the text from one footnote reference to the next footnote reference carries the same classification as the source document cited in the footnote, unless otherwise indicated. Using this system, one footnote may, and in many cases does, indicate classification for several paragraphs; similarly, one paragraph, documented by two or more footnotes, may carry two or more security classifications.

The first part of the report discusses the general situation of the country and the progress of the work. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and the plans for the future.

The second part of the report contains a list of the various projects and the results achieved. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and the plans for the future.

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PART ONE

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS

CHAPTER 1

Streamlining the Command Structure

1. National and International Command Relationships

During Fiscal Year (FY) 1959 there were no basic changes in the functional relationships of the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), to the other U.S. forces and Allied commands in the European Theater (Chart 1). As the senior Army command in the theater, USAREUR continued to be administered by the Department of the Army. However, effective 15 September 1958, a reorganization of the U.S. Military Establishment made unified commands directly responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff,¹ and removed the military departments from the chain of command over them; thus the authority of the unified U.S. European Command (US EUCOM) over USAREUR, as one of its components, was strengthened and clarified. Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), CINCUSAREUR² continued to wear a "second hat" as Commander, Central Army Group (COMCENTAG), and in that capacity he was responsible to the Commander, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (COMLANDCENT). Most of USAREUR's combat

¹(1) PL 85-599, 85th Cong., 6 Aug 58. UNCLAS. (2) Incl 1, 8 Sep 58, to ltr, US EUCOM to USAREUR, 15 Sep 58, subj: JCS Unified Command Plan. ECJCP 322. CONF.

²Gen C. D. Eddleman succeeded Gen H. I. Hodes on 1 April 1959. UNCLAS.

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elements in Germany were earmarked for CENTAG as part of the NATO forces.

2. Missions

There were likewise no changes in USAREUR's assigned tasks, which consisted of peacetime missions, including combat short of general war, during which the NATO military structure would not become operational, and wartime missions, when the over-all direction of the Allied effort would be through NATO. In peacetime USAREUR's primary mission was to maintain the security and combat readiness of its combat forces, the bulk of which were assigned to the U.S. Seventh Army.³ The U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe (USACOMZEUR), in France, gave logistical support to the combat units and carried out such other duties as CINCUSAREUR might direct.⁴ The U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF), in Italy, was to be prepared to provide missile support to Italian Army units of Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe (LANDSOUTH), guarding Italy's northern frontier (Chart 1).⁵

For a list of other major commands, subordinate commands, and assigned units, see Appendix A, Command Data.

3. Reorganization

During FY 1959 USAREUR moved nearer to the culmination of a series of relocations and reorganizations that had begun in 1956 with the transfer of certain depots in Germany to the control of ComZ--later USACOMZEUR--headquarters, followed in 1957 by the elimination of the USAREUR technical service commands--excepting the Signal Command--and the relief of the chiefs of technical services from all command and operational responsibility.⁶ The principal purpose of the change was to facilitate transition from peacetime to wartime operations. A secondary purpose was to economize in personnel.

a. The SHAPE Proposal. In January 1958 General L. Norstad, SACEUR, had decided to recommend to the Department of the Army a consolidation of


³USAREUR ltr, 15 Aug 58, subj: USAREUR Mission Register (U). AEAGC-PL 250/18. SECRET.

⁴Incl 1, USACOMZEUR Missions and Organization FY 1959, to 1st Ind, USACOMZEUR to USAREUR G3 Hist Sec, 5 Aug 59, to ltr, USAREUR Hist Div to USACOMZEUR, 24 Jun 59, subj: Request for Information. AEAH 250/56. OFLUSE.

⁵(1) Ltr, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Dec 57, subj: Missions and Functions Assigned to SETAF by US CINCEUR (U). AEAGC-PL 250/16 GC. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Info Bul 35, 27 Mar 59, pp. 3-4, 5-6. UNCLAS.

⁶(1) USAREUR Hist Div, Ann Hist Rept, Hq USAREUR, FY 56, pp. 219-223. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 210-214. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). The establishment of the Seventh Army Support Command in January 1958 similarly relieved Seventh Army staff sections of technical service command responsibility. (USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, p. 11. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS



SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM USAREUR INFO BUL 35,
27 MAR 59, P. 7. UNCLAS.

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some of its headquarters in Europe.⁷ General Norstad had felt that USAREUR was maintaining an excessively large number of peacetime headquarters for the number of troops involved--2 headquarters on the corps level and 1 on the army level, with up to 3 corps headquarters to be added, under CENTAG, if war broke out. In addition, he had deplored the fact that CINCUSAREUR--a 4-star general--was not in direct command of the combat force and was in many respects virtually a "housekeeper" for a junior commander--the Commanding General, Seventh Army. His specific proposals had been that USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters be combined, with consequent savings in personnel; that the 4-star commander in chief also command Seventh Army; that the NATO responsibilities of the headquarters be met through the assignment of German and French officers to his staff during both peace and war; and that a 3-star deputy commander supervise administration and logistics.⁸

CINCUSAREUR meanwhile had been directed to study the possibilities of reducing the number of major commands and echelons in USAREUR.⁹

b. The Clarke Plan. A number of possibilities had been examined. Lt. Gen. B. M. Clarke--then Seventh Army commander--while recommending strongly that the existing organization be kept, had submitted the following suggestions as workable and as meeting General Norstad's desires:¹⁰

- (1) Eliminate Seventh Army headquarters.
- (2) Reorganize USAREUR headquarters into a tactical headquarters similar to an army group, to be known as U.S. Seventh Army, Europe.
- (3) Incorporate into this headquarters a small NATO element of U.S., German, and French officers, to assume CENTAG's functions.
- (4) Establish a support and logistical command at Heidelberg, under a 3-star deputy commander in chief, to assume the administrative and logistical functions being performed by USAREUR, WACOM, ADSEC, and USACOMZEUR headquarters.

⁷(1) Ltr, Gen W. P. Palmer, Dep US CINCEUR to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 9 Jan 58, subj: Consolidation of Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army. USAREUR Regis Nr 18-03. (2) Memo, Gen Hodes to Gen Palmer, 14 Jan 58. USAREUR Regis Nr 18-10. (3) Memo, Gen Palmer to Gen Hodes, 28 Jan 58. USAREUR Regis Nr GS-18-13. All SECRET.

⁸Ltr, Gen L. Norstad, SACEUR, to Gen M. D. Taylor, CofSA, 1 Apr 58. USAREUR Regis Nr 48-31. SECRET.

⁹Ltr, Gen Palmer to Gen Hodes, 9 Jan 58, cited above. SECRET.

¹⁰Ltrs, Lt Gen B. M. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, to Gen H. I. Hodes, 15 Mar and 11 Apr 58. USAREUR Regis Nr AG 48-128. SECRET.

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(5) Reorganize existing corps headquarters into groups, each with an administrative and support command to replace the field army and area commands.

c. The Hodes Proposal. General Hodes had felt that in peacetime the consolidation of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters would be an inadvisable attempt to combine the responsibilities of USAREUR, extending throughout the NATO area, with the divergent and dissimilar functions of Seventh Army, covering a 175-mile front. In wartime, moreover, it would create operational risks for the Allied land forces. If there was to be a consolidation, it would be preferable either at the higher joint-service level or at a lower level through the merger of USAREUR Rear with USACOMZEUR headquarters at Orleans.

Nevertheless, General Hodes had submitted a plan similar to, but varying from, that proposed by General Clarke. The combined headquarters would be known as Seventh Army/USAREUR. It would have a forward echelon at Stuttgart and a rear echelon, including Headquarters, COMUSMACV, at Heidelberg. CINUSAREUR and his personal staff would move to Stuttgart. A lieutenant general, as Deputy Commander in Chief for Administration and Logistics, would be stationed at Heidelberg and would command the Heidelberg echelon. The tactical elements would be consolidated at Stuttgart. There would be no further shifts of personnel or units, and the cost would be about \$3,000.¹¹

An alternative suggestion had been the establishment of a Seventh Army/CENTAG headquarters at Heidelberg and a USAREUR (Theater Army) headquarters at Stuttgart. The latter would be made capable of administering a field army. This alternative would shift some 3,000 persons and would cost over \$500,000.¹²

d. The Taylor Proposal. On the ground that none of the foregoing plans would enable the Army to fulfill its mission in Europe more effectively, General M. D. Taylor--then Army Chief of Staff--had informed General Norstad that a satisfactory solution had not been found.¹³ He had pointed out that defense along the European front required an army group headquarters, such as USAREUR/CENTAG, despite the small number of corps and divisions involved. Because many responsibilities of CINUSAREUR could not be delegated, he would not be able to give Seventh Army the

¹¹ Ltr, CINUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, with Tabs 1-9, 17 Mar 58, subj: Consolidation of Hq USAREUR and US Seventh Army. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br, Comd Reorg file.

¹² Cable SX-3437, CINUSAREUR sgd Hodes to DA for Eddleman, 28 Apr 58. SECRET.

¹³ Ltr, Gen Taylor to Gen Norstad, 21 Apr 58. USAREUR Regis Nr GS 48-30. SECRET.

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immediate and constant attention required to maintain its high degree of combat readiness. Consequently, the consolidation proposed would risk weakening the effectiveness of the Army component of US CINCEUR's forces. Moreover, the reduction in the size of USAREUR headquarters that was already proceeding under General Hodes' direction¹⁴ would probably result in as great a personnel savings as any consolidation of headquarters would bring about. His conclusion had been that any basic change in the existing command structure would be inadvisable. However, in line with General Norstad's recommendation, he had proposed that CINCUSAREUR assume command of Seventh Army and designate, if he desired, a 3-star general to supervise Seventh Army training and operations, and that the integration of foreign officers into the Heidelberg headquarters continue under the existing USAREUR/CENTAG organization.¹⁵

e. The Connor Study. Almost concurrently, an independent USAREUR study of the command structure had been completed.¹⁶ It had recommended a peacetime USAREUR/CENTAG headquarters at Heidelberg; the assignment of a number of "special assistants" to CINCUSAREUR; a Deputy for Field Army Operations, to be Seventh Army commander, at Heidelberg; a Deputy for Theater Army Operations at nearby Mannheim; and reorganization of the area commands as support brigades, under a Field Army Support Command, with headquarters at Kaiserslautern. In time of war the Deputy for Field Army Operations would have a combined Seventh Army/CENTAG staff.

(1) General Adams' Comments. Maj. Gen. P. D. Adams, then Northern Area Command (NACOM) commander, commenting on the Connor study, had urged that the proposed "special assistants," if designated, should be a working staff and that the CENTAG contingent should be a full staff capable of participating in exercises and initiating operations. He had favored the principle of eliminating area commands, but felt that the Berlin Command, because of its critical importance, should remain an entity under the direct control of CINCUSAREUR.¹⁷

(2) General Eddleman's Comments. Lt. Gen. C. D. Eddleman, then Seventh Army Commander, felt that the existing command structure was best suited to the existing situation, but recommended that if

¹⁴USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 37-38; FY 58, pp. 51-52. SECRET (info used CONF).

¹⁵(1) Ltr, Gen Taylor to Gen Norstad, 21 Apr 58, cited above.
(2) Cable DA-440148, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Apr 58. USAREUR SMC IN 4772. Both SECRET.

¹⁶Incl 1, subj: A Projected Command Structure for USAREUR, to DF, USAREUR G3 to distr, 8 May 58. USAREUR Regis Nr GC 68-119. SECRET.

¹⁷(1) Ltr, Maj Gen P. D. Adams, GC NACOM, to Maj Gen T. L. Sherburne, Jr., USAREUR ACofS G3, 21 Jan 58. USAREUR Regis Nr GC-58-118. (2) Ltr, Gen Adams to Gen Sherburne, 30 Jun 58. USAREUR Regis Nr GC 78-10. Both SECRET.

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reorganization was directed it should provide for a single commander over all U.S. Army forces in peacetime and over CENTAG in wartime. This commander should have a single staff, established by merging the USAREUR and Seventh Army staffs, and two deputies--one for administration and one for operations. The deputy for operations would be responsible for training the Seventh Army in peacetime and would command it in war. The deputy for administration would control the entire U.S. Army support structure in the USAREUR area and in wartime would be redesignated Theater Army commander.¹⁸

(3) Disposition. General Hodges approved the Connor Study's broad concepts, for planning purposes, but withheld final decision until details of staffing, costs, and other implications were known and other studies of the theater logistical organization, the Seventh Army boundary (see par 6), and related matters were completed.¹⁹

f. The Clayman Study. Another USAREUR study, completed in November 1958, recommended the integration of the USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters staffs into Headquarters, Seventh Army/USAREUR, and the maintenance within that headquarters of a field army section capable of assuming command of Seventh Army. Its principal recommendation, however, was that USACOMZEUR be redesignated as the Theater Army Logistics Command and that the ordnance, quartermaster, medical, and transportation services--including the Bremerhaven port of embarkation--be added to it.²⁰ A USAREUR Support Command would also be established to carry out the administrative, house-keeping, and logistical support activities in the area between the west bank of the Rhine and the Franco-German border, as well as in most of the former Headquarters Area Command (HACOM) covering the Heidelberg-Mannheim-Karlsruhe triangle. It would be so organized as to be capable of forming a field army logistical command to support Seventh Army.

General Hodges felt that, although this plan had merit, it would not result in sufficient over-all savings to justify its acceptance in entirety. He directed his deputy to continue studying the problem and to consider the possibility of merging the Western Area Command (WACOM) with V Corps, ADSEC, or some other command.²¹

¹⁸ Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Oct 58. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Plans & Plcy Br Comd Reorg file.

¹⁹ DF, USAREUR G3 to Dep CofS, 18 Jun 58, subj: Command Structure. AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

²⁰ Study of USAREUR Command Structure (The Clayman Study), Nov 58. SECRET. In G3 Plans & Plcy Br Comd Reorg file.

²¹ Memo for rec, Maj R. L. Gruenther, USAREUR G4 Mgt Br, 17 Nov 58, subj: CinC Guidance on Reorganization. CONF. In file above.

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g. Merger of WACOM and NACOM. Upon the basis of the resulting study²² General Hodes approved the merger of WACOM under NACOM, to be effective 1 March 1959, and directed that consideration of further consolidations be held in abeyance for future reference and for presentation to the incoming commander in chief.²³ This merger and a subsequent reorganization of NACOM saved 470 military and 30 U.S. civilian spaces.²⁴

h. USAREUR-USACOMZEUR Realignment. Shortly after General Eddleman assumed command of USAREUR he was presented with a dual plan for the reorganization of USACOMZEUR as the outcome of staff studies made up to that time.²⁵ Under Plan A (Chart 2) a number of technical staff divisions and personnel would be moved from USAREUR headquarters and merged with USACOMZEUR headquarters at Orleans. The expanded Orleans echelon would be organized on the general-staff principle. Its commander would be both Deputy CINCUSAREUR and Commanding General, USACOMZEUR. The Advance Section (ADSEC) and Base Section (BASEC) would be combined into one logistical command, which might be further expanded to include the Seine and Orleans Area Commands. Under Plan B (Chart 3) a new headquarters, comparable to a Theater Army and commanded by a Deputy Commander in Chief for Administration and Logistics, would be established as the Orleans echelon. The personnel moved from Heidelberg would constitute the Deputy Commander in Chief's staff. USACOMZEUR would be redesignated a logistical command and would be subordinate to the new headquarters.

General Eddleman approved Plan A to be the peacetime organization and Plan B as the wartime organization²⁶ and authorized the issuance of directives to govern phased procedures under Plan A. CINCUSAREUR, the general-staff divisions, the comptroller, and selected technical and administrative divisions would remain in Heidelberg as USAREUR Forward and would be responsible for policy and tactical matters. During Phase I, ending 31 December 1959, the USAREUR Ordnance, Transportation, and Quartermaster Division

²² Study of USAREUR Command Structure (The Young Study), Jan 59. In file above. SECRET.

²³ (1) Memo for rec, Maj Gruenther, 30 Jan 59, subj: Briefing for General Hodes on Troop Strength Reductions, FYs 59 and 60. CONF. In file above. (2) Cable SX-1345, USAREUR to NACOM and WACOM, 30 Jan 59. (3) Cable SX-1948, USAREUR to NACOM, 19 Feb 59. Both SECRET.

²⁴ Intvw. Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR G3 Hist Sec, with Lt Col R. E. Neiman, G3 Plans & Ploy Br, and Mr. E. W. Kahn, G1 Civ Mpr Con Br, 15 Sep 59. CONF.

²⁵ Memo for rec, Brig Gen H. K. Johnson, USAREUR ACoFS G3, 24 Apr 59. AFAGC-PL 215/15. CONF.

²⁶ Ibid. CONF.

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staffs, in that order, would move to Orleans.²⁷ During Phase II, 1 January 1960 to 1 July 1961, other selected USAREUR staff agencies and/or functions would move as funds and facilities became available. The Orleans echelon would be commanded by the Commanding General, USACOMZEUR, who would ultimately become also Deputy CINCUSAREUR. The chief of each transferred technical staff division would serve as the technical service officer in his field for both USAREUR and USACOMZEUR headquarters.

The reorganization, when completed, would establish the elements of a theater army headquarters at Orleans, its anticipated wartime location. Ultimately the diminished USAREUR headquarters at Heidelberg would be primarily tactical, prepared to augment CENTAG headquarters immediately at the outbreak of war. The Orleans echelon would be primarily logistical, and at the outbreak of war would become Theater Army headquarters.²⁸

At the end of FY 1959 further modifications of the command structure and reorganizational measures were under consideration.

4. Integration and Internationalization of the CENTAG Peacetime Staff

The integration and internationalization of CENTAG headquarters was one of the major objectives to be achieved in FY 1959. For this purpose an international TOE was to be established, and the posts thus created were to be filled at the earliest feasible date mutually agreeable to COMCENTAG and the French and German Ministers of Defense.²⁹ Each general staff division was to have American, French, and German personnel, with the total roughly proportional to the forces earmarked for CENTAG at GAO. The proportion of American, French, and German personnel was to be reexamined whenever the forces assigned to CENTAG changed substantially. Although the United States provided approximately 60 percent of the combat forces of CENTAG, as compared to 20 percent each from the French and Germans, the initial objective was to achieve integrated participation on the basis of 50 percent American, and 25 percent each French and German personnel.³⁰

²⁷(1) Cable SX-3901, CINCUSAREUR to CofSA, 14 May 59. SECRET.

(2) DF, USAREUR G4 to other stf divs, 22 May 59, subj: Realignment of Certain Staff Divisions. AEAGD-MN 250/15 GD. SECRET. Shortly after the beginning of FY 1960 directives were issued for the movement of these staffs on 10 September, 20 September and 10 December respectively. CONF.


²⁸DF, USAREUR G4 to certain stf divs, 22 May 59, subj: USAREUR Headquarters Reorganization. AEAGD-MN 250/15. CONF.

²⁹Ltr, SHAPE CofS to CINCENT, 1 Jul 58. NATO CONF. In CENTAG Plans Stf, Peacetime Hq file.

³⁰DF, ACofS G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Sep 58, subj: Wartime Mission and Organization for CENTAG Headquarters. AEAGC-GA. SECRET.


Chart 2

Plan A-Peacetime Organization, Orleans Echelon



Source: G3 Plans & Policy Br. CONF.

Plan B-Wartime Organization, Orleans Echelon



Source: USAREUR G3 Plans & Policy Br. CONF.

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CENTAG had meanwhile prepared a proposal for the expansion of its peacetime organization. As the first step toward complete integration, CENTAG was ready to request 7 German officers and 8 enlisted men. The addition of German personnel to the CENTAG peacetime headquarters would facilitate NATO war planning because more data concerning the German forces' capabilities, organization, policies, and status would thus become available. Moreover, coordination with German Military Districts in barrier and denial and other engineer planning would improve. Planning and coordination of rear area security and damage control would be facilitated, and the preparation for and conduct of NATO exercises would become easier. Also, German personnel would participate directly in planning for the defense of German territory. Finally, the transition to the ultimate CENTAG peacetime organization would be smoother.³¹

On 18 November 1958 the proposed expansion and internationalization of the CENTAG peacetime headquarters was discussed during a briefing attended by General Hodges, who considered the projected number of U.S. officers on the staff as out of proportion to the workload visualized. The U.S. officers might be phased in later, if their services were actually needed. Moreover, the expansion of the peacetime CENTAG staff and headquarters would have to be geared to the availability of NATO family housing, because no USAREUR housing would be available.

Following the briefing, and as a related action, preparations were made to establish a portion of the CENTAG staff on full-time duty in a separate building. It was intended that all NATO papers would flow directly from the CENTAG staff to the commander in chief, with the USAREUR/CENTAG G3, in his ancillary position as coordinator of the CENTAG staff, continuing to monitor all actions.³²

On 22 November CENTAG submitted to LANDCENT a proposal for a completely integrated headquarters; the necessary facilities could be made available in the Mannheim area. The peacetime headquarters would have the same organizational structure as the war establishment, so that in an emergency the peacetime organization could be augmented with mobilization designees without any need for modifying the organizational structure. The peacetime organization would furnish approximately 45 percent of the strength of the wartime headquarters, thus assuring a smooth and rapid transition to wartime status. CENTAG headquarters could be brought to approximately 85 percent of its wartime strength within 2 hours of the occurrence of an emergency, since the personnel augmentation from USAREUR headquarters would be readily available. Arrangements to assure that German and French augmentation personnel would join CENTAG within 24 hours after the outbreak of an emergency would be essential, since the organization could not function efficiently at reduced strength for any extended period. The efficiency of wartime performance would be enhanced

³¹DF, same to CofS, 13 Nov 58, subj: Integration of German Personnel into CENTAG Headquarters. AEAGC-CA. NATO SECRET.

³²Memo for rec, Lt Col E. E. Surdyk, CENTAG, Plans Stf, 18 Nov 58. NATO CONF. In CENTAG Admin Ofc.

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if all personnel who were to be assigned to CENTAG in an emergency would be designated during peacetime and would join CENTAG headquarters during NATO exercises.³³

At the same time CENTAG requested the German Ministry of Defense to furnish 7 officers and 8 enlisted men as a nucleus of the German increment. Increased strength of the German forces assigned to CENTAG in the past year and the growing capability of the national territorial forces had increased the scope and complexity of emergency and operational planning to the degree that integration at an early date would be highly desirable so that CENTAG could discharge its planning functions. Also, the integration of German personnel would facilitate the transition of the currently small staff into the larger peacetime organization that had been proposed to LANDCENT. This proposal envisaged a German increment of 30 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 124 enlisted men, including headquarters command and support troops.³⁴

Pending approval of the new CENTAG peacetime headquarters organization by higher NATO headquarters, General Hodges decided to activate an interim peacetime establishment, if the Germans were willing to contribute their contingent. This interim headquarters was to comprise 17 American (8 officer and 9 enlisted), 15 German (7 officer and 8 enlisted), and 17 French (7 officer and 10 enlisted) personnel.³⁵

On 17 December 1958 LANDCENT informed CENTAG that the reorganization proposal forwarded the previous month was considered a big step toward creating a fully integrated, international, and independent headquarters. The augmentation by German personnel--in addition to the French already present--would provide a most useful nucleus that could be expanded to a full headquarters staff once the organization had been agreed upon. Certain points would need clarification before the study of the CENTAG proposal could be completed by LANDCENT. For instance, while it was clear that the two American assistant chiefs of staff would be assigned to USAREUR headquarters in peacetime, and would take up their CENTAG posts only on exercises and upon mobilization, the peacetime duties envisaged for the French and German assistant chiefs of staff would have to be defined. Since all deputies were to be American officers, it was suggested that the French and German assistant chiefs of staff should be included in the peacetime establishment and should become thoroughly familiar with their

³³Ltr, USAREUR CofS to COMLANDCENT, 22 Nov 58, subj: Peacetime Organization of Headquarters CENTAG (U). AEAGC-CA. NATO SECRET.

³⁴Ltr, USAREUR CofS to Ger Fed Min of Def, 22 Nov 58, subj: Integration of German Personnel into CENTAG Headquarters. NATO CONF. In USAREUR SGS CAG ORG 250/H53.

³⁵Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COMLANDCENT, 26 Nov 58, subj: Peacetime and Wartime Headquarters. CEN-GC-OP 2500 GC. NATO SECRET.

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work. Additional information was also requested on the exact functions of the support units and on the necessity for locating the headquarters near Mannheim rather than in Heidelberg. The provision of housing being a national responsibility, no charge against NATO funds could be accepted for the construction of such housing. CENTAG was therefore asked to furnish housing for German and French personnel on a rental basis, if possible.³⁶

Shortly after receiving this letter USAREUR decided to take some action pending availability of German and French mobilization designees to the CENTAG wartime establishment. The USAREUR staff divisions were instructed to provide American personnel within their capabilities, so that vacant Allied spaces could be filled on the appropriate CENTAG alert and mobilization rosters.³⁷ However, since the peacetime duties of CENTAG headquarters did not justify the assignment of four general officers as assistant chiefs of staff, it was envisaged that all assistant chief of staff positions would be filled by mobilization designees who during peacetime were assigned positions and functions on national establishments as directed by national authorities.³⁸ In its reply, LANDCENT commented that since the French Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, and the German Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, were mobilization designees, national authorities would experience difficulties in determining suitable peacetime national appointments for these officers that would allow them to assume their CENTAG appointments only on mobilization and for NATO training exercises.³⁹ During a briefing held on 26 March 1959 General Hodes decided that the CENTAG peacetime Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G1 and G4, should not occupy both a CENTAG and a national position.⁴⁰

The revised organization proposed to LANDCENT in April 1959 incorporated the suggestions made on this and other subjects. The positions of Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G1 and G4, would be filled on a full-time duty basis by officers with the rank of colonel. This would allow the incumbents to become thoroughly familiar with the problems in their respective fields during peacetime and to be fully qualified in the event of an emergency. At the same time, the chiefs of special staff divisions were upgraded to the rank of colonel, thus making their grade commensurate with their responsibilities. There were only three American

³⁶ Ltr, Hq LANDCENT to CENTAG, 17 Dec 58, subj: Peacetime Organization of Headquarters CENTAG. 4030.16A/544/58. NATO SECRET.

³⁷ DF, USAREUR ACoS G3 to all stf divs, 4 Jan 59. subj: CENTAG Headquarters Wartime Organization. AEAGC-CA. NATO CONF.

³⁸ Cable SX-1203, Hq CENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 14 Jan 59. NATO RESTRICTED.

³⁹ Ltr, LANDCENT to USAREUR, 27 Jan 59, subj: Peacetime Organization of Headquarters CENTAG. 4030.16 ALC/PA/544/59. NATO SECRET.

⁴⁰ DF, CENTAG to USAREUR CoS, 7 Apr 59, subj as above. In USAREUR SGS CAG ORG 250/15-1959. NATO SECRET.

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officers in this proposed organization who also held peacetime national positions: COMCENTAG and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G2 and G3, who occupied the respective positions in USAREUR headquarters during peacetime. Moreover, upon reexamining the problem of location it was found that suitable facilities in the Heidelberg area could be made available to CENTAG headquarters. Because of the many advantages of establishing CENTAG headquarters in the Heidelberg area, further development of comparative cost estimates for moving to the Mannheim area had been discontinued. However, since family housing was at a premium in the Heidelberg area, no USAREUR housing could be made available to meet CENTAG requirements for other than American personnel.⁴¹

By April 1959 the following steps had been taken to organize CENTAG headquarters on a separate, integrated, and international basis: The former CENTAG Plans Staff had been physically separated from the USAREUR staff divisions and had been redesignated CENTAG headquarters. The full-time participation of American personnel had been increased, and the Federal Ministry of Defense was providing a nucleus of German officers and other ranks. To insure further progress in this direction, a 3-phase program was proposed to LANDCENT for approval. During the first phase, covering the three months after approval of the CENTAG peacetime establishment plan, the personnel were to be increased to approximately one-half of the proposed strength by rank and nationality. Within 6 months after the approval, the personnel of CENTAG headquarters would be increased to 100 percent of authorized strength. The U.S. forces would render support on a reimbursable basis up to the end of this second phase. During the last phase the support units would be completely organized and could thus assume their responsibility.⁴² This proposal had not been finally approved by 30 June 1959. The USAREUR Chief of staff meanwhile explored the possibility of revising current policy, according to which personnel spaces for CENTAG expansion would come from the corresponding USAREUR staff divisions. He suggested that the possibilities of drawing spaces from outside USAREUR headquarters or of levying all--rather than the corresponding--divisions be investigated.⁴³

5. Atomic Delivery Weapons Support Organization

Toward the end of 1956 the United States Government had agreed to provide atomic delivery weapons⁴⁴ to its NATO allies. In February 1957 US EUCOM had been authorized to permit the MAAG's in Holland, Norway,

⁴¹Ltr, CENTAG CofS to COMLANDCENT, 13 Apr 59, subj as above. NATO SECRET (info used CONF). In file above.

⁴²Ibid. NATO SECRET (info used CONF)

⁴³Daily Summary of Act Proc through SGS, 13 Jun 59. SECRET.

⁴⁴At various times the terms "modern weapons," "advanced weapons," "special weapons," and "guided missiles" have been used rather indiscriminately and more or less interchangeably. As of August 1959 the JCS-preferred usage was "atomic delivery weapons."

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Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Turkey, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany to start discussions with the host countries.⁴⁵ The following May the Department of the Army had indicated that USAREUR would have primary responsibility for the logistical support of all atomic delivery systems furnished to NATO countries, and in September 1957 a US EUCOM letter of instructions (LOI) specifically assigned to CINCUSAREUR the responsibility for over-all coordination and the provision of assistance and consultative service for introducing surface-to-air missiles into non-U.S. NATO forces.⁴⁶

Up to this point only the provision of the weapons delivery systems had been considered, but in December 1957 President Eisenhower had announced in Paris that the United States would establish in Europe a stockpile of atomic warheads for NATO.⁴⁷ Then, in June 1958, another US EUCOM LOI assigned to CINCUSAREUR primary responsibility for assistance and support of the program to introduce surface-to-surface missiles, in addition to surface to air missiles, into the NATO forces.⁴⁸ Throughout this period USAREUR had prepared and several times revised a plan for accomplishing its responsibilities in these fields, but the draft plan had not been approved by the beginning of FY 1959. At that time USAREUR's responsibilities included three major areas: the provision of assistance and consultative service; logistical support, to include maintenance, of the missile systems; and the provision of support and custody of atomic warhead stockpiles.⁴⁹ Undoubtedly, the most significant aspect of this question was the provision of custody for the nuclear components. US CINCEUR's basic concept of control was that--in accordance with U.S. law--the nuclear weapons would be placed with a U.S. custodial organization that would be physically positioned with or near the non-U.S. NATO delivery systems units. Thus, the warheads would be readily accessible to the forces that would deliver them and at the same time would remain under U.S. control until released.⁵⁰ These functions had been assigned to USAREUR because technical direction and guidance of the U.S. support units could be best exercised by the component commander of the service.

⁴⁵ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 147, 174-75. SECRET.

⁴⁶ (1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 199-200. SECRET; (2) DF, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to CofS, 22 Jun 59, subj: EUCOM Missile Policy (U). AEAGC-MA. CONF.

⁴⁷ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 53, p. 144. SECRET.

⁴⁸ DF, 22 Jun 59, cited above. CONF.

⁴⁹ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 144-45, 199, 200-201. SECRET.

⁵⁰ US CINCEUR Plan for Support of the NATO Special Ammunition Program (U) (US CINCEUR SUP SASP (U)). USAREUR AC 3854. TOP SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

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furnishing the weapon. The unified commander was not to become involved in what were primarily uniservice considerations.⁵¹

According to SHAPE criteria, three types of facilities would be required: custodial sites, where weapons would be stored and simple maintenance would be performed; support sites, where additional weapons would be stored and more complicated types of maintenance performed; and depot sites, where the most complicated types of maintenance would be performed and reserve stocks of weapons would be stored.⁵² The USAREUR support plan, which was published in October 1958, provided for artillery missile warhead support detachments to be stationed with or near the non-U.S. NATO delivery units to fulfill the first function, and for ordnance general support and ordnance depot support companies to meet the second and third requirements, respectively. These units would be assigned to one or more artillery warhead support group headquarters, which, in turn, would be assigned to USAREUR.⁵³

Later, however, in light of the experience gained in Turkey,⁵⁴ General Hodes believed that the USAREUR plan might have to be changed. Specifically, the very long communication and supply lines between USAREUR and the support detachments in Turkey were considered to be a disadvantage; if the detachments were commanded by JUSMAT instead of USAREUR there would be closer command supervision and a shorter line of communication. Moreover, the expected reductions in travel and per diem funds available to USAREUR would curtail staff supervision visits from Germany. Thus, US CINCEUR was asked to reconsider his decision that USAREUR command the support units in such remote areas as Turkey, Greece, and the Scandinavian countries.⁵⁵

General Palmer's reply was not received until April 1959, by which time General C. D. Eddleman had assumed command. The reply merely reaffirmed that the component commanders could most effectively command the support detachments.⁵⁶

⁵¹Cable EC-9-3144, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jun 58. USAREUR SMC IN 4899. SECRET.

⁵²ACE Plan for the NATO Special Ammunition Storage (sic), Sep 58. SHAPE/128/58. COSMIC TS.

⁵³USAREUR Support Plan for Advanced U.S. Army Weapons in Non-U.S. NATO Forces (U) (Sup for ADUSW), 27 Oct 58, Vol. I, pp. 14-15, 22. USAREUR/GC 108-173/27 Oct 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

⁵⁴For further details, see Chapter 7, Logistics.

⁵⁵Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen W. B. Palmer, Dep US CINCEUR, 16 Feb 59, atchd to omt 7, USAREUR G3 to Dep CinC, 12 Feb 59, subj: Command Relationship--NATO Atomic Stockpile (U). AEAGC-NA 250/15. SECRET.

⁵⁶Ltr, Gen Palmer to Gen C. D. Eddleman, CINCUSAREUR, 17 Apr 59, w/ handwritten note, 21 Apr 59, sgd EFC /Maj Gen E. F. Cardwell, USAREUR Dep CofS for Adv Wpns & GM/. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 250/17 (RP) Emergency Planning Files--Special Weapons.

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Meanwhile, USAREUR headquarters had been considering the most effective means of carrying out its responsibilities for support of the NATO atomic delivery weapons program. In addition to the three support functions performed by USAREUR, the negotiation of service-to-service arrangements with the Army of the recipient country required theater-level planning and coordination. Contacts had to be made at high levels--both civilian and military--and the policy adopted in all such dealings had to be uniform. Throughout FY 1959 these functions were performed by the USAREUR general staff divisions within their normal fields of interest and responsibility.⁵⁷ Also, a command organization was needed that could effectively control the warhead support units. Any such organization would have to depend to the maximum upon existing subordinate headquarters. It would also have to facilitate the wartime operational control of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile support units by the NATO land and air commanders, respectively, in the Central Region. Moreover, such an organization would have to facilitate coordination with the MAAG's, ministries of defense, and military forces of the recipient countries. Finally, it would have to be so constituted as to permit expansion in size to meet the eventual 1963 requirements without structural revisions.⁵⁸ These requirements could be met best by U.S. Seventh Army commanding the support groups in the CENTAG/FOURATAF area, by USASMTAF commanding the support groups in Italy, Greece, and Turkey, and by establishing a Northern Warhead Support Brigade, directly subordinate to USAREUR, to command the support groups in the NORTHAG/TWOATAF area, Denmark, and Norway. No changes would be needed in the USAREUR headquarters organization.⁵⁹

When General Eddleman was briefed on the subject, he rejected this proposal and directed that an additional staff division be formed to accomplish USAREUR's headquarters responsibilities for atomic delivery weapons. The new division was to be staffed with the G3 and G4 personnel then engaged in this activity without any addition from other sources. It was to become operational on 1 July and would serve as the nucleus of a warhead support brigade headquarters directly subordinate to USAREUR that would be activated during FY 1960 and would command all warhead support groups except for the one in Italy, which would remain subordinate to USASMTAF.⁶⁰

⁵⁷The major portion of these responsibilities, of course, fell to the G3 and G4 divisions, each of which had a separate branch that handled NATO atomic delivery weapons matters. For details of the operations in this field of interest, see Chapter 7, Logistics.

⁵⁸DF, G3 to CofS, 25 Apr 59, subj: USAREUR Organization for Non-US NATO Support. AEAGC. SECRET.

⁵⁹(1) Ibid., with Tab O & P. (2) Cmt 3, G3 to CofS, 30 Apr 59, to above. Both SECRET.

⁶⁰Memo for rec, USAREUR SGS, 15 May 59, subj: G-3 Briefing on Staff Organization and Command Structure for MAP. AEAGS. CONF.

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The NATO Advanced Weapons Division, Headquarters USAREUR, was established effective 1 July 1959.⁶¹

6. Reorganization of the Logistical Command Structure

a. Change in the Seventh Army Rear Boundary. During Exercise LION BLEU, in March 1958, General Hodes had criticized the duplication of supply effort between Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR in the Western Area Command. Early in FY 1959 a subcommittee of the USAREUR Supply and Maintenance Board, which had been established to study this problem, recommended that the Seventh Army rear boundary be moved from the French-German border to the escarpment located at distances varying from 10 to 17 miles west of the west bank of the Rhine; concurrently, WACOM would become a subarea of the USACOMZEUR Advance Section. Seventh Army, however, preferred that the west bank of the river itself should be the boundary, since the escarpment was difficult to define topographically. This recommendation was approved, and the rear boundary was changed effective 15 September 1958.⁶²

While this decision extended the USACOMZEUR area of responsibility to the west bank of the Rhine, CINCUSAREUR did not want WACOM to be absorbed into the Advance Section, because USACOMZEUR would thus have assumed administrative functions in Germany. Moreover, the problem of supply effort duplication still remained to be solved.⁶³

If WACOM was not assigned to either USACOMZEUR or Seventh Army, it would constitute an additional separate command reporting directly to CINCUSAREUR both in peacetime and war, which was at variance with General Hodes' wishes to reduce the number of such commands. Moreover, because of its wartime mission--including responsibility for area security and rear area damage control--WACOM would be inserted as a separate command between the Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR areas of responsibility, with units assigned to both commands stationed on its territory.⁶⁴

⁶¹USAREUR GO 205, 16 Jun 59. UNCLAS.

⁶²(1) Memo for rec, Maj W. F. Veaudry, USAREUR G4 Mgt Br, 11 Aug 58, subj: Notes from Meeting with General Westphalinger, General Fleming, Colonel Taylor, and Colonel Stillwell, 7 Aug 1958. CONF. In G4 Mgt Br.
(2) Cable SX-6274, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 25 Aug 58. SECRET.
(3) Memo for rec, Maj Veaudry, 28 Aug 58, subj: Study on WACOM, Army Rear Boundary, Elimination of Duplication of Supply Organization in WACOM Area. CONF. In G4 Mgt Br.

⁶³Memo for rec, Maj Veaudry, 11 Aug 58, cited above. CONF.

⁶⁴Memo, Maj Gen H. R. Westphalinger, ACoS G4, to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Sep 58, subj: Establishment of Seventh Army Rear Boundary and Elimination of Duplication of Supply Activities in the WACOM Area (U). CONF. In G4 Mgt Br, docu nr 6098-8.

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A solution was found by leaving the peacetime missions of WACOM unchanged, while assigning it in wartime--to take effect at ORA--to USACOMZEUR. Certain units stationed in the WACOM area would be assigned to Seventh Army at ORA. Finally, to eliminate the duplication of supply functions, the following mission changes were directed:

(1) The responsibility for issuing chemical supplies to troops in the WACOM area was transferred from the 85th Chemical Battalion, a Seventh Army unit, to the Chemical Supply Section, Kaiserslautern General Depot;

(2) The storage and issue mission for class V supplies at Rhine Ordnance Barracks was transferred from Seventh Army to USACOMZEUR; and

(3) The Seventh Army Engineer Depot was to be relocated east of the Rhine as soon as facilities became available.

These changes were to take effect not later than 1 November 1958.⁶⁵

b. The NACOM-WACOM Merger and the Second Boundary Change. In the meantime, however, another problem had arisen. SHAPE ACE Directive MC 36/1 defined, for NATO purposes, the land combat and communications zones and established the respective responsibilities of national territorial and Allied commanders. According to this directive, Allied commanders were to be responsible for over-all defense and security of their forces and communications; national authorities would retain sovereignty in the communications zone and, in consultation with Allied commanders, would be responsible for the general defense and security of these areas, to include the defense of lines of communication running through their countries. Also, the Central Europe Joint Emergency Defense Plan (CE JEDP) 2-58 delineated army rear boundaries and the combat zone on the ground. The authority to change these boundaries was vested in SHAPE, and the action taken in September 1958 concerning the Seventh Army rear boundary was clearly at variance with the above NATO terms of reference.⁶⁶

In October both LANDCENT and the West German Ministry of Defense inquired about USAREUR's intentions regarding the area between the Rhine and the Franco-German border.⁶⁷ USAREUR reassured the German authorities

⁶⁵(1) Memo for rec, Maj R. L. Gruenther, G4 Mgt Br, 9 Sep 58, subj: Approval of Rear Boundary, WACOM Study. In G4 Mgt Br. (2) DF, USAREUR ACofS G4 to G3, et al., 10 Sep 58, subj: Elimination of Duplication of Supply Activities and Determination of the Status of WACOM (U). AEAGD-MN 250/H5.3. Both CONF.

⁶⁶Memo, Col D. R. Ward, C/USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br, to ACofS G3, 21 Oct 58, subj: Army Rear Boundary (U). AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

⁶⁷(1) Ibid. (2) Stf Study, unsd /USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br/, 3 Apr 59, subj: CENTAG Rear Area. SECRET. In G3 Plans & Ploy Br 250/15 Organization Planning (CENTAG Rear Area).

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that the organizational changes did not affect the delineation of the land combat zone.⁶⁸

During the following months the merger of WACOM and NACOM was being considered as a means to simplify the administrative and logistical structure. When General Hodes decided to accomplish this merger, effective 1 March 1959, the commanding general of NACOM was also appointed the Deputy Chief of Staff for the CENTAG Rear Area, which was defined as that portion of the Federal Republic of Germany lying west of the Rhine River and within CENTAG's area of responsibility.⁶⁹

Actually, under the NATO concepts (MC 36/1) the German territorial command--in this case, Wehrbereichskommando (WBK) IV--was the proper agency to assume responsibility for rear area damage control, area security, refugee control, and allocation of national resources in the CENTAG area west of the Rhine. Since the German command lacked the immediate capability of assuming such responsibility, however, the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for the CENTAG Rear Area had been created as a temporary solution that would both relieve USACOMZEUR of a NATO role in Germany and provide an American commander with over-all responsibility for the former WACOM area.⁷⁰ In no case, however, was it intended that the new CENTAG deputy chief of staff would become involved in the operation of supply installations in his area of responsibility. That function would remain with the appropriate national supply authorities, and he would concern himself primarily with rear area damage control, security, traffic control, and liaison.⁷¹

However, this still left USACOMZEUR with the wartime responsibility for maintaining the U.S. national line of communication through the former WACOM area, to include liaison with the German WBK IV for support of U.S.

⁶⁸ Memo for rec, Col R. J. Meeker, C/USAREUR G3 NATO Asst Br, 31 Oct 58, subj: Conference at Bonn, 29 October, Concerning Army Rear Boundary (U). CONF. In file above, 250/18 Emergency Planning (Rear Area Defense).

⁶⁹ Cable SX-1948, USAREUR to NACOM, 19 Feb 59. CONF.

⁷⁰ (1) Memo for rec, Maj Veaudry, 12 Mar 59, subj: Briefing for CINCUSAREUR Regarding Wartime Disposition of that Area West of the Rhine Formerly Known as WACOM, 12 Mar 59, 1000 Hours (U). (2) Cmt 3, USAREUR SGS to G3, 18 Mar 59, subj: Ltr Gen Brown fr Gen O'Neill, dtd 7 March 1959 (sic). Both SECRET. Both in file above.

⁷¹ (1) DF, USAREUR G4 to G3, 14 Mar 59, subj: Problems Presented by Colonel Fyke, G3 NACOM, in Implementation of the Directive Appointing General Mace Deputy Chief of Staff CENTAG, Rear Area (U). AEAGD-MN. CONF. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen F. J. Brown, USAREUR CofS, to Maj Gen E. J. O'Neill, CG, USACOMZEUR, 18 Mar 59. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br 250/15 Organization Planning (CENTAG Rear Area).

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forces.⁷² Efforts were made to relieve USACOMZEUR of this wartime responsibility within the Federal Republic of Germany.⁷³

Another complicating factor was that the new Seventh Army rear boundary split the German WBK IV in two. WBK IV was thus required to coordinate with Seventh Army on one side of the Rhine and with the Deputy Chief of Staff for the CENTAG Rear Area--and/or USACOMZEUR--on the other; the Germans would have preferred a single point of contact between CENTAG and WBK IV. The experience of Exercise TOP WEIGHT was to be instrumental in finding solutions to these problems.⁷⁴

As a result of the exercise,⁷⁵ the Seventh Army rear boundary was moved back to the German western border along the Belgian, Luxembourg, and French eastern borders, effective 15 May 1959.⁷⁶

c. Revised NATO and National Responsibilities. When the Seventh Army rear boundary reverted to the German border, the army commander was simultaneously assigned administrative responsibility for the U.S. sectors west of the Rhine River, effective at ORA, or at GAO, or at the direction of CINCUSAREUR. In peacetime, however, NACOM was to be responsible for all area-command-type functions, except for USAFE installations. NACOM would also pass to Seventh Army control at ORA or GAO, and USACOMZEUR was relieved of its former responsibilities in the area. Operational and emergency plans had to be revised accordingly; this affected noncombatant evacuation planning in particular.⁷⁷

Moreover, in delegating his responsibilities, COMCENTAG designated the commanding general of Seventh Army as the NATO commander responsible for executing MC 36/1 in the CENTAG area west of the Rhine, to include rear area security and damage control, refugee control, and highway traffic regulation and control. He would also be the single U.S. point of contact with appropriate national territorial commanders, with German

⁷²(1) Ltr, Gen O'Neill to Gen Brown, 7 Mar 59. SECRET. In file above. (2) DF, USAREUR Engr to ACofS G4, 13 Mar 59, subj: CENTAG Rear (NACOM) Draft Working Paper (C). AEAEN-MO 250/17. SECRET.

⁷³Cmt 3, USAREUR SGS to G3, 18 Mar 59, cited above. SECRET.

⁷⁴Stf Study, USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br, 3 Apr 59, cited above. SECRET.

⁷⁵For more details, see Chapter 4, Training.

⁷⁶(1) Critique of Exercise TOP WEIGHT 1959, 28 Apr 59. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Tng & Maneuvers Sec. (2) Cable SX-3465, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 23 Apr 59. SECRET.

⁷⁷(1) Cable SX-3691, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 4 May 59. SECRET. (2) Cmt 4, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 14 May 59, to cmt 3, SGS to G3, 18 Mar 59, cited above. CONF.

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governmental agencies at the Land (state) level, and with both NATO and non-NATO commands having troops or facilities in his area of responsibility.

Finally, the commanding general of Seventh Army would designate a subordinate commander to assume administrative responsibility of the area west of the Rhine under emergency conditions; the commander so designated would be the sole U.S. point of contact with national territorial commanders and German governmental agencies below the Land level in his area.⁷⁸

This meant that Seventh Army now had sole and complete responsibility for area command, tactical, and retail logistical operations in the former WACOM sector in wartime. This responsibility included the utilization of assigned NATO-committed logistical troops in the support of Seventh Army's tactical operations; no international command was to be interposed between the supported forces and the national agencies furnishing the support.⁷⁹

While not a complete solution of all the problems and questions raised during the attempts to establish a more effective logistical command structure, this reorganization at least met several important requirements:

(1) The new organization eliminated the need for USACOMZEUR to exercise any wartime retail logistical functions within the Federal Republic of Germany.

(2) As desired by both USAREUR and the Federal Ministry of Defense, it provided a single U.S. point of contact for NATO matters in the rear area.

(3) One command, WACOM, had been eliminated, with consequent simplification of U.S. command relationships.

(4) A U.S. commander subordinate to Seventh Army was to exercise over-all control of the CENTAG rear area, without interference by another command--possibly a foreign one--between the combat forces of Seventh Army and their logistical support units.

⁷⁸(1) Cable SX-3691, cited above. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-3753, CENTAG to Seventh Army, et al., 6 May 59. NATO SECRET.

⁷⁹Incl, to 1st Ind, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 27 May 59, to ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, n.d., subj: NATO Integration of Logistics Studies (U). ECJD-L 5920. SECRET.

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CHAPTER 2

USAREUR's Role in International Crises

7. The New Berlin Crisis

a. The Political Buildup. During the second half of 1958 the Russians took actions designed to achieve their objectives in Berlin and in Western Europe as a whole. These actions included repeated attempts by the East German regime to establish a legal basis for challenging the occupation of Berlin by the Western Allies; increased harassment of land, water, and air access routes to the city, with the immediate goal of forcing the Western Powers to recognize the German Democratic Republic (GDR); and a series of declarations made by government and other officials.

Among the latter declarations was a statement by the Soviet Berlin Commandant on 13 September 1958, according to which the Russians considered the GDR as competent to deal with the Western Allies on all matters affecting Berlin and East Germany.¹

b. USAREUR Emergency Plan (EP) 103. On 3 October 1958 USAREUR published a new version of EP 103, which specified the means for reopening the access routes to Berlin if they were blockaded.

The plan was based on the assumption that, if the Russians initiated harassing measures to restrict access to Berlin, it would be of vital importance to demonstrate at once the United States' firm determination not to tolerate such action. If the Russian harassment continued to threaten Western access to Berlin, Allied security interests would require

¹(1) Report, "Legal Basis for Presence of Allies in Berlin Zones," by Capt K. D. Heaton, IAI DCS/Intel Hq USAFE (ADVON), in USAFE Air ISUM, Jan 59, pp. 13-16. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Sp Intel Est 2-59, 28 Feb 59, pp. 5-10. SECRET.

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taking immediate and forceful action to counter this challenge even though such countermeasures might lead to general war.²

The following two courses of action were considered as alternatives:

(1) Course A: The Use of Limited Forces to Determine Russian Intentions. In this course of action a task force consisting of one tank-infantry platoon and a convoy of five 2½-ton trucks were to test the Russian intentions to resist passage through the road check point located at Helmstedt on the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn. In conjunction, a corresponding force from West Berlin was to perform a similar mission at the Babelsberg road check point at the other end of the Autobahn.

(2) Course B: The Use of Limited U.S. Military Forces to Reopen Road Access to Berlin. In this instance a force ranging from a company-size up to a battalion-size tank-infantry task force, together with the 5-truck convoy, was to reopen the same access route to Berlin. A similar force from Berlin, only limited to company-size, was to take the same action at the Babelsberg check point.

Under both courses of action only such force was to be used as was required. The barriers were to be crashed, if necessary. U.S. units were not to open fire unless fired upon. If no resistance was offered upon crashing the Helmstedt barrier, the convoy would proceed to Berlin under course of action B. In the event of resistance, the task force was to use sufficient force to enable the convoy to proceed to Berlin, and/or join up with the corresponding force coming from Berlin.³

✓ c. Rising Pressure. Walter Ulbricht, speaking for the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) Party in Berlin on 29 October 1958, stated that Berlin was an East German city and questioned the legality of the presence of Allied forces in Berlin. According to him, their presence in the city contradicted international law which had been agreed to by the Four Powers. He added that the agreements under which East Germany had assumed sovereignty from the U.S.S.R. included the entire territory of Berlin.⁴

✓ In response to the rising pressure on West Berlin, General Hodes directed the U.S. Commander, Berlin, to perform such duties as the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Berlin might require in the event of an emergency involving the security of the U.S. forces. Further, he was to take such measures as were considered essential to safeguard the security of the

²USAREUR EP 103 (U), 3 Oct 58. AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. TS.

³Ibid. TS.

⁴The New York Times (Intl ed.), 29 Nov 58. UNCLAS.

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U.S. forces. Further, he was to take such measures as were considered essential to safeguard the security of the American troops in the U.S. sector of Berlin and within that sector to act as the deputy of CINCUSAREUR.⁵

On 10 November 1958 Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev told a Polish-Russian meeting in Moscow's Lenin Stadium: "The time has come for the powers which signed the Potsdam Agreement to give up the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin and thus make it possible to create a normal atmosphere in the capital of the German Democratic Republic." He announced that the U.S.S.R. would hand over to the East German government those functions in Berlin that were still with Soviet organs. He charged that the Western Powers had violated the 1945 Potsdam Agreement on all points except the Four-Power status of Berlin; he also accused the West of using Berlin to carry on subversive activities against the U.S.S.R. and other Warsaw Pact countries. He added, ". . . and on top of everything, they enjoy the right of unhampered communication between West Berlin and West Germany by air, rail, highway, and waterways of the German Democratic Republic. . . they have long ago abolished that legal basis on which their stay in Berlin is rested."⁶

On 11 November 1958 the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn named the U.S. Commander, Berlin, as his personal representative in Berlin and authorized him to act in his behalf.⁷

Soviet harassment continued during the month of November, particularly through the halting of U.S. vehicles on their way to Berlin.⁸

d. The Crisis. The culmination of the harassment came on 27 November 1958, when the Soviet Government declared as invalid and abrogated all protocols and agreements entered into by the U.S.S.R. with respect to Berlin. The Soviet Union had resolved to abolish the occupation regime in Berlin. All official contacts between the Soviet and Allied military and governmental officials associated with the occupation status of Berlin were to cease. Berlin was to be demilitarized and declared a "free city."⁹

⁵Ltr, Gen Hodes to US Comdr Berlin, 7 Nov 58, subj: Letter of Instructions. AEAAG-X. SECRET.

⁶The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 11 Nov 58. UNCLAS.

⁷DF, USAREUR Polit Ad to CofS, 14 Nov 58, subj: Letter of Authority from Ambassador Bruce to USCOB. AEAPO. CONF.

⁸The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 16 Nov 58. UNCLAS.

⁹Cable 320, US Msn Berlin to State Dept, 12 Nov 58. USAREUR SMC IN 2725. SECRET.

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U Accordingly, the Soviet military forces were to be removed from East Berlin. The Western Powers were to negotiate directly with the GDR on the withdrawal of their garrisons from West Berlin, with the Soviet Union offering its good offices in these negotiations. If no agreement to that end was achieved by 27 May 1959, the Soviet Union would carry out its plans by unilateral agreement with the GDR.¹⁰

U These Soviet declarations raised two sharp issues. The first involved Western access to Berlin guaranteed by a series of Four-Power agreements. Control of the routes by the East German regime, which the Western Powers did not recognize, held the threat of a new Berlin blockade. The second, and larger, issue concerned the Western commitments on Berlin and the responsibility to achieve German unification with Berlin as the capital. The Soviet proposals to transfer occupation authority to the GDR represented a unilateral abrogation of those responsibilities, with unforeseeable consequences to the United States' position in Western Europe and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹¹

U e. American Reaction. The Allies had no alternative but to take the position that they would maintain their garrisons in Berlin. If they agreed to deal with the GDR, they would be unable to do so. Even a de facto recognition of the GDR by the Western Allies would seriously undermine the existing basis for Allied occupation of Berlin. Furthermore, de facto recognition would give the Communists an increased stranglehold on the access routes to Berlin and thus place them in a better position to force eventual Allied de jure recognition of the German Democratic Republic. There was little reason to believe that the GDR would not try to interfere with air traffic as the Russians had in 1948-1949.¹²

U In preparation for difficulties that might arise because of the Soviet threat to turn the Autobahn and railway check points over to the GDR, on 29 November the U.S. Commander, Berlin, instructed military convoy and rail commanders on the actions to be taken if GDR representatives interfered at border check points. In essence, U.S. military and privately owned vehicle operators as well as military train commanders were to refuse to accept GDR documentation of travel authorizations as a prerequisite to entry into the East Zone of Germany. If this policy led to a self-imposed blockade of the ground access routes to Berlin on the part of the United States, a determination of the method to be employed to reopen those access routes would be made by the United States Government.¹³

¹⁰ The New York Times (Intl ed.), 29 Nov 58. UNCLAS.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² (1) Cable 320, cited above. SECRET. (2) The New York Times (Intl ed.), 29 Nov 58. UNCLAS. (3) Cable 1160, US Emb Bonn to Sec State, 2 Dec 58. USAREUR SMC IN 586. SECRET.

¹³ (1) Cable COB-158, US Comdr Berlin to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Nov 58. (2) Cable SX-7967, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 29 Nov 58. USAREUR SMC IN 6980. Both SECRET.

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f. Allied Counteraction. On 16 December 1958 the United States, the United Kingdom, and France reaffirmed that they would keep their garrisons in West Berlin, that they would uphold their right to free access to the city, and that they would not permit East Germany to control their movements into Berlin. U

On the following day the North Atlantic Council declared that no state had the right to withdraw unilaterally from its international engagements. The Soviet denunciation of the inter-Allied agreements on Berlin could in no way deprive the other parties of their rights or relieve the Soviet Union of its obligations. The council fully associated itself with the views expressed on the subject by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany in their statement rejecting the Soviet proposal. The demands expressed by the Soviet Government had created a serious situation that would have to be faced with determination. Each member state had assumed responsibilities in regard to the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the Western position in that city. The member states of NATO could not approve a solution of the Berlin question that jeopardized the right of the three Western Powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required it and that did not assure freedom of communications between that city and the free world. The Soviet Union would be responsible for any action that had the effect of hampering or endangering this freedom. The 2.2 million inhabitants of West Berlin had just reaffirmed, in a free vote, their overwhelming approval and support for that position. U

The Berlin question could be settled only in the framework of an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on Germany as a whole. The Western Powers had repeatedly declared themselves ready to examine this question as well as those of European security and disarmament. They were still ready to discuss all of these problems.¹⁴ U

Before the end of 1958 the Soviet Union indicated that its 6-month limit for the negotiation of a new status was not rigid. At the same time the United States asserted that former agreements remained in full force and that the Soviet "attempts to undermine the rights of the United States to be in Berlin and to have access thereto were in violation of international agreements."¹⁵ U

g. USAREUR Actions in Early 1959. On 10 January 1959 USAREUR discontinued the practice of issuing temporary license plates for the express purpose of permitting persons whose private vehicles were not normally registered by USAREUR to travel to and from Berlin.¹⁶

¹⁴USAREUR Info Bul 4, Vol. 14, 3 Feb 59, "The Berlin Story." UNCLAS.

¹⁵(1) The Washington Post, 1 Jan 59. UNCLAS. (2) The New York Herald Tribune, 1 Jan 59. UNCLAS.

¹⁶DF, USAREUR AG to CofS, 16 Jan 59, subj: Clearance for Autobahn to Travel to Berlin. AEAAG-AP 265/HI 36. CONF.

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U Early in February the question of patrolling the Autobahn and maintaining armed guards on the trains was under consideration. The U.S. position was that since the agreement guaranteeing access to Berlin was made by the Soviets they had the responsibility for the security of these communications routes. Therefore, the United States reserved the right to patrol the Autobahn and to maintain armed guards on the trains in the event that the Soviets were not present to maintain security. These actions were not to be considered of a warlike nature but, rather, a normal precautionary measure to be taken by any military force in a country with which no peace treaty had been concluded.¹⁷

U Shortly thereafter military police escorts for convoys were initiated. As a result of incidents that had previously occurred, all vehicles carried two drivers and emergency rations and equipment. Transportation and communication traffic increased correspondingly through the remainder of the fiscal year. In addition, the American facilities in the Helmstedt area were expanded and reinforced.¹⁸

During this same month Annex A to USAREUR EP 113 was published. This new annex provided for the air evacuation of certain specified noncombatants, particularly non-U.S. personnel. It prescribed the method of handling these individuals, but did not specify who they were to be. This selection was to be made by U.S. intelligence personnel.¹⁹

U During March 1959 plans were prepared for the activation of a special operations center at USAREUR headquarters in case the Berlin situation necessitated such action. The typical incident that would cause the activation of this operations center would be if the Russians refused to pass a U.S. military convoy over the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn.²⁰

The day after General Eddleman assumed command of USAREUR he amplified the instructions that had previously been given to the U.S. Commander, Berlin. The latter's authority to take the actions he considered essential to safeguard the security of the U.S. troops was reiterated. In addition he was to insure the protection, security, and immunities of U.S. and Allied occupation authorities, their dependents, their employees, and their representatives in the U.S. Sector of Berlin. He was to prepare U.S. plans for the defense of Berlin in the event of an armed attack and coordinate these plans with those

¹⁷ Ltr, Maj Gen F. J. Brown, USAREUR CofS, to Maj Gen B. Hamlett, US Comdr, Berlin, 7 Feb 59. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250 Berlin.

¹⁸ Intvw, Capt J. L. Begley, USAREUR G3 Hist Sec, with Lt Col A. L. Jones (USMC), USAREUR G3 Opn Br, 21 Aug 59. CONF.

¹⁹ Annex A to USAREUR EP 113, 2 Feb 59. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

²⁰ (1) Cable SX-2146, USAREUR to Berlin Comd, 28 Feb 59. (2) DF, USAREUR CofS to distr, 2 Mar 59, subj: USAREUR Operations Center. Both CONF.

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of other Allied occupying powers. He was also to be responsible for the documentation and control of U.S. military trains, vehicles, and convoys between Helmstedt and Berlin in accordance with tripartite agreements. Finally, he was to prepare emergency plans pertaining to U.S. unilateral actions as directed.²¹

h. The New EP 103. As early as February 1959 USAREUR was prepared to act according to a new version of EP 103. With a few minor changes, the two courses of action prescribed in the previous plan were retained. In addition to these, however, the plan specified three other courses of action that expanded on the same theme as before and called for more definite counteraction to a Soviet blockade. These new courses of action were as follows:

(1) Course C. This called for the use of a combat command to reopen the access route in much the same manner as had been prescribed in Courses A and B, but the plan increased the forces involved and made the combat command responsible for assuming control of the Autobahn after it had reopened the access route.

(2) Course D. This was the same as Course C, except that a much larger force--an entire armored division--was to perform the mission.

In courses of action C and D, the forces to be used were to appear at the check point with the proper documentation for passage to Berlin. In addition, the commander of the task force was to present the following message, written in English, German, and Russian, to the gate guard:

"Having been ordered to proceed to Berlin via the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn, I have been instructed to present these travel documents to the Soviet officer in charge of this checkpoint. I will wait 30 minutes for the Soviet officer to approve them. If, after 30 minutes, I have not received the Soviet officer's permission to pass to Berlin with this force, I will pass my convoy and escort through the checkpoint using such measures as are necessary, and proceed to Berlin."

(3) Course X. This course of action was to be followed in order to extricate personnel and equipment detained by Soviet/GDR authorities in the vicinity of Marienborn. This operation required the use of an armored-infantry battalion-size task force. The force was to arrive in the Helmstedt area prior to daylight, and its commander was to present the proper travel documentation to the check point guard along with the following trilingual written message:

"I have been directed by the U.S. authorities to extricate the U.S. personnel and equipment that your forces have detained. I will wait 30

²¹ Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US Comdr, Berlin, 2 Apr 59, subj: Letter of Instructions. AEAGG-PL 250/17. SECRET.

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minutes for you to check with your superiors as to the release of the detained personnel and equipment. If after 30 minutes they are not released, I will extricate them using such measures as are necessary."22

Although in effect for planning during the crisis period of early 1959, the new EP 103 was not officially published until 29 May, two days after the Russian deadline had passed without incident.

i. Troop Movements During the Crisis. In the period immediately preceding the expiration of the Soviet ultimatum USAREUR directed two significant troop movements. The first of these was the deployment of Task Force 11, and the second was the movement of three NORTAF atomic delivery battalions to the NORTHAG area on a rotational basis.

On 1 April Task Force 11--the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment plus attachments--was dispatched, less one battalion, to the Bergen-Hohne training area in the NORTHAG sector, where it stayed until 16 May for the announced intention of "training." On this date the task force returned to its home station leaving one battalion plus the 619th and 541st Engineer Companies at Bergen-Hohne until 31 May. This task force was designated to perform all of the courses of action that the United States planned to take under EP 103 should the access routes to Berlin be cut, with the exception of Course D, which called for a division-size unit. The task force was also to constitute the U.S. contribution to a tripartite force designed to test Russian intentions or to reopen the access routes to Berlin.

u The second movement began on 30 April when 1 of 3 selected NORTAF battalions was deployed to the NORTHAG area. The announced intention of having these atomic delivery units rotate every two weeks in the NORTHAG area during this critical period was for "training" purposes.

u The troop movements executed during this tense period served the dual purpose of placing combat units in favorable locations in the event of an emergency and of enabling the Soviet Military Liaison Mission to become cognizant of this fact.23

j. Other Berlin Plans. By the close of the reporting period several other Berlin plans were undergoing revision. EP 104, the unilateral emergency contingency plan for the U.S. garrison in Berlin, was canceled on

22
USAREUR EP 103, 29 May 59. TS.

23 (1) DF, G3 to CINCUSAREUR, n.d. [Apr 59], subj: USAREUR Requirements in NORTHAG (U). AEAGC-PL 250/17. (2) Intvw, Capt Begley with Col W. B. Richardson, G3 Exec Off, 7 Dec 59. (3) Cable SX-5430, 22 Apr 59, USAREUR to Seventh Army. All TS. (4) Cable SX-3557, 27 Apr 59, USAREUR to Seventh Army. CONF. (5) Cable SX-5900, 13 May 59, USAREUR to Seventh Army. SECRET. (6) Cable SX-2290, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 5 Mar 59. TS.

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28 April 1959. EP's 103, 107, pertaining to the surface movement of supplies if aircraft were prevented from flying to Berlin, and 112, covering the tripartite air evacuation of Berlin, were being revised. A new Annex A was being prepared for EP 113, concerning the evacuation of sensitive U.S. personnel from Berlin.²⁴

8. The Lebanon Operation and Its Aftermath²⁵

a. The Buildup. As a result of a personal appeal by the President, in early March 1957 the Congress of the United States had adopted a resolution which promised both economic and military aid to nations of the Middle East in their struggle against Communism. This so-called Middle East Doctrine pledged the military forces of the United States to the aid of any Middle East nation requesting assistance in its effort to resist overt aggression by Communist forces, when deemed necessary by the President. A little over a year later this Middle East Doctrine was put to the test.

During the spring of 1958 there was increased tension and unrest in the Middle East area. To cope with the increase in world tension, President Eisenhower requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider the Middle East problem.²⁶ In the late spring the unrest in Lebanon flared into an open rebellion against the legitimate government of President Camille Chamoun.²⁷

Despite the fact that the insurrection had started out as an internal conflict between opposing political and religious factions, it thrived subsequently on the antagonism of some Lebanese to the strongly pro-Western policies of the incumbent President and the desire of these factions to follow the course of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). In June the Lebanese Government appealed to the United Nations for aid and at the same time denounced the U.A.R. for intervention in internal Lebanese affairs. Subsequently a group of UN observers was sent to Lebanon, but, because of rebel resistance, they were unable to carry out their mission.

On 15 July President Eisenhower announced: "The insurrection was. . . supported by sizable amounts of arms, ammunition and money, and by personnel infiltrated from Syria to fight against the lawful authorities. . . . I received from President Chamoun of Lebanon an urgent plea that some

²⁴Intvws, Capt Begley with Lt Col R. S. Stacy, 10 Sep 59, and Lt Col A. L. Jones (USMC), 15 Sep 59, USAREUR G3 Opn Br. SECRET.

²⁵For a detailed account of the Lebanon Operation, see USAREUR G3 Hist Sec, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon (U). SECRET.

²⁶The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 15, 16 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

²⁷Dod Fact Sheet Nr 1, The Middle East Crisis, 11 Aug 58, pp. 203. UNCLAS.

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United States forces be stationed in Lebanon to help maintain security and to evidence the concern of the United States for the integrity and independence of Lebanon. In response to this appeal from the government of Lebanon, the United States had dispatched a contingent of United States forces in Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese independence and integrity . . . which we deem vital to the national interest and world peace."²⁸

b. EP 201. CINCELM, as the JCS-designated commander in chief of the specified command for the Middle East (CINCSPCOMME), had developed a joint operation plan for military operations in that area, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed US CINCEUR to provide certain Army, Navy, and Air Force elements to support this plan. The USAREUR contribution to this planning effort was EP 201, governing the movement of Army Task Force (ATF) 201 from Europe to the Middle East. This plan had been coordinated with CINCSPCOMME and CINCUSAFE and approved by US CINCEUR and the Department of the Army.²⁹

(1) USAREUR's Responsibilities. Under EP 201, USAREUR's primary mission in a Middle East emergency was to provide the ATF 201, consisting of two airborne battle groups reinforced with minimum essential combat and service-support elements.³⁰ The task force was to be so organized as to permit its deployment either in whole or in part, depending on the situation. Its combat strength was to be at least sufficient to permit limited operations for approximately one week, its capability for deployment by air was to be immediate, and its follow-up forces were to permit effective limited operations for an indefinite length of time. Thus, it was to be divided into five basic echelons:

Force ALPHA, composed of one reinforced airborne battle group and the task force command group (1,720 personnel), was to be prepared to move from the departure airfield on 12 hours' notice.

Force BRAVO, comprising the second airborne battle group and the advance headquarters of the task force (1,723 personnel), was to move from the departure airfield on 24 hours' notice.

Force CHARLIE was to move by sea or air, depending on the situation. In either case, movement to the port of embarkation or from the departure airfield would begin within 120 hours of notification. This force contained the main headquarters, the task force artillery--consisting of 2

²⁸The New York Times, 16 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

²⁹(1) USAREUR ltr, 26 Feb 58, subj: USAREUR Emergency Plan 201 (Revision of 1 Feb 58) (U). AG 3148. SECRET. (2) Cmt 2, USAREUR G4 to G3, 28 Nov 59, subj: Review of Draft Annual Historical Report, Hq. USAREUR, FY 1959 (U). AEAGD-MN 250/56 GD. SECRET.

³⁰DF, ACoFS G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Sep 58, subj: Wartime Mission and Organization for CENTAG Headquarters. AEAGC-GA. SECRET.

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airborne batteries of 105-mm howitzers, 1 section of a 762-mm rocket battery, and the headquarters element--an airborne reconnaissance troop, an engineer construction company, the advance party of the task force support command, an evacuation hospital unit, elements of an airborne support group, and an Army Security Agency detachment.

Force DELTA was to move by sea, departing from home stations for the ports on 120 hours' notice. It comprised the seatail of the airborne battle groups.

Force ECHO, a 90-mm tank battalion, was to move by sea; it was to initiate movement to the port on 98 hours' notice or remain at its home station prepared to move on 48 hours' notice, as directed.³¹

USAREUR was also to furnish logistical support to the task force until resupply from the United States was established--presumably E/30 to E/45--and to continue to furnish emergency resupply and personnel replacements until the Department of the Army was able to furnish such support.³²

(2) Over-all Command Functions. The general commanding the task force was to assume command of his units when they closed into the marshaling camps, staging areas, departure airfields, or ports of embarkation in Western Europe. The force would pass to the direct command of CINUSAREUR upon departure from the aerial and sea ports of embarkation, and to the operational control of CINCSPCOMME upon arrival in the designated staging area in the Middle East--tentatively identified as Adana and/or Iskenderun, Turkey.³²

In the middle of May 1958 USAREUR conducted a restricted exercise of a portion of EP 201.³⁴ Generally, these and other activities revealed that the USAREUR plans for the support of CINCSPCOMME were sound. Nevertheless, at a critique held early in June 1958 several areas of possible improvement were noted. Accordingly, some changes of a minor nature were made before the plan was actually put into operation.³⁵

c. Alert and Departure. At 0530 hours on 15 July US CINCEUR directed USAREUR to prepare one battle group for deployment to Beirut. USAREUR had

³¹Annex B, Concept of Operations, to USAREUR EP 201, pp. 1-4. SECRET.

³²(1) USAREUR EP 201, p. 3. SECRET. (2) Appendix 2, CINCSPCOMME Staff Augmentation, to Annex E, Personnel, to USAREUR EP 201. SECRET (info used CONF).

³³USAREUR EP 201, p. 9. SECRET.

³⁴Opn GRANDIOS After Act Rept, 1 Jul 58. CONF. In USAREUR G3 Ops Br EP 201 file.

³⁵DF, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to CofS, 23 Jun 58, subj: USAREUR EP 201 Critique (U). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET.

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already alerted Force ALPHA two hours earlier.³⁶

Force ALPHA began movement to Fuerstenfeldbruck airbase on 15 July at 1400 hours, closing there by 1900 hours. The outloading of Force ALPHA was completed at 0800 hours on 16 July, and all elements of the force cleared by 2248 hours.³⁷

On 16 July USAREUR declared a state of "increased vigilance" throughout the command. While this did not constitute a formal USAREUR alert, the readiness of forces to execute alert and operational plans if so ordered was increased. To this end, alert procedures and current operational plans were reviewed, and command posts were maintained on a 24-hour basis by all headquarters down to battalion level. These actions were taken covertly to avoid alarming dependents and indigenous populations.³⁸

By 16 July Force BRAVO was placed on a 12-hour alert status in garrison.³⁹ On the next day the airlift of Force CHARLIE began, and Forces DELTA and ECHO assembled and prepared to move to the ports of embarkation.⁴⁰ On 8 August, when it became clear that a combat situation would not develop, Force BRAVO was placed on a 48-hour alert, which was lifted one week later.⁴¹

d. Reduction in USAREUR's Combat Capabilities. With the withdrawal of the task force units from its overall troop strength, USAREUR was interested in the rapid replacement of these losses. It recommended to the Department of the Army that ground forces be deployed from the United States to Lebanon and that the USAREUR units there be returned to Europe, provided the situation in the Middle East did not deteriorate further. This was considered essential to accomplishing the mission of the U.S. Army in Europe. The Department of the Army agreed to consider this recommendation at the time forces were actually deployed from the United States.⁴²

³⁶ Tab E, to memo, Col G. M. McHaney, C/USAREUR G3 Opns Br, to Col D. C. Clayman, Dep ACofS G3, 6 Aug 58, subj: Airlift Operations TF 201. AEAGC-OP 278/6 GC. SECRET.

³⁷ Incl 4, to Hq, Prov Abn Bde, ATF 201, Comd Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF.

³⁸ Cable SX-5278, USAREUR to subor comds, 16 Jul 58. SECRET. These provisions were not lifted until 2 August, by which time the situation had become relatively stable.

³⁹ Cable SX-5269, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 16 Jul 58. SECRET.

⁴⁰ Cable DA-945015, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jul 58. USAREUR SMC IN 5320. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

⁴¹ Cables SX-5954 and SX-6126, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 8 & 15 Aug 58. SECRET.

⁴² (1) Cable SX-5453, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS for Paohler, 19 Jul 58. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-945380, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jul 58. USAREUR SMC IN 7220. CONF.

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Later in July the U.S. Seventh Army expressed concern over its "critical" losses in combat and combat-support capabilities. The then Seventh Army commander, Lt. Gen. C. D. Eddleman, considered that the crux of the problem lay in the 24th Division's airborne capability. Although the 4-division Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) was maintained in the United States for such emergencies as this, USAREUR had been called upon to provide the forces because it had the immediate capability. As a result, the military potential in Europe had been reduced to meet the needs of another theater.⁴³ Over 2,200 men of the 24th Division were deployed in Lebanon, reducing the division's infantry strength by 20 percent. (Had Force BRAVO been deployed, the division would have lost 40 percent of its infantry and 30 percent of its total strength.) Had a general alert occurred, the 24th Division would have been brought up to strength with replacements from the 8th Division, but this would have reduced seriously the reserves immediately available to Seventh Army.⁴⁴

e. USAREUR's Role in Future Middle East Emergencies. The operation in Lebanon was a successful demonstration of the United States' willingness and ability to respond rapidly to a crisis involving aggression against a friend government. The timely landing of American forces averted a planned coup that would have removed the legitimate government of Lebanon from power. Later, the presence of the U.S. forces and their convincing state of readiness had an important psychological effect in stabilizing the situation.⁴⁵

Perhaps the most important single consideration arising from the Lebanon operation⁴⁶ was whether USAREUR should be required to furnish troops for the support of contingency-type operations in theaters outside of continental Europe.

As previously mentioned, both CINCUSAREUR and the Seventh Army commander held that the weakening of the forces present in Europe impaired

⁴³(1) Cable 5154, Seventh Army cite AETGC-PL to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jul 58. USAREUR SMC IN 9473. (2) Incl, ltr, Lt Gen C. D. Eddleman, CG Seventh Army, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jul 58, to LP, USAREUR SGS to G3, 1 Aug 58 subj: Letter 31 July General Eddleman to General Hodes Re: 24th Infantry Division (U). In G3 Plans & Ploy Br. Both SECRET.

⁴⁴Cmt 2, G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Aug 58, subj: Reduction in USAREUR Combat Capability to Provide Army Forces to SPECOMME. AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

⁴⁵(1) Tabs A & C, to incl, n.d., to ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, subj: Lessons Learned from the Lebanon Operation. AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) AMLANFOR After Act Rept, Part II, Sec III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

⁴⁶The withdrawal of Army units from Lebanon and their return to USAREUR control took place during the period 15 September-25 October 1958. For details of the Army's role in the Lebanon operation, see The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon (U), cited above. SECRET.

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their ability to fulfill the primary missions of defense along the Iron Curtain. However, no reinforcements arrived in Europe before the troops returned from Lebanon at the end of the operation.

(1) Airborne Capability. Current contingency plans for the Middle East were the only reasons for maintaining in Europe divisional forces capable of executing parachute operations. No airborne capability was needed for the execution of USAREUR's own primary missions. To maintain such an airborne capability, specialized personnel and equipment were diverted from USAREUR's limited resources, thus impairing the command's posture along the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, the forces earmarked for contingency operations could not be held on a constant alert status because of the need for field training required for combat readiness. However, if the units were at training areas when a crisis developed, their commitment to an area of difficulty would be delayed.⁴⁷

(2) The Implementation of Middle East Contingency Plans. The requirement that USAREUR have a contingency force in readiness for deployment to the Middle East seemed difficult to reconcile with the fact that STRAC, whose units were specifically organized, trained, equipped, and located for such missions, was being maintained in the continental United States for that purpose. Moreover, for USAREUR, the necessity of supporting ATF 201 divided command responsibility. This not only tended to reduce the efficiency of the contingency operation--which presumably would not be the case if an organization such as STRAC performed such tasks--but also impaired USAREUR's administrative and logistical support capability by imposing an additional workload, with attendant diversion of effort, upon all the units and headquarters involved.⁴⁸

(3) USAREUR's Recommendations. In light of USAREUR's difficulties in maintaining forces for the support of Middle East contingency plans, CINCUSAREUR recommended to the Department of the Army four possible courses of action:

(a) The ATF 201 mission could be performed by STRAC forces deploying directly from the United States;

(b) Two airborne battle groups could be stationed on a rotational, temporary-duty basis in the Middle East or in Europe;

(c) An Army task force could be permanently stationed in the Middle East area; and

⁴⁷Incl, stf study, USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br, n.d. [Aug 58], subj: Forces for Contingency Operations, w/2 incls, to ltr, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 4 Sep 58, subj: Substitution of Infantry Battle Groups for Airborne Battle Groups in the USAREUR Troops Basis (C). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET.

⁴⁸Ibid. SECRET.

(d) An Army task force could be permanently stationed in the USAREUR area, with the corresponding spaces being added to the current USAREUR troop basis.

Of these choices, General Hodes preferred the first. In his opinion the situation presented an excellent opportunity for emphasizing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that STRAC should assume primary Army responsibility for planning and executing contingency plans. This course of action would have the added advantage of establishing firm Army requirements for strategic airlift. Since no airborne units were required for accomplishing USAREUR's primary mission, the airborne troops could be replaced by infantry as soon as the responsibility for contingency operations was transferred to STRAC.⁴⁹

While these recommendations were still under consideration, the Department of the Army suggested two possible solutions: USAREUR's 2 airborne battle groups could be converted by replacing individual parachutists with infantrymen at the expiration of overseas tours; as an alternative, the 2 airborne battle groups could be replaced by 2 infantry battle groups whose personnel, however, would not be in a gyroscope posture.⁵⁰

Seventh Army preferred and USAREUR requested that the unit replacement methods be used.⁵¹ Complications arose, however, because gyroscope planning had progressed so far that the exchange of airborne battle groups had to proceed according to schedule. However, while USAREUR thus received airborne battle groups as replacements, the incoming units could later be converted to infantry groups.⁵²

f. Prestocks and Resupply. According to the original plans, USAREUR was responsible for the initial logistical support of the Lebanon operation; after E/45 resupply for ATF 201 was to be solely a Department of the Army responsibility, except in emergency situations. Moreover, USAREUR had recommended the establishment of prestocks at suitable locations in preparation for the implementation of EP 201. However, because no agreements concerning the establishment of stocks had been reached by July 1958, no supplies had been prestocked in the objective area before

⁴⁹ Cable SX-6191, CINCUSAREUR to DA for Taylor, 21 Aug 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. For a detailed discussion of STRAC's need for, and lack of, firm commitments of airlift capacity, see H. B. Yoshpe and V. Bykofsky, Lebanon, A Test of Army Contingency Planning (U), (Off of CofT, Washington, D.C., 1958). SECRET.

⁵⁰ Cables DA-363307 & DA-947346, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 28 & 29 Aug 58. USAREUR SMC IN 8517 & 9068. SECRET.

⁵¹ DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 13 Sep 58, subj: Replacement of Airborne Battle Groups (U), w/atchd draft cable, no nr, CINCUSAREUR to DA. AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

⁵² Cable DA-948475, DA from Moore (DCSOPS) to CINCUSAREUR exclusive for Hodes, 23 Sep 58. USAREUR SMC IN 6311. SECRET.

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the start of the Lebanon operation.⁵³

During the early part of the Lebanon operation USAREUR reconsidered the question of over-all supply responsibilities. Actual consumption was much lower than had been anticipated because of the noncombat situation. Moreover, USAREUR could furnish more timely and more manageable resupply because the order-shipping time was shorter than from the United States and because staff visits could be made more easily and information interchanged more rapidly. USAREUR therefore recommended that it resume the resupply mission shortly after the Department of the Army had assumed the responsibility. The recommendation was approved, and the second resupply shipment, departing New York on 21 August 1958, was therefore the last.⁵⁴

To resupply the Army task force from Europe was not a major problem, because the tactical units brought with them 6 days' supplies and sufficient gasoline to support 300 miles of operations. Aerial resupply took care of 5 days' resupply, and the next 10 days' supplies arrived on the first ships.⁵⁵

Because a combat situation did not develop, a new problem arose. The low consumption rate caused material to stockpile until by 24 July the storage problem was becoming critical. The very limited space available to the U.S. forces and the expected arrival of resupply shipments in Beirut called for a quick decision.⁵⁶ CINCSPCOMME therefore recommended that a 30-day level of all classes of supplies be maintained both at Beirut and in the Adana-Iskenderun area of Turkey. CINCUSAREUR approved, and on 29 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the positioning of stocks at Adana.⁵⁷

To provide some covered storage at Adana, two 40 x 100-foot prefabricated buildings were sent from Leghorn on 3 September for erection

⁵³ Cable MLP-A-37634, CINCUSAFE to CINCSPCOMME, 24 Jul 58. USAREUR SMC IN 7420. SECRET.

⁵⁴ (1) Cable SX-6106, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG, 15 Aug 58. (2) Cable DA-946693, DA to COMAMLANFOR, CINCUSAREUR, 16 Aug 58. USAREUR SMC IN 4992. (3) Cable SX-6164, USAREUR to DA, 19 Aug 58. (4) Cable SX-6219, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 21 Aug 58. (5) Cable DA-946953, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Aug 58. USAREUR SMC IN 6977. All SECRET.

⁵⁵ AMLANFOR After Act Rept, Part II, Sec IV, p. 1. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

⁵⁶ Incl, to ltr, USAREUR to distr, 29 Jul 58, subj: G4 Journal Extracts, EP 201. AEAGD-PL 250/18 G4. SECRET.

⁵⁷ (1) Cable CINCSPCOMME to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jul 58. USAREUR SMC IN 7611. (2) Cable SX-5662, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 28 Jul 58. (3) Cable JCS-945715, JCS to CINCSPCOMME, 29 Jul 58. USAREUR SMC IN 8949. All SECRET.

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by an engineer construction company. These buildings were to house the class I, II, and IV permanent prestocks and provide office space for the storage dump security personnel. By 12 October 1958 the construction, including fences, ditches, roads, and the two prefabricated warehouses, was complete.⁵⁸

g. Support Bases for Future Operations. At a critique of US CINCEUR participation in the Lebanon operation conducted during the period 2-3 December 1958 the conferees agreed that the Adana (Incirlik)⁵⁹ airbase in Turkey was not suited for supporting the existing plans for Middle East operations. Three times within the previous two years forces had been alerted to deploy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the only base available had been Adana. This limitation, plus the distance from European bases and the difficulties in securing overflight rights, posed a problem in effecting a rapid buildup of forces. The saturation experienced at Adana during the peak of the Lebanon operation was so complete that some inbound aircraft had to be delayed until ramp space was available. USAR-EUR and USAFE were therefore given the priority assignment of surveying airfield sites in Turkey and preparing a joint study on the subject.⁶⁰

The joint survey was conducted during the period 11-23 January 1959 after preliminary study and research had been accomplished. The airbases at Murted, Konya, Incirlik, Malatya, Cigli, Bandirma, and the Adana civil field were visited. The site survey and followup study revealed that no single base or combination of bases in Turkey, other than Incirlik, was capable of meeting the criteria specified. However, as the Lebanon operation had indicated, even under noncombat conditions Incirlik was incapable of simultaneously supporting the SAC mission, the composite air strike force, and the transport operations in conjunction with the Army.⁶¹ Moreover, in early March 1959 the selection of a site was complicated by a SACREUR requirement for locating a U.S. JRBW squadron in Turkey. USAFE recommended Cigli airbase, near Izmir, for this purpose.

The USAREUR/USAFE report rejected the Murted, Konya, and Bandirma airbases from further consideration because the potential resupply

⁵⁸(1) Cable BX-6456, USAREUR to COMANTANFOR for 201 Log Comd, 3 Sep 58. SECRET. (2) Hq 201st Log Comd Hist & Comd Rept, 1-14 Sep 58, p. 35; 1-12 Oct 58, p. 37. CONF.

⁵⁹Whenever "Adana" is used with regard to airbases, the military airfield is meant. This was later redesignated Incirlik to distinguish it from the Adana civil airport.

⁶⁰Final Report on Critique of US CINCEUR Participation in CINC-SPECOMET OPLAN 215-58, Blue Rat Critique, 2-3 December 1958. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals; except none. US EUCOM Control Nr S-58-2067. AG 128-190.

⁶¹Rept of Jnt USAFE-USAREUR Site Sv and Study of Bases in Turkey (S), 1 Apr 59. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 EmergPlans Sec.

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requirements for transport aircraft could not be met at any of these three bases. The comments concerning the other bases were as follows:

(1) Incirlik could not be developed to provide for an advanced U.S. Army depot and a matching staging area for 12,000 troops. It could be used on an interim basis as a prestock point for the 3,900 tons of supplies for ATF 201. If air congestion during a future operation precluded the use of Incirlik, logistical resupply might be handled from the Adana civilian airport located approximately eight miles away. Such action would be subject to agreement by the Turkish Government.

(2) Cigli was to be assigned to USAFE on 1 July 1959 and was programmed for a tactical rotational squadron, the first elements of which were to arrive in the second quarter of FY 1961. If Cigli was approved as the site for a U.S.-operated IRBM squadron, the runway would have to be widened and strengthened. In that case, the earliest beneficial-occupancy date would be FY 1963. However, it was understood that if funds reserved for the IRBM program could be used to finance this runway construction, beneficial occupancy could be accelerated by at least one year. A prerequisite to establishing the advanced Army depot and troop staging area at Cigli would be the widening and strengthening of the runway to accommodate G-130B aircraft.

(3) Malatya was too distant from a water port to meet the criteria for an acceptable advanced Army depot or for a prestock site. Malatya could be developed as a staging area for ATF 201 and could be operational by 1 January 1960, if the pertinent agreement with the Turkish Government was consummated, the funds were made available, and the decision was made--all before 1 July 1959.

(4) Antalya was geographically the best located field in Turkey. However, it was rejected because the harbor was undeveloped and all supplies would have to be lightered ashore; the airfield had only a sod surface; and the base had been deleted from the infrastructure program. In addition, the U.S. Navy had recently expressed a strong interest in this airfield, which was favorably situated for the support of its operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(5) Camp Darby at Leghorn in Italy, could be developed as an Army advanced depot at a cost of approximately \$400,000. If this additional mission could be imposed on Camp Darby without amending the present terms of agreement with the Italian Government, the base would be capable of immediate acceptance of certain categories of supply, including approximately 50 percent of the ammunition. The balance of supplies requiring warehousing and the remaining ammunition could be accepted 21 months after the funds were made available. No additional land would be required.

In the opinion of the site survey group, a split depot appeared to be the only solution if the JCS determined that the establishment of an advanced Army depot at Cigli was not possible and that the depot would

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nevertheless have to be located in Turkey. The air-transportable items--8,000 tons--and the staging area could be established at Malatya, and the non-air-transportable items--4,000 tons--might be stored in the vicinity of Iskenderun. Beneficial occupancy could be achieved about 21 months after agreements had been reached and funds had been made available.

The following interim position was therefore suggested by the groups:

- (1) To designate Malatya as the staging base for airlift operations in support of CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58 as soon as the POL supply problem and the other deficiencies had been resolved;
- (2) To retain the prestock facilities at Incirlik pending establishment of an advanced depot elsewhere in Turkey. In the event airlift was required and the Incirlik facilities proved inadequate, the Adana civil airport could be used to augment Incirlik; and
- (3) To use Camp Darby as the depot and San Guista Airport, near Pisa, as a support base if the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that the establishment of an advanced depot for Middle East operations had to be accomplished in the immediate future.

As long-range proposals, the group suggested that Cigli be designated as the base to support staging, prestockage, and the advanced depot. Malatya would be retained as an alternate staging base and would be used as a refueling base on the return leg for operations involving Iran or Iraq. As an alternative to the above solution, the advanced depot could be placed at Camp Darby.⁶²

In transmitting the report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US EUCOM commented that none of the airfields available to the United States in Turkey had facilities for holding personnel of an airborne division and its nonorganic logistical support units during the 10- to 15-day period required for marrying up troops with prepositioned stocks. No suitable location for an advanced U.S. Army depot was available in Turkey. The only site in the central and eastern Mediterranean area that could be developed quickly and that was capable of expansion to stage a force of divisional size was Camp Darby. For these reasons US EUCOM recommended that negotiations with the Turkish Government be initiated to establish an interim staging area for ATF 201 only at Malatya. A permanent base could ultimately be developed at Cigli, including a staging area for approximately 12,000 troops, facilities to accommodate the 3,900 tons of prestocks required by ATF 201, and the advanced Army depot, with provisions for stocking approximately 12,000 tons of equipment and supplies.⁶³ By the conclusion of the reporting

⁶² Ibid. SECRET.

⁶³ Cable EC-9-2124, US CINCEUR to JCS, 14 Apr 59. USAREUR SMC IN 4534. SECRET.

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period the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the use of Malatya as an interim staging area, but the long-range proposals with their various implications were still under consideration.⁶⁴

⁶⁴Intvw, Capt Begley with Lt Col J. E. Simmons, USAREUR G4 Emerg Plans Sec, 14 Oct 59. SECRET.

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PART TWO

PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS

CHAPTER 3

Planning

9. USAREUR Emergency and Alert Planning

a. Operation Plans.

(1) CINCUSAREUR Operation Plan (OPLAN) 301. On 4 December 1958 CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 301 was published; it superseded USAREUR Capabilities Plan (CP) 1-56 (Basic), Volume I, and was derived from and supported US CINCEUR's OPLAN's 100-1 and 100-2. The plan provided for operations short of general war and covered specifically the transition from peace to war. The new version of the plan reflected changes in organizational structures. That portion of the plan dealing with the conduct of cold war activities was effective upon receipt; for general war and operations short of general war, it was effective for planning purposes upon receipt and for execution when directed by CINCUSAREUR.¹

(2) CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 302. On 22 June 1959 CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 302 was published; it supported US CINCEUR's OPLAN 100-3, and superseded that portion of USAREUR CP 1-56 (Alternate), Volume I, which pertained to the conduct of U.S. military operations in the event that SACEUR was delayed in assuming operational command at the outbreak of general hostilities. The defensive measures outlined for the first 30 days of fighting were the same as those specified in the previous plan. If SACEUR had not assumed operational command by that time, the next phase of operations would be conducted as directed by US CINCEUR. CINCUSAREUR was authorized to direct the execution of his draft OPLAN 303 to provide for the security and integrity

¹USAREUR ltr, 4 Dec 58, subj: CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 301 (U). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET.

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of his force, if the Soviet forces breached the Rhine-Ijssel River line.²

(3) CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 303. The final draft of CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 303 was completed on 26 March 1959, but the plan was not published by the end of the reporting period, pending revision of US CINCEUR OPLAN 100-4, from which it was derived and which it supported. OPLAN 303 was to replace that portion of USAREUR CP 1-56 (Alternate), Volume I, which pertained to the conduct of U.S. operations from the Rhine River to defensive positions in the Pyrenees Mountains in the event that Soviet forces effected an uncontrollable penetration of the Rhine-Ijssel defensive positions, causing the collapse of the NATO command structure in the Central Region. This plan could also be used in the early stages of a general war, in the event that the NATO headquarters did not assume their operational responsibilities.³

(4) USAREUR EP 202. On 20 September 1958 the portion of USAREUR EP 202 that applied to Morocco was revised on the basis of information received on 27 August 1958 concerning changes in US CINCEUR OPLAN 200-12. On order of US CINCEUR, USAREUR would provide a force ranging in size from a reinforced rifle company to a task force commanded by a major general and composed of his staff and two infantry battle groups. Operations would be limited to guaranteeing the security of U.S. personnel and protecting such U.S. installations as the naval base at Port Lyautoy, the airbase group at Sidi Slimane, the air division headquarters at Rabat, the airbase wing at Nouasseur, the airbase group at Ben Guerir, and five aircraft control and warning stations in Morocco. This force might be required to reinforce all the above installations simultaneously. Every reasonable effort was to be made to preclude U.S. forces from becoming involved in an international incident.⁴

b. Alert Plans.

(1) Changes in USAREUR/CENTAG EP 321. The USAREUR/CENTAG EP 321 (Alert Measures), which supported USAREUR OPLAN 301 and CENTAG EDP 2-58, remained in effect with only minor changes to bring it into consonance with the revised US CINCEUR and CINCENT alert plans and changes in the U.S. Seventh Army rear boundary. Added simple-alert measures included war plans for national logistical projects, increased efforts for collecting intelligence, intensified control of frontiers, and alerting certain nonassigned

²(1) USAREUR ltr, 22 Jun 59, subj: CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 302 (U). ABAGC-PL 250/17. SECRET. (2) CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 302, 22 Jun 59. TS.

³(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to distr, 26 Mar 59, subj: Draft CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 303 (U). ABAGC-PL. TS. (2) Final draft, CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 303. TS. (3) Intvw, Capt J. M. Sathrum, USAREUR G3 Hist Sec, with Lt Col L. F. Stone, G3 War Plans Sec, 31 Jul 59. SECRET.

⁴(1) Cable EC-9-4483, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 27 Aug 58. USAREUR SMC IN 8042. (2) Cable SX-6767, USAREUR to subor hq, 20 Sep 58. Both TS.

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active units as well as personnel earmarked for NATO headquarters. In addition, there were requests for the progressive activation of national movement and transportation organizations, for the activation of national requisitioning authority, and for the assumption of operational command by SACEUR.

The additional reinforced-alert measures concerned preparations for evacuating inhabitants of certain operational areas, electronic deception and countermeasures, control of electromagnetic radiations against their use as navigational aids by the enemy, and arrest or control of known or suspected enemy agents. Other measures included authority to disperse U.S. nuclear weapons to non-U.S. atomic delivery forces in support of SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan, implementation of port emergency planning and dispersion measures, and requisitioning procedures for host nation local resources. Additional changes concerned the evacuation of patients and withdrawal of hospitals from target and forward areas, an increase in hospital capacity by 50 percent, the application of censorship to private communications, and the establishment of military field press censorship.⁵

(2) USAREUR EP 312 (NEO). The new USAREUR Manual for the Emergency Evacuation of Noncombatants, 1959, supported US CINCEUR's Noncombatant Evacuation Plan, dated 25 November 1957. It incorporated a number of changes made during the two years since the last USAREUR plan had been published.⁶

(a) Major Commands. The evacuation of noncombatants from Italy was incorporated into the USAREUR mission. Also, certain changes were made to improve the communications facilities in Spain and France. Moreover, the U.S. movement control responsibility was delineated in such a manner that Seventh Army would assist in controlling movements on routes E-5 through E-80 up to the Franco-German border; at the crossing points USACOMZEUR would assume this responsibility.⁷ The delineation presupposed proper coordination with NATO military commanders and with host-nation agencies in an effort to secure their cooperation in the execution of evacuation plans. All aspects of the evacuation directly involving non-U.S. personnel were to be discussed with the authorities concerned. The American noncombatant evacuation plans were to be coordinated with the plans of the West German Federal Ministry of Defense to insure that the designated military routes would be kept free for the evacuation movements and that the established time schedule could be executed. The German authorities

⁵(1) Memo for rec, Lt Col L. F. Stone, USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br, 18 Mar 59, subj: Change 4 to CENTAG/USAREUR EP 321. NATO SECRET. (2) Memo, G3 Plans & Ploy Br to Dep ACoFS G3, 22 May 59, subj: CENTAG/USAREUR EP 321. CONF. Both in G3 War Plans Sec.

⁶LOI, 1 Aug 59, to USAREUR EP 312 (NEO), 1959. ABAGC-PL 250/17. CONF.

⁷USAREUR EP 312 (NEO), Chap 1 & 7. SECRET.

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would thus be able to adjust their own planning accordingly; in addition, the maximum number of American military personnel would become available for combat duties.⁸ The Federal Ministry of Defense, in turn, agreed that the evacuation of noncombatants was a military operation for the execution of which the military road network would have to be kept free. NEO plans were furnished to the Ministry of Defense, whose subordinate agencies--including territorial commands and military districts--were authorized to coordinate directly with U.S. Army headquarters down to the area-command level.⁹

Discussion with USAFE officers--who indicated that certain airbases, such as Wiesbaden and Rhein-Main, should be evacuated by surface transportation--led to policy changes regarding the air evacuation of noncombatants. In the future only those noncombatants on airbases east of the Rhine River and in forward areas who could not be moved more expeditiously by surface transportation would be evacuated by air. By adopting this concept, USAFE would be able to concentrate the airlift effort on those areas in which it could be used to the greatest advantage, such as the forward regions of southern Bavaria and the airbases in all other parts of Bavaria.¹⁰

An important addition to USAREUR EP 312 was Chapter 9, which pertained to the deliberate evacuation of noncombatants from Germany, France, and Italy during a rapidly deteriorating situation that might precede the announcement of the Order of Reinforced Alert (ORA). By the end of a period that was not to exceed 30 days the noncombatants would either be in the Western Hemisphere, on a carrier en route to that destination, in a survival area, or in a staging area. Movement would be direct from home stations to sea and air ports of embarkation and thence to the United States without intermediate stops. Since the noncombatants residing in forward areas of Germany were scheduled to be evacuated first, tactical troops would enjoy maximum freedom to carry out military measures without being encumbered by NEO responsibilities. Berlin might be evacuated as a specified area; because of its isolated position the air evacuation of its noncombatants would receive a high priority. For other areas, however, available rail and bus transportation would be used primarily; if necessary, it would be supplemented by privately owned vehicles augmented by military transportation. Berlin, Bremerhaven, all airbases east of the

⁸ Ibid., pp. 18-19. SECRET.

⁹ (1) Cable SX-7888, CINCUSAREUR to subor hqs, 25 Nov 58. (2) USAREUR ltr, 6 Feb 59, subj: Change Number 5 to USAREUR EP 312 (NEO) (U). AEAGC-PL 250/17. Both SECRET.

¹⁰ (1) Memo, Lt Col J. M. Snyder, USAREUR G3 Emerg Plans Sec, to Asst Dep ACofS G3, 24 Nov 58, subj: Revision of Chapter 8, USAREUR EP 312 (NEO) (U). (2) USAREUR ltr, 5 Mar 59, subj: Changes No. 6 to USAREUR EP 312 (NEO) (U). AEAGC-PL 250/17. Both SECRET. Both in G3 Plans & Plcy Br.

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Rhine, and the eastern half of the U.S. Zone of Responsibility in Western Germany would be evacuated by E/3, and the remaining areas east of the Rhine River by E/8. Noncombatants residing on German territory west of the Rhine would evacuate from E/10 to E/15, while the remaining 15 days would serve for the evacuation of persons living in France. USASETAF noncombatants would be evacuated directly from Italy within the 30-day period.¹¹

(b) Transit through Switzerland. During negotiations that took place in spring 1959 the Swiss authorities agreed in principle to the transit of 25,000 American civilians, indicating that the evacuees would receive all possible aid and help. However, the Swiss reserved the right to forbid for a certain length of time entry into their country if Swiss military interest required a temporary closing of the frontier or if the continuation of the journey into a neighboring country was not assured.¹² Moreover, while the Swiss Government would have preferred to concentrate the points of entry and departure in the region of Basel, USAREUR desired to designate the Schaffhausen area as the tentative point of entry. Also, the principle of moving evacuees into, through, and directly out of Switzerland was accepted, but the Swiss Government was requested not to insist that the evacuees leave the country to face greater danger if the situation deteriorated during the evacuation. Finally, USAREUR asked for further clarification with regard to the possible delay in entry that could be caused by the temporary closing of the Swiss frontier.¹³ Negotiation continued at the end of FY 1959.

10. CENTAG Planning

a. CENTAG Emergency Defense Plan (EDP) 2-58. A tactically new plan, EDP 2-58, which otherwise resembled the old emergency plan, became effective for CENTAG forces on 1 July 1958. It implemented the forward concept and was designed to halt the enemy as far to the east as possible. The concept of four separate defensive lines was continued, but their positioning was considerably changed. The Rhine River, no longer the final defensive line, was to be used only as a position from which counterattacks could be launched to restore the new final defensive line, which was farther east. Two of the defensive lines remained in the same geographical locations but were redesignated: Line TOULOUSE became Line ETHNOLOGIST, and Line YORK became Line OINTMENT. Line RICHMOND was eliminated, and two new lines--Line HUMOR and Line ODOUR--were added. The three most easterly lines--Line ETHNOLOGIST, Line HUMOR, and Line OINTMENT--were identical from the town of Fritslar, where they joined with NORTAG, southward to the Vogelsberg peak, west of Fulda. From that point they were as follows:

¹¹ USAREUR EP 312 (NEO), pp. 65-72. SECRET.

¹² Ltr, Mr. A. G. Mencher, Dep Chmn, Paris Ln Gp, to Lt Col W. P. King, USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br, 21 May 59. SECRET. In Plans & Ploy Br.

¹³ Cable SX-4303, USAREUR to Chmn Paris Ln Gp, 6 Jun 59. SECRET.

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Line ETHNOLOGIST continued southeast from the Vogelsberg, passed just east of Bad Kissingen, Schweinfurt, Bamberg, and Nuernberg, and then turned slightly southeast until it reached the town of Landshut. Once more it veered directly south just east of Rosenheim and then along the Inn River to the Austrian border.

Line RUMOR continued due south to the town of Schluechtern, bent slightly southeast, passed east of Wuerzburg, and with Augsburg as a pivot turned due south again, following the Lech River to the Austrian border. The French forces were responsible for the portion of this line from Augsburg to the Austrian border.

Line OINTMENT, the new 48-hour line, split from Line Rumor at Schluechtern and ran due south to Ulm; the French units were responsible for the defense along the Iller River to the Austrian border.

Line ODOUR, the new final defensive line, joined NORTHAG at Battenberg and then proceeded south, passing just west of Aschaffenburg and Crailsheim, directly to Ulm. From Ulm the French would form the southern portion of the final defensive line.

The most significant difference between this plan and former plans was the eastward shift of the defensive lines. The shift involved not only the positioning of Seventh Army units, but also that of the French forces to a marked degree. Previously it had been anticipated that the French would first make contact with the enemy along the Iller River, but under the new plan their initial line of contact would be along the Lech River, which formed the southern portion of Line RUMOR.¹⁴

b. The Atomic Support Plans. Annex D--the CENTAG Atomic Support Plan--to CENTAG EDP 2-58 was not published during FY 1959, pending receipt of the revised Central Europe Atomic Strike Plan (CE ASP) upon which it was to be based. Guidance for subordinate headquarters was therefore based on CE ASP 2-58 until such time as the new Annex D would be published.¹⁵

The general purpose of the Central Europe battle plans was to destroy, neutralize, and delay enemy forces along the main axes of penetration; to assist in the protection of the navigational and bombing aids; and to support the defense of the Central Region as far to the east as possible in anticipation of the counteroffensive to follow.¹⁶

¹⁴(1) CENTAG EDP 2-58, 1 Jul 58. (2) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Maj B. L. Carroll, CENTAG G3, 30 Sep 59. Both COSMIC TS.

¹⁵Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col J. C. Wood, Jr., CENTAG G3, 30 Sep 59. SECRET.

¹⁶CE ASP 2-58, Vol. II, Regional Interdiction and Land Battle Plans, 18 Dec 58. COSMIC TS.

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Volume I of CE ASP 2-58 contained plans for the accomplishment of those SACEUR Directed Tasks assigned to CINCENT and was subject to the provisions of SACEUR ASP-1 and Central Europe Joint Emergency Defense Plan (CE-JEDP) 2-58. The SACEUR Directed Tasks were specifically assigned to CINCENT to insure continuity of operations in carrying out the objectives of SACEUR's programs after the initial attacks. The above tasks would be executed through the following separate plans: SACEUR's Scheduled Counter-Air Program, SACEUR's Counter Atomic-Air Directed Tasks, SACEUR's Counter-Radar and Air Control Center Program, and SACEUR's Interdiction Program.¹⁷

Volume II of CE ASP 2-58 contained plans for the conduct of regional interdiction and for the support of the land battle. Commanders designated as releasing commanders were authorized to release for expenditure the atomic weapons in Code GREEN plans upon the announcement of R-hour by SACEUR. provided that:

- (1) Weapons that had been earmarked for expenditure only with the approval of higher commanders could not be released;
- (2) The threat envisaged in the plans actually had materialized;
- (3) Neither SACEUR nor CINCENT had placed or approved other restrictions on the weapons release or plan of execution; and
- (4) Targets in West Germany and Austria were not attacked until SACEUR specifically approved operations in those countries.

This atomic plan was developed in support of CE JEDP 2-58 and the corresponding emergency defense plans of subordinate commanders, some of which had been modified. It conformed with the requirements laid down by SACEUR, and served as a basic regional plan that effected coordination at all joint levels and between the strike and logistical support forces of the Central Region.

In employing atomic weapons within the Central Region, every effort was to be made to accomplish the essential military results without unnecessary destruction of non-military facilities and to limit attacks in the vicinity of densely populated areas. Consideration was to be given to the contamination effect of radiological fallout. Surface burst was to be carefully limited to the minimum essential to the accomplishment of the commander's mission.¹⁸

¹⁷(1) CE ASP 2-58, Vol. I, Regional Plans for SACEUR Directed Tasks, 28 May 58. (2) Incl, to cmt 2, Hq CENTAG to USAREUR Hist Div, 21 Apr 59, to DF, Hist Div to USAREUR G3, 25 Mar 59, subj: Review of Draft Annual Historical Report Headquarters CENTAG to Headquarters Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (U), 1 January-31 December 1958. AEAHI 250/56. Both COSMIC TS.

¹⁸(1) CE ASP 2-58, Vol. II. (2) Incl, to cmt 2, to DF, Hist Div to G3, 25 Mar 59, cited above. Both COSMIC TS.

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c. Barrier and Denial Plans. The retardation plan supporting CENTAG EDP 2-58 was published on 1 December 1958. This plan specified the fortifications, obstacles, and barriers that were to be prepared to delay and block the enemy and to deny him facilities or resources of military value that would have to be abandoned. The area of operation was divided into successive delaying positions and lines for the first sustained battle and for the final defensive engagement.

Denial targets were to be destroyed, neutralized, or evacuated on a priority basis after the execution of essential tactical demolitions. The use of atomic demolition munitions was authorized when the desired denial was not obtainable by other means or if the destruction of a target would require prohibitive amounts of material and/or manpower.¹⁹

d. Refugee Control Planning. Annex J of CENTAG EDP 2-58, published 10 July 1958, dealt specifically with refugee control. In this annex national civil, police, and territorial forces were instructed to direct their efforts to enforce the stay-at-home policy for their civil populations by the execution of those coordinated preventive measures necessary to preclude the initiation of refugee movement. Every effort was to be made to control, divert, slow down, and stop on their own territory such movements of refugees as might take place in spite of precautionary measures. An inherent factor of this control was the responsibility of providing minimum material aid to refugees.

National military forces were to prepare and review emergency and operational plans to insure that they covered wartime requirements for refugee control, labor availability, employment of civil-affairs/military-government units, establishment of wartime liaison with the appropriate elements of territorial and civil agencies, procurement of indigenous resources, and other matters of civil-affairs/military-government operations.

Moreover, if the local government was unable or unwilling to act effectively, national military forces were to be prepared to control the population in order to safeguard their own security and insure freedom of action in conducting military-type operations.²⁰

Actually, the absence of effective plans for the emergency control of population movements presented a serious problem because of the danger that hordes of refugees would impede the movements of the tactical forces. For example, movement of civilians from their normal places of residence to evacuation centers could be planned carefully in advance, but, a collapse of this planned movement would quickly transform these evacuees into hordes of fear-driven refugees whose movements would be unpredictable.

¹⁹ Annex E, to CENTAG EDP 2-58, 1 Dec 58. COSMIC TS.

²⁰ Annex J, to CENTAG EDP 2-58. COSMIC TS.

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and therefore difficult to control. Moreover, deliberate enemy political action could be expected to create another category of civilian refugees--namely, expellees who would be driven from their homes. Their movements could also be expected to hamper the freedom of operation of the ground forces.²¹

Guidance for controlling wartime population movements was drawn from the SHAPE ACE Directive MC 36/1, which placed upon national territorial commanders the full responsibility for wartime control of refugee movements within their national areas. USAEUR, however, instructed its subordinate commanders to prepare unilateral plans for use in the event that national authorities failed to assume their responsibilities.²²

(1) The Problem in Germany. In October 1958 Seventh Army submitted a revised refugee control plan which confirmed that neither Seventh Army nor the German territorial commands had the immediate capability to control the expected numbers of refugees. With the gradual improvement of the German territorial defense structure and the passage of the necessary enabling legislation, however, the Germans themselves would be able to implement effective emergency dispersal plans by 1962-3. Since a delay was not acceptable to General Hodges, he decided that in the interim Seventh Army--in cooperation with the appropriate German agencies--would control the main supply routes and river crossings in the CENTAG area of responsibility. Control of other than main routes would divert too many tactical troops from their proper mission.²³

The German territorial commands and the Land governments had been informed of the plans for the evacuation of the civilian population, but no effective measures could be taken without amending the Federal Constitution. To surmount this obstacle, USAEUR recommended that in an emergency the Allied commanders be authorized to issue instructions concerning refugee control to the national territorial commanders. NATO staffs would be able to complete their refugee control planning without waiting for a German constitutional amendment.²⁵

²¹Stf study, Col F. de Sazbielle, LAMPOENT 61, 21 Jul 58, subj: Large-scale Movement of Population in Wartime (Civil Emergency Plan). 4530.PA/325/58. NATO RESTRICTED.

²²DF, USAEUR CA Div to CofS, 7 Oct 58, subj: Control of Refugees. CONF. In CA Div Plans Br.

²³(1) Memo, Lt Col J. P. Bullion, USAEUR CA Div, to Lt Col G. W. Pohl, C/CA Div Plans Br, 1 Nov 58, subj: Phasing of Action for the Emergency Dispersal Plan. CONF. In CA Div Plans Br. (2) Cable 1206, Seventh Army to CINCUSAEUR for G3, 24 Feb 59. USAEUR SMC IN 6671. SECRET.

²⁴DF, USAEUR CA Div to CofS, 7 Oct 58, subj: Control of Refugees. CONF. In CA Div Plans Br.

²⁵USAEUR CA Div Hist Jnl, Oct 58. CONF.

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German emergency plans envisioned the evacuation of 29 urban centers with a population of over 11 million people. To assure that the evacuees would remain in their new centers, they would have to be convinced that they were better off there than elsewhere. Otherwise they might flee the evacuation centers and thereby create further control problems. However, no such centers actually existed, and the German territorial commands had no means of preventing mass movements of the civilian population from interfering with military operations.²⁶

In April 1959 NATO representatives met at LANDCENT headquarters to discuss draft plans pertaining to refugee control in the period from D-day to D+10 with the forces that would then be available. These plans were to be tested during the forthcoming NATO Exercise SIDE STEP,²⁷ which was to emphasize the employment of civil-affairs units, the effectiveness of liaison with the appropriate territorial commanders, and the use of local labor. Also to be determined was how much the local authorities could be assisted in preventing refugee interference with military operations. The German Ministries of Defense and Interior agreed to cooperate closely with the army groups.²⁸

(2) The Problem in France. USACOMZEUR lacked the authority and the capability--its limited forces were dispersed over a wide area--to assume control of the refugee movement. The communication zone agencies therefore confined their efforts to coordinating with the appropriate French territorial authorities in a manner similar to that adopted for area security and damage control.²⁹

The French had prepared a plan for the evacuation of civilians within metropolitan France; this, however, excluded non-French refugees. Also, no provision had been made for receiving refugees from West Germany.³⁰ The French granted that existing agreements authorized USACOMZEUR to coordinate refugee control planning at the military region level, but they reserved the right to select routes, barrier line locations, and dispersal areas for themselves. They insisted that the handling of refugees was essentially a NATO problem and that MC 36/1 was unrealistic in assigning to each nation responsibility for the control of refugees within its borders. If France granted admission to the refugee masses expected from Germany, the main burden of refugee control would ultimately fall upon the

²⁶(1) Ltr, LANDCENT to distr, 13 May 59, subj: Refugee Control Planning, w/atchd Min of Refugee Con Conf held at LANDCENT, 24 Apr 59. 1710. 25 LC/PA/237/59. NATO SECRET. (2) Memo for rec, Lt Col Bullion, 11 May 59, subj: Meeting with Col Reidel, C/Ger Ln Grp to CENTAG. NATO CONF. In CA Div Plans Br.

²⁷USAREUR CA Div Hist Jnl, Apr 59. CONF.

²⁸Ltr, LANDCENT to distr, 13 May 59, cited above. NATO SECRET.

²⁹Cable AEZOT-7-366, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Mar 59. USAREUR SMC IN 3861. SECRET.

³⁰USAREUR CA Div Hist Jnl, Nov 58. CONF.

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French authorities. They therefore insisted that the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom assume responsibility for the reception of some of the refugees. Until NATO developed an integrated international concept concerning refugee control, the French would close their eastern frontiers to refugees from Germany in wartime.³¹

e. Joint Command and Operations Centers (JCOC). During the last half of 1958 an Air Force exercise was held in order to refine JCOC operations. As a result of this exercise and joint planning with the Air Force, the JCOC at the field-army level was abolished and a new structure substituted. The new structure called for an air support operations center (ASOC) and a tactical army operations center (TAOC) at the field-army level and for the establishment of a JCOC at the army-group level. The existing FOURATAF/CENTAG JCOC was therefore maintained; at the field-army/tactical-air-force level a joint facility was to be created, composed of the field-army G2 and G3 air sections, while the ASOC was to be furnished from national air force resources. This joint facility was to be given capability for atomic as well as conventional air support.³²

In peacetime the FOURATAF wartime headquarters was to be maintained with adequate space allocations and the normal housekeeping facilities required to provide for CENTAG representation. The field armies were to make similar provisions for the ASOC in their wartime headquarters. CENTAG was to provide FOURATAF/CENTAG with a JCOC in an emergency. Similarly, an air liaison officer was to be provided from USAFE to U.S. Seventh Army and from 1st CATAC to French First Army; both officers were to be capable of representing the tactical air force commander in an emergency.³³

11. Atomic Delivery Weapons for NORTHAG

a. The USAFEUR/NORTHAG Agreement. US EUCOM Operations Plan 100-3 made USAFEUR responsible for providing ground-delivered atomic support to non-U.S. NATO nations in Central Europe. The Northern Task Force (NORTHAF), composed of two 280-mm gun, two Honest John rocket, and two Corporal missile battalions as well as the necessary logistical support units, had been formed to furnish atomic support to NORTHAG. The new USAFEUR/NORTHAG agreement, which had been drafted in February 1958 to replace the U.S.

³¹(1) Memo for rec, Lt Col Bullion, 17 Nov 58, subj: Conference on Refugee Control Planning with Representatives of the French Republic on 10 Nov 1958. NATO CONF. (2) Memo, Lt Col Bullion to C/CA Div, n.d., subj: Comments re 10 November 1958 Conference on Refugee Control Planning with Republic of France. CONF. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. Both in CA Div Plans Br. (3) Cable AEZOT-7-366, cited above. SECRET.

³²Intvw, Capt J. L. Begley, USAFEUR G3 Hist Sec, with Maj M. Garten, G3 Ops Br, 24 Feb 59. NATO SECRET.

³³Cable 35640, FOURATAF to COMCENTAG, 18 Dec 58. NATO SECRET.

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Seventh Army/NORTHAG Agreement then in existence, was not ratified until 15 June 1959.³⁴ This new agreement covered the movement, operational control, administration, logistical support, and communications of NORTAF. After approval by US CINCEUR/SACEUR, the order for the deployment of this force would be issued by CINCUSAREUR, through the Commanding General U.S. Seventh Army. Two types of movement were planned: The first, designated ADRIAN, was a gradual movement under the guise of training and would take place either during a period of tension or in the early stages of a simple alert. The second, designated CHEVRON, was a rapid movement to be executed when direct deployment to concentration areas or battle positions was required, as upon declaration of ORA or GAO. The time needed to travel from home stations to GAO positions would depend upon the distances involved and the conditions under which the movement was to be executed. Under relatively ideal conditions, times would vary from approximately 12 hours for the first unit to arrive in position to 72 hours for the last. When deployed, the units would carry the prescribed load of atomic munitions, which would form part of the NATO allocation of weapons to NORTHAG. Atomic weapons subsequently allocated would be provided through the U.S. Advanced Weapons Ammunition Supply Points (US AWASP's) and would remain under physical custody of U.S. forces at all times. Upon crossing the CENTAG/NORTHAG boundary the task force would be relieved from assignment to the U.S. Seventh Army, assigned to USAREUR (Theater Army), and attached to NORTHAG for operational command. Since the delivery units would normally be employed in army and corps atomic artillery roles, COMNORTHAG probably would further attach them to corps or lower level headquarters, except that he would retain operational control of the Corporal battalions.³⁵

To preclude any misunderstanding, USAREUR amplified in March 1959 the procedures prescribed for the emergency deployment of NORTAF to the NORTHAG sectors. No atomic warheads under NORTAF control were to precede the delivery units into the NORTHAG area. Warhead supply planning for NORTAF was to conform to these instructions.³⁶

b. Reduction of Support. On 15 September 1958 USAREUR advised US CINCEUR that the United Kingdom expected to deploy one Corporal unit in the NORTHAG area on or about 1 November 1958. If the British unit attained its operational readiness capability one month later, USAREUR would like to withdraw one of the U.S. Corporal battalions currently committed to support NORTHAG in the event of an emergency. In acceding to USAREUR's request for approval, US CINCEUR specified that operational plans

³⁴(1) DF, G3 to CINUSAREUR, 3 Apr 59, subj: Northern Task Force (U), CEN-GC-OP 6430. COSMIC TS. (2) Ltr, NORTHAG to USAREUR, 15 Jun 59, subj: Agreement for Employment of Northern Task Force. UNCLAS.

³⁵(1) USAREUR-NORTHAG Agreement for Employment of Northern Task Force, n.d. /Jun 59/. USAREUR AG 3276. TS. (2) DF, G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Apr 59, cited above. COSMIC TS.

³⁶Cable SX-2614, 18 Mar 59, USAREUR to Seventh Army, USACOMZEUR.
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earmarking U.S. delivery units for NORTAF would be revised as NORTHAG's non-U.S. NATO ground atomic delivery capability progressed.³⁷

In February 1959 General Hodes informed COMNORTHAG that the time appeared to be proper to plan for reducing NORTAF, because a number of non-U.S. NATO atomic delivery units were expected to become operational in his area in the near future. With a British Corporal regiment expected to become operational, one U.S. Corporal battalion might be withdrawn from the commitment to the U.S. task force by 30 June 1959. It also seemed appropriate to plan on phasing out the entire task force commitment by June 1960 in consideration of the other non-U.S. atomic delivery units that would become available in the NORTHAG area by that time.³⁸

In his reply COMNORTHAG mentioned the many problems with which his command was faced in building up atomic delivery units. Although he was urging the five national elements of NORTHAG to have their own organic atomic units, there was still some uncertainty regarding the buildup plan. He suggested, therefore, that CINCUSAREUR postpone his efforts to establish specific dates or plans for a phased reduction of NORTAF.³⁹ In reality General Hodes did not intend to establish specific dates for the release of each battalion from the NORTAF commitment, but wanted to reach an agreement that U.S. units would be withdrawn from NORTAF on a one-for-one basis as NORTHAG's own atomic delivery units became operational. In any event, the planning assumptions specified in the April 1958 LANDCENT message were for the 1958-59 timeframe and were not valid beyond 1959.⁴⁰

On 30 March 1959 General Hodes requested COMLANDCENT's assistance in eliminating the requirement for U.S. atomic delivery support to NORTHAG during 1960. This could be accomplished by three specific kinds of action: First, by announcing unequivocally to the Central Region army groups and defense ministries that USAREUR planned to support only the U.S. Seventh Army with ground atomic delivery units after mid-1960; second, by promulgating 1960-61 planning guidance according to which each member nation of LANDCENT would have to provide its own ground atomic delivery units; and third, by LANDCENT headquarters taking on increasingly active role in site selection, unit stationing, land acquisition, infrastructure funding, and other aspects of the NATO stockpile program that would fall within its responsibility. NATO organic atomic capability could come about only if the NATO subordinate commands and the national authorities in the Central

³⁷(1) Cable SX-6650, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 15 Sep 58. (2) Cable EC-9-4898, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Sep 58. USAREUR SMC IN 5298. Both TS.

³⁸Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Sir D. Ward, COMNORTHAG, 27 Feb 59. TS. In USAREUR G3 TS Con.

³⁹Ltr, Gen Ward to Gen Hodes, 12 Mar 59. CAG COS 3370. COSMIC TS.

⁴⁰Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Ward, 25 Mar 59. USAREUR COS 1528. COSMIC TS.

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Region made a concerted, unified effort to bring it into being.⁴¹ On 5 May 1959 LANDCENT notified the defense ministries of the countries in the Central Region of USAREUR's intentions of withdrawing U.S. atomic delivery units, and at the same time reminded them of the Allied Command Europe Plan for NATO Atomic Stockpile, dated 12 September 1958, which provided for three Corporal battalions for NORTHAG. LANDCENT also asked SHAPE to leave the Corporal support of NORTHAG at a minimum of three battalions. Upon reexamination of the problem, General Eddleman--the new CINCUSAREUR--notified US CINCEUR that his command would provide NORTHAG with the necessary U.S. Corporal support until the Northern Army Group's non-U.S. capability was increased to the equivalent of three Corporal battalions. At the end of the reporting period it was estimated that NORTHAG would be phased out within a year except for one U.S. Corporal battalion. The commitment for this last Corporal Battalion would continue until FY 1962, when the third NORTHAG Corporal battalion was expected to become operational.⁴²

12. Air Defense

a. Control. In the second half of July 1958 US EUCOM transmitted to its component commands a draft directive assigning to CINCUSAFE the responsibility for the air defense of Central Europe. All surface-to-air missile units and their tactical headquarters were to be placed under the operational control of the Air Defense Commander. In his comments to this draft directive, CINCUSAREUR asked that gun-type artillery units be kept under the operational control of Seventh Army. He also wanted to have the war-time authority to displace surface-to-air missile units, if the tactical situation necessitated such action and CINCUSAFE had not issued any redeployment orders. Finally, CINCUSAREUR asked that CINCUSAFE prescribe rules of engagement that would exploit the effectiveness of surface-to-air missile units to the maximum. More specifically, the suggested normal weapons status would be WEAPONS FREE under Warning RED or YELLOW, and no HOLD FIRE orders would be issued in the Seventh Army area without the latter's concurrence.⁴³ While these comments were considered reasonable, US EUCOM did not want to restrict CINCUSAFE in the execution of the mission he was being assigned. The Air Defense Commander would seek complete Army collaboration and support in exploiting the full value of the surface-to-air missile

⁴¹Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen H. Speidel, COMLANDCENT, 30 Mar 59. USAREUR COS 1528. COSMIC TS.

⁴²(1) Ltr, LANDCENT to distr, 5 May 59, subj: Special Ammunitions Storage Program. COSMIC TS. (2) Cable SX-4301, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 6 Jun 59. SECRET. (3) Cable SX-4451, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 13 Jun 59. TS.

⁴³(1) Cable EC-9-3820, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, 22 Jul 58. USAREUR SMC IN 6649. (2) Cable SX-5598, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 25 Jul 58. Both SECRET.

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units that were being placed under his operational control.⁴⁴ on 6 August 1958 CINCSAFE was assigned the air defense mission as it pertained to the U.S. European Command, pending creation of an integrated NATO air defense system. At the same time the 32d Artillery Brigade and its six Nike battalions were placed under the operational control of CINCSAFE. Approval of US CINCEUR would have to be obtained before any U.S. Army unit was deployed outside the FOURMIAF area.⁴⁵

In anticipation of the new air defense directive, CINCSAREUR had ordered the transfer of two Nike battalions from the 34th to the 32d Brigade; simultaneously, the 34th Brigade headquarters had been reduced to a zero balance in strength.⁴⁶ The 2 Nike battalions involved in the transfer had been employed in the defense of the Rhine River bridges and the Seventh Army Commander therefore wanted to retain 2 Skyweeper battalions to defend the bridges.⁴⁷ Since the bridges were protected by the operational Nike units still in place, USAREUR determined that atomic delivery weapons units and major headquarters would be given priority for antiaircraft gun protection. At the same time Seventh Army's inadequate air defense was a matter of great concern, and the Hawk units programmed for FY's 1961 and 1962 were therefore to be deployed in the Seventh Army area, if possible.⁴⁸

b. Hawk Deployment. According to USAREUR's plans, 4 of the 6 Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions were to be deployed to Europe in FY 1961 and the 2 others in FY 1962. The air defense concept provided for siting the Hawk batteries in the forward area of the U.S. Seventh Army so that they could complement the Nike units by executing low-altitude strikes or forcing hostile targets up to altitudes most favorable to Nike action. In FY 1961 a band of 3 rows of 5 Hawk batteries deployed in a checkerboard pattern would cover the most likely avenues of approach for high-priority targets flying to the west. This band was to be extended to the north and south when NATO Hawk units became available. The two battalions scheduled to arrive in FY 1962 were to be so deployed as to thicken the belt in the U.S. zone. These plans would be subject to revision if no NATO Hawk units became available to extend the U.S. belt.⁴⁹ CINCSAFE concurred

⁴⁴Ltr, Gen W. B. Palmer, Dep US CINCEUR, to CINCSAREUR, 5 Aug 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/H5-58 Air Def.

⁴⁵Cable EC-9-4030, US CINCEUR to CINCSAREUR, CINCSAFE, 6 Aug 58. USAREUR SMC IN 1493. SECRET.

⁴⁶Cable SX-5648, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 26 Jul 58. SECRET.

⁴⁷Ltr, Lt Gen J. D. Eddleman, CG Seventh Army, to CINCSAREUR, 31 Jul 58, subj: Command Structure for Seventh Army Air Defense. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/H5-58 Air Def.

⁴⁸(1) Cable SX-6075, CENTAG to Seventh Army, 14 Aug 58. NATO SECRET.
(2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Eddleman, 10 Sep 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/H5-58 Air Def.

⁴⁹Cable SX-6768, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 20 Sep 58. SECRET.

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in the forward disposition of the Hawk units, but preferred a thinner band with greater initial north-south extension to provide the optimum over-all low-altitude defense for Western Europe.⁵⁰ US CINCEUR pointed out that decisions on the deployment of Hawk units would be the responsibility of CINCUSAFE as the Air Defense Commander. As Hawk units arrived, they would be placed under his operational control.⁵¹

In a letter to General L. L. Lemnitzer, then Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Hodes expressed serious concern over this air defense concept. If the field-army commander was to carry out his responsibilities, he would have to be given the authority to select sites and move units to conform to his operations. Since all conventional air defense units in Seventh Army would probably have to be inactivated to provide spaces for the Hawk battalions, the army commander would have no means for carrying out his air defense responsibilities unless US CINCEUR revised his stand. While the concept was acceptable that Hawk units assigned to the field armies, committed to NATO, and deployed in Europe would have to conform to the air defense procedures prescribed by the regional NATO air defense commander, General Lemnitzer was asked to assure that the Seventh Army commander would be given authority to employ, position, and move Hawk units assigned for the protection of his own forces while conforming to NATO air defense procedures.⁵²

In his reply General Lemnitzer pointed out that Hawk battalions were being deployed primarily for the air defense of field-army forces; they were being provided to US CINCEUR for the air defense of NATO Europe. On the other hand, it would be unwise at this time to request the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a decision, as the weight given to the theater commander's views would most likely result in a decision unfavorable to the Army.⁵³

In a letter sent to the Deputy US CINCEUR in early December 1958, General M. D. Taylor, then Army Chief of Staff, noted the delegation of responsibility to CINCUSAFE and did not question the authority of US CINCEUR to deploy Nike and Hawk battalions. However, he did hope that US CINCEUR and CINCUSAFE would bear in mind that the Army surface-to-air missile units planned for deployment in Europe in FY's 1961 and 1962 were designed for field-army use and had been justified to Congress for such

⁵⁰ Cable CINC-40668, CINCUSAFE to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, et al., 8 Oct 58. USAREUR SMC IN 2111. SECRET.

⁵¹ Cable EC-9-5288, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 10 Oct 58. USAREUR SMC IN 2733. SECRET.

⁵² Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen L. L. Lemnitzer, VCofS DA, 16 Oct 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS Sp Wpns (1958).

⁵³ Ltr, Gen Lemnitzer to Gen Hodes, 12 Nov 58. SECRET. In file above.

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use. Essentially, this justification had been based on the inadequacy of the field army's air defense, which resulted from the growing obsolescence of current field-army antiaircraft weapons. Hence, while these new weapons could be integrated into the over-all theater air defense, the requirements of the field-army commander should be given due weight in their deployment.⁵⁴

During the same month representatives of interested headquarters formed a working group of the AFCEM Air Defense Committee to prepare a low-altitude surface-to-air missile deployment plan for the Central Region. The plan envisaged four rows of Hawk batteries from the Kiel Canal to the Swiss border, with the westernmost row east of the Rhine River in the CENTAG zone. Six U.S. Army Hawk battalions were to be included in the CENTAG Zone. By 30 June 1959, however, SHAPE had not approved the AFCEM plan.⁵⁵

In April 1959 CINCUSAREUR sent CINCSAFE his latest proposed Hawk deployment plan with a request for concurrence to permit the earliest possible initiation of the already over-delayed action necessary to deploy the Hawk units. This plan was in consonance with the concepts established by representatives of both headquarters on 24 February 1959. On the premise that the over-all NATO deployment would be in 4 rows of batteries situated as far to the east as possible, the 4 U.S. Hawk battalions to be deployed in FY 1961 would form 2 rows (Map 1). The 6 succeeding battalions to be deployed in FY 1962--instead of the 2 originally planned--would extend and thicken this defense within the over-all area allocated for U.S. units. However, there might be instances when units would have to be deployed outside of this area because of operational or logistical considerations. Some units would be east of planned ground defense positions, which under certain conditions might interfere with the field-army commander's use of defensive atomic fires. Moreover, they would also be exposed to attack by enemy ground forces. It was therefore considered essential that, after the initiation of hostilities, the field-army commander have the authority to redeploy the Hawk units and subsequently notify the air defense commander.⁵⁶ On 14 May 1959 the U.S. Seventh Army was directed to proceed with a site selection program based on this tentative deployment plan, even though CINCSAFE had not yet replied.⁵⁷ One week later CINCSAFE's reply was received. While he acknowledged that after hostilities had commenced the field-army commander might be compelled to move Hawk units under enemy pressure, CINCSAFE insisted

⁵⁴Ltr. Gen M. D. Taylor, CofSA, to Gen Palmer, 1 Dec 58. SECRET. In file above.

⁵⁵(1) Cable EADP-10593, COMAIRCENT to CINCENT, et al., 22 Dec 58. USAREUR SMC IN 6354. (2) DP; USAREUR G3 to CofS, 10 Mar 59, subj: US Army HAWK SAM Deployment (U). AEAGC-OP 250/16. Both SECRET.

⁵⁶Ltr. USAREUR to CINCSAFE ADVON, 20 Apr 59, subj: US Army Hawk Deployment Plan. AEAGC-OP 250/16. SECRET.

⁵⁷Cable SX-3906, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 14 May 59. CONF.

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that he be notified immediately. Moreover, units might have to be deployed outside the delineated zone to conform to tactical and logistical requirements; however, these adjustments would have to be forward and toward the east. As the Air Defense Commander, he had established a criterion that low-level missiles were to be deployed as close to the western edge of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) as practicable, requiring the Hawk units that were to be deployed in the south to be shifted eastward. A copy of the USAREUR plan with the USAFE modification was forwarded to FOURATAF headquarters for concurrence and determination of compatibility with NATO plans for flank extensions to the Hawk belt.⁵⁸


c. Fire Control Coordination Equipment.

(1) Selection. In September 1958 USAREUR was asked to concur in a draft USAFE letter concerning a special FY 1959 Military Assistance Program for an integrated air defense system. In an informal answer USAREUR pointed out that, since all requirements for Army equipment--Nike, Hawk, and AN/MSG-4--were in approved or recommended programs, there was no need for including such items in the USAFE program. At a conference on the USAFE proposals held on 20 September 1958 a SHAPE representative asked that the Army AN/MSG-4 system, which had been approved by the Department of Defense and was actually available, be used, together with its radar, the AN/MPS-23, at sector operations centers (SOC's). If a SOC had its own radar, the requirement for the AN/MPS-23 would be eliminated. When the USAFE proposals were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 27 September 1958, CINC-USAREUR took exception to two points: the plan to locate the AN/MSG-4 system in the SOC, and the possibility that the AN/MPS-23 might be separated from the AN/MSG-4. However, since a basic Department of Defense decision concerning data handling and control systems was pending, US EUCOM preferred to wait until that decision had been made before discussing the point raised by USAREUR.⁵⁹

Meanwhile, the Department of the Air Force had challenged the Department of the Army deployment of AN/MSG-4 equipment to overseas areas where the Department of the Air Force contemplated deployment of TACS BADGE (GPA-73) equipment. This controversy had been referred to a Joint Tactical Group under the chairmanship of the Department of Defense. This group apparently had to determine both the time when GPA-73 equipment would

⁵⁸ 1st Ind, to ltr, USAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 21 May 59, to ltr, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 20 Apr 59, cited above. SECRET.

⁵⁹ (1) DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 16 Oct 58, subj: ACE Air Defense System (U). AEAGC-OP 250/H5.1 GC. (2) Cable SX-7275, CINCUSAREUR to SHAPE, 20 Oct 58. (3) Memo for Maj Gen D. E. Beach, Dir of Air Def & Sp Wpns, ODCSOPS, n.d., subj: Air Defense Coordination Equipment for ACE (U). AEAGC-OP 250/H5.2 GC. All SECRET.



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become available in overseas theaters and the advisability of procuring and deploying AN/MSG-4 equipment.⁶⁰

Engineer testing of the AN/MSG-4 started in the spring of 1959, and it was anticipated that an interim report, upon which the Department of the Army could base its decision on deployment, would be received in October 1959. If the evaluation was favorable, the Department of the Army would make prototype set available to USAREUR by about January 1960. The Department of Defense was expected to decide on the procurement of the AN/MSG-4 system after the interim report had been evaluated.⁶¹

(2) Location of Equipment. In anticipation of the receipt of the AN/MSG-4 equipment by the 32d Artillery Brigade, CINCUSAFE asked that planning for its installation be coordinated with his staff. The air defense of Germany would be conducted from three prime ground environment terminals--the command and reporting centers (CRC's) at Langensiefel, Giebelstadt, and Freising--that he supervised from the Kindsbach caves. Accordingly, it was his desire that when the AN/MSG-4 system was issued to the 32d Artillery Brigade, the Army functions pertaining to target assignment, weapons commitment, and control status be performed in the CRC's.

General Hodes objected to the collocation of the AN/MSG-4 equipment at the CRC's because this would reduce the over-all effectiveness of the 32d Artillery Brigade. The AN/MSG-4 system was designed to complement the antiaircraft defense and would therefore have to be located to the best tactical advantage of that defense. As an alternate solution, he suggested the use of closed circuit television, which would permit the CRC's to obtain a complete picture of the artillery brigade operations.

But the Air Defense Commander continued to press for positive control over all weapons. According to him, collocation of the weapons control centers was necessary to have a fully integrated air defense system. General Eddleman concurred in the USAFE plan when he was satisfied that collocation of the supervision of surface-to-air missiles and interceptors would improve joint action and simplify and expedite the flow of intelligence to the Nike firing units.⁶²

On 1 June 1959 CINCUSAFE directed that an SOC, consisting of the missile control center (Army air defense command post) and the Air Force

⁶⁰ Ltr, Gen Beach to Maj Gen E. F. Cardwell, USAREUR Dep CofS for Adv Wpns & GM, 28 Nov 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/H5-58 Air Def.

⁶¹ Cable DA-957340, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Apr 59. USAREUR SMC IN 843. SECRET.

⁶² (1) Ltr, Gen E. F. Everest, CINCUSAFE, to Gen Hodes, 25 Feb 59. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Everest, 9 Mar 59. (3) Ltr, Gen Everest to Gen Eddleman, 27 Apr 59. (4) Ltr, Gen Eddleman to Gen Everest, 13 May 59. All CONF. All in USAREUR SGS 250/17 Air Def.

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control elements (command and reporting center) be established at Langerkopf.⁶³

d. USAREUR's Air Defense Concept. The air defense of Central Europe was to be conducted according to an area concept by which the Seventh Army would operate under an air defense umbrella of Nike, Hawk, and fighter interceptors--U.S. and NATO--under over-all operational control of the Air Defense Commander. This concept would involve an initial Hawk barrier along the Iron Curtain, backed up by a Nike defense in accordance with SACEUR plans. It was not intended to reduce the mobility of the Hawk units in the forward areas of the combat zone. Their tactical control and survival through redeployment would be assured by the close and continuing coordination of the 32d Artillery Brigade and the Seventh Army.⁶⁴

13. Major Changes in U.S. Forces

a. The Restationing of the Airborne Battle Groups. On 1 July 1958 the 11th Airborne Division was redesignated as the 24th Infantry Division. The division remained responsible for providing the airborne elements of Army Task Force (ATF) 201, consisting of two airborne battle groups, a composite artillery battalion, and a quartermaster parachute company. To enable the 24th Division to comply with this requirement, it was organized as a composite division with a strength of 14,511, whereas the standard infantry division was composed of 13,080 personnel.⁶⁵

At the time of the Lebanon operation, when part of ATF 201 was deployed to the Middle East and the 24th Division was reduced by over 2,200 personnel, plans were prepared to shift the burden of supporting the task force to the 8th Infantry Division, which was earmarked as the reserve division. The potential reduction in the combat capability of the reserve was considered as the lesser of two evils. But the entire problem would be eliminated if the Department of the Army approved General Hodes' recommendation to transfer the primary Army responsibility for supporting contingency plans in the Middle East to the Strategic Army Corps in the United States.⁶⁶ However, the Department of the Army not only refused to relieve USAREUR of its Middle East support mission, but also indicated that the planned gyroscope movement of the 304th and 505th Airborne Battle Groups could not be canceled.⁶⁷

⁶³(1) USAFE OPLAN 506-59, 1 Jun 59. (2) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Maj H. E. Strong, USAREUR G3 Ops Sec, 31 Aug 59. Both SECRET.

⁶⁴Cable SX-5737, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 2 Sep 59. SECRET.

⁶⁵USAREUR CO 155, 13 Jun 58. UNCLAS.

⁶⁶Cable SX-6191, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hodes to DA for Taylor, 21 Aug 58. SECRET.

⁶⁷Cable DA-948475, DA from Moore to CINCUSAREUR excl for Hodes, 23 Sep 58. USAREUR SMC IN 6311. SECRET.

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As a result, the 8th Infantry Division was reorganized as a composite division on 1 December 1958, so that it could assume the airborne support responsibility hitherto held by the 24th Division. On 21 December 1958 the 504th Airborne Battle Group of the 8th Division replaced the 503d Airborne Battle Group of the 24th Division as Force BRAVO, and one month later the 505th Airborne Battle Group of the 8th Division relieved the 187th Airborne Battle Group of the 24th Division as Force ALPHA. On 5 February 1959 the 24th Division was reorganized as a standard infantry division.⁶⁸

Two months later the Department of the Army indicated that \$372,950 had been approved for the construction of the facilities that were needed to continue USAREUR's airborne capability. There was no indication that USAREUR would be relieved of the airborne support mission in the future.⁶⁹

b. Missile Units in Germany.

(1) Nike Atomic Capability. The first battalion-size package of Nike Hercules-trained personnel arrived in Europe in the spring of 1959; these personnel were capable of converting four batteries of Nike Ajax to Hercules with an atomic capability. Normally a battalion-size package would be assigned within one battalion, but, since only permanent Nike sites were utilized for the Hercules, the package was split between two battalions with permanent sites. The conversion progressed smoothly for the first two units--Battery B, 2d Missile Battalion, 56th Artillery, located at Landau, and Battery A, 5th Missile Battalion, 1st Artillery, located at Wackernheim--each of which acquired an atomic capability by 26 May 1959. Incomplete construction at the other permanent sites delayed the conversion of two other batteries.⁷⁰

(2) Redstone Capability. The 40th Missile Group, which was the first Redstone unit to arrive in Europe, became fully operational on 10 October 1958. The second Redstone unit, the 46th Missile Group, was stationed at Neckarsulm in the spring of 1959; it achieved operational readiness by 31 May 1959.⁷¹

c. The Italianization of USASETAF. Because of impending national elections in Italy in the autumn of 1958, USAREUR had requested in May

⁶⁸ (1) Incl 2, to ltr, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Nov 58, subj: Schedule for Restationing Airborne Battle Groups (U). AETGC-PL 250/16, CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) DF, G3 to CINCUSAREUR n.d., subj: Peacetime Location of ATF 201. AEAGC-OP 250/18-GC. SECRET.

⁶⁹ Cable DA-407369, DA to USAREUR, 30 Apr 59. USAREUR SMC IN 26. SECRET.

⁷⁰ Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Maj Strong, 22 Oct 59. SECRET.

⁷¹ Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col J. F. Mitchell, USAREUR G3 Ops Sec, 22 Oct 59. SECRET.

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1958 that the Italianization plan be dropped temporarily and that the FY 1959 troop program be raised accordingly.⁷² In reply, the Department of the Army forwarded a plan for the Italianization of USASETAF that called for the reduction of 2,000 personnel spaces by the end of FY 1959. By FY 1961 the Italianization of the entire 1st U.S. Missile Command was envisaged. Moreover, the FY 1960 Army Troop Program indicated a reduction of 800 additional USASETAF spaces. However, the Department of the Army explained in January 1959 that the 800-space reduction would not be enforced until the Departments of State and Defense specifically approved approaching the Italian Government on this matter.⁷³

During FY 1959 the USASETAF reorganization was accomplished, but not on the basis of a space-for-space replacement by Italian personnel. In December 1958 three U.S. Army infantry security companies were inactivated. In June 1959 two Honest John battalions were inactivated, and both the Sky Cavalry Squadron and engineer battalion were reduced to company size. Elimination of the Headquarters Service and Supply Group and selective reductions in the headquarters of USASETAF, the 1st U.S. Missile Command, and the USASETAF Logistical Command provided the additional spaces. These reductions were partly compensated for by the availability of two Italian Honest John battalions in an advanced state of training. Moreover, LANDSOUTH planned to provide Italian infantry security companies for USASETAF.⁷⁴

Meanwhile the Department of the Army was reappraising its plans for the Italianization of USASETAF, taking into consideration such factors as the 18-month training period required by Italian Corporal units to attain initial limited capability and the delays that had occurred in the negotiations. In February 1959 USAREUR was therefore asked to submit revised plans for further Italianization; these plans were developed in conjunction with USASETAF.⁷⁵

USASETAF submitted two plans in April 1959. The first plan provided for a course of actions to be taken if the Department of the Army maintained its schedule to Italianize the entire 1st U.S. Missile Command by the end of FY 1961, while the second plan covered the same program but

⁷²(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 7 May 58, subj: SETAF (U). AEAGC-PL.
(2) Cable SX-3696, USAREUR to DA, 10 May 58. Both SECRET.

⁷³(1) Ltr, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jun 58, subj: Indigenization of USASETAF (S). OPS OD EME. (2) Cable DA-952906, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Jan 59. USAREUR SMC IN 196. (3) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col R. E. Neiman, C/USAREUR G1 Mil Mpr Con Sec, 9 Oct 59. All SECRET.

⁷⁴(1) Cable P-0351, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Mar 59. USAREUR SMC IN 8993. (2) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Col Neiman, 9 Oct 59. Both SECRET.

⁷⁵(1) Cable DA-954561, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Feb 59. USAREUR SMC IN 1818. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-1849, USAREUR to USASETAF, 13 Feb 59. CONF.

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allowed for a delay of 12 additional months. In a separate memorandum Maj. Gen. J. P. Daley, the commander of USASETAF, explained that neither plan was really acceptable. The American Corporal battalions of USASETAF could be replaced only by taking arbitrary actions that would reflect on American-Italian relations. Further, the elimination of tactical U.S. Army units in northern Italy in the next year or two would drastically reduce the influence of the U.S. Army on the Italian Army, which in turn would weaken materially the NATO ground posture in southern Europe. He therefore recommended that for the next few years the troop plans for USASETAF be based on the need to keep a limited number of U.S. tactical units--preferably missile units--in northern Italy. General Eddleman indorsed these recommendations and asked the Department of the Army to reconsider its plans for further inactivations of U.S. Army combat units in Italy.⁷⁶ No further action was taken before the end of the reporting period.

d. Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition. On 1 July 1958 the U.S. Army Surveillance Unit, Europe, was established as a TD organization and attached to the USAREUR Quartermaster and Signal School at Lenggries, Germany, for technical assistance and logistical and administrative support. The mission of the unit was to provide USAREUR with an interim target acquisition capability with the equipment then available, to train personnel, and to test new equipment.

The equipment available at the time of activation included the M-33 AAA Fire Control Radar, the MPQ-10 Counter Mortar Radar, the KA-20 camera, the Mobile Photo Laboratory TMO-7, and the L-19 and L-20 aircraft. The M-33 radar with an air controller, used to vector Army aircraft for visual observation and for photo missions with the KA-20 camera, proved effective for reconnaissance missions. The MPQ-10 was equipped with a moving target indicator so that it could be used as a ground-surveillance radar.

Exercise FREE PLAY, conducted in February 1959, gave the surveillance unit its first opportunity to test the effectiveness of its operational capabilities. Unfortunately, the full effect produced by the unit could not be determined because each of the opposing forces benefited from its services. Even so, USAREUR directed that the U.S. Seventh Army activate interim surveillance units within each of its divisions.

The TOE's under which the infantry and armored divisions were operating provided for 44-man surveillance platoons in the division reconnaissance squadrons. These spaces had not been filled because the proper equipment had been lacking. When the interim platoons were activated, they were designated aerial surveillance platoons and became part of the division

⁷⁶(1) Ltr, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Apr 59, subj: Reorganization of USASETAF (U), with 1st Ind, USAREUR to DA, 29 Apr 59. AEAGC-NA. (2) Memo, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Apr 59, subj: Reorganization of SETAF Subsequent to 30 June 1959, with 1st Ind, USAREUR to DA, 20 Apr 59. AEASE-CG. All SECRET.

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aviation company. Personnel were drawn from Seventh Army resources, and by 30 June 1959 the equipment was being issued to give each division an interim combat surveillance and target acquisition capability.⁷⁷

As a means of improving that capability, the Department of the Army authorized a one-time purchase of \$35,000,000 worth of nonstandard equipment. Of this total, USAREUR was authorized the following:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Replacing</u>	<u>Authorization</u>
SD-1 Drone System, consisting of 12 Drones		1 per division; 2 for USASETAF
AN/MPQ-29 Radar	M-33 Radar	2 per division; 2 for USASETAF
AN/TPS-21 Radar	-	2 per battle group (infantry division); 1 per tank battalion (armored division); and 1 per armored infantry battalion (armored division)
AN/TPS-25 Radar	MPQ-10 Radar	1 per division; 3 for USASETAF
AN/APS-85 Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), mounted in L-23D aircraft	-	1 per division; 2 for USASETAF

The Department of the Army was not able to purchase the desired equipment with the funds available; therefore, USAREUR would not receive the authorized quantities in all cases.

By the end of June 1959 the surveillance unit had received 1 SD-1 Drone System, 1 AN/TPS-25 Radar, and 4 L-23D aircraft with AN/APS-85 (SLAR) mounted. This equipment was issued and put into operation as soon as it arrived. The drone system, radar set, and one aircraft were retained by the surveillance unit. Two L-23's were assigned temporarily to V and VII Corps headquarters, respectively, for evaluation and use by the corps G2 and were to be on call to the divisions. The fourth L-23 was destined for USASETAF. As additional new equipment arrived, it was to replace previously issued items; eventually, all equipment was to be replaced by standard items as they became available. The existing

⁷⁷(1) DF, USAREUR G2 to CofS, 23 Dec 58, subj: Combat Surveillance Organization (U). AEAGB-IC (C) 274/5.3. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Capt J. H. Madison, USAREUR G2, 19 Oct 59. CONF.

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surveillance organizations were expected to be changed on the basis of future testing and evaluation.⁷⁸

e. Recommendation for Discontinuance of Operation Gyroscope. Based on his observations while Seventh Army commander and on the advice of his senior commanders and staff, General Eddleman asked the Department of the Army in April 1959 to discontinue gyroscope⁷⁹ movements to Europe as soon as possible. He pointed out that at the end of March 1959 only 21 percent of Seventh Army personnel and 14 percent of all USAREUR military personnel were in gyroscope units. Moreover, the USAREUR Individual Replacement System instituted in 1956⁸⁰ was working well; it had been further improved in February 1959 by the preparation of longer-range forecasts of needs and earlier announcements of individual assignments. General Eddleman added that enlisted men in grades E-8 and E-9 were being assigned to Europe by name, in the same manner as officers and warrant officers, and recommended that this practice be extended to other senior NCO's and that replacement by small packets be substituted for gyroscope movements.⁸¹

Underlying the recommendation was the fact that the gyroscope plan had been based upon assumptions and expectations that had since been nullified. It had been assumed, for instance, that the strength of the Army would be fixed at approximately one million men, that its structure would not change significantly, and that Government-operated family housing would be available overseas for all entitled married personnel who wished to bring their families with them.⁸²

Some benefits had been noted. The presence of large numbers of Regular Army personnel who had voluntarily joined gyroscope organizations of their choice, because of greater stability of assignment, had contributed to good unit morale. Officers and NCO's had gained valuable experience in moving units overseas. Unit training was effective and progressive up to the time of the receipt of midterm replacement packets.⁸³

These benefits, however, had been more than counterbalanced by a number of seriously disadvantageous developments. Since sufficient

⁷⁸(1) DF, USAREUR G2 to SGS, 4 Dec 58, subj: Quarterly Report of US Army Combat Surveillance. AEAGS-IG (C) 274/5.3. SECRET. (2) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Capt Madison, cited above. CONF.

⁷⁹(1) AR 22-20, 27 Aug 58, subj: Operation Gyroscope. UNCLAS.
(2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, p. 60. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁸⁰See USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 70-71. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁸¹Ltr, Gen C. D. Eddleman, CINCUSAREUR, to CofSA, 22 Apr 59. AEAGA-E 265/76. CONF.

⁸²Ibid. CONF.

⁸³DF, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to CofS, Apr 59, subj: Termination of Operation Gyroscope for all USAREUR Units. AEAGC-OP 278/5. CONF.

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housing for eligible married personnel was never available, most of the gyroscope units had to be brought overseas with fewer than their authorized number of upper-grade NCO's and specialists, most of whom were married. Consequently, positions of leadership and skill had to be filled with inexperienced personnel, many of whom were recent inductees. Moreover, when the application of sound promotion policies restricted the advancement of these individuals to grades commensurate with positions held, resentment was frequent.

Another serious development had been the necessity of meeting the required quota of Regular Army personnel in gyroscope units by transferring to them large numbers of men who had less than a full overseas tour to serve. These men were constantly being lost to the organizations and were being replaced in many instances by personnel ineligible to gyroscope back to the United States with the units. Thus, there was more shifting of personnel in a gyroscope unit, throughout its overseas period, than in a typical nongyroscope unit.

The most serious objection to gyroscope rotation was that it lowered combat readiness critically. In most cases the training of units before arrival was less than desirable and had to be supplemented by intensive training overseas. Six to nine months of training usually brought a gyroscope unit to a higher state of proficiency than that of the typical nongyroscope unit. However, the gyroscope unit's original group of inductees returned to the United States midway in its overseas tour and was replaced by large, partially-trained packets. Although a high state of readiness was regained in about 4 months, proficiency was again reduced dangerously during the last 2 to 4 months overseas, this time to its lowest ebb when the organization was filled with short-term personnel and occupied with preparations for the turn-over to the incoming unit, individual clearances, and other necessary preliminaries to departure. "The static readiness of a nongyroscope unit has some minor fluctuations, but comparable to the material changes in the gyroscope unit," noted General Eddleman.⁸⁴

At the end of the fiscal year General Eddleman's recommendation had not been acted upon.⁸⁵

14. CENTAG's German Forces

Throughout FY 1959 the German forces earmarked for CENTAG continued to be 2 corps headquarters and 5 divisions--1 mountain, 1 airborne, 1 armored, and 2 infantry. While no new units were added, the previously designated divisions underwent a drastic reorganization starting in March

⁸⁴ Ltr, Gen Eddleman to CofSA, 22 Apr 59, cited above. CONF.

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In early August 1959 the Department of the Army announced the discontinuance of gyroscope movements to Europe, effective 1 September, and the substitution of replacement by 4-man packets organized into temporary carrier companies. UNCLAS.

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1959. To double the number of units, the tank and artillery battalions were split in half and brought up to strength with fillers. One third of each infantry battalion was used to form a new unit so that a fourth battalion was created from every three infantry battalions. The infantry divisions were redesignated armored infantry divisions, and all divisions were subdivided into brigades rather than regiments and combat groups, as formerly. The divisional supply and service units continued unchanged. The new armored infantry divisions were composed of 1 tank and 2 infantry brigades, with a strength increase of approximately 1,550 personnel. The armored division consisted of 1 infantry and 2 tank brigades, with a 1,200-man personnel increase. The mountain division was composed of 1 tank and 2 mountain brigades, with an additional 1,600 men. The airborne division was reduced by approximately 700 personnel and was organized into 2 airborne brigades and 1 tank battalion.

The reorganization coincided with the release of approximately 24,000 conscripts at the end of March 1959. Although this situation weakened the German forces at a time when CENTAG could least afford to be weak, the reorganization could not be carried out successively in one division after another because of the urgency of creating additional units. The reorganization was still in progress at the end of FY 1959.⁸⁶

15. Unconventional Warfare

a. Movement of the 10th Special Forces Group. The plan to relocate the 10th Special Forces Group from Bad Tölz, Germany, to Camp Darby, Italy, had been approved by all interested agencies, including the Department of the Army. By mid-FY 1959 only the approval of the Italian Government was lacking. In December 1958 the American Embassy in Rome made the initial contact, but negotiations with the Italian Government did not proceed smoothly or rapidly. In May 1959 the Ambassador suggested that--unless overriding military considerations of which he was not aware spoke for moving this group to Italian territory--serious consideration should be given to shifting it to another country, where maneuvers and the general activities of the group would be less conspicuous, less likely to attract the attention of the crowded local populace, and thus less likely to affect U.S. interests adversely.

Moving the 10th Special Forces Group had been considered necessary because the D-day posture would thus be improved by avoiding crash redeployment to a wartime base of operations. This was still true, but General Eddleman viewed unfavorably any political restrictions on training this force or concealing its intended wartime employment. On 2 June 1959 he

⁸⁶(1) Ltr. MAAG Ger to USAFEUR, 3 Feb 59, subj: MAAG-FRG Briefing Charts (U). MGAR-OT-000. (2) DP, CA Div to CINCSUSAFEUR, 12 Mar 59, subj: Imminent German Army Reorganization. LEACA 265/H52.1 CA. (3) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Maj B. L. Carroll, CENTAG G3, 12 Oct 59. All SECRET.

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therefore suggested to US CINCEUR that this group should remain in its present location.⁸⁷

b. Operations. The 10th Special Forces Group participated in the Support Operations Task Force, Europe (SOTFE), FTX 58-2 conducted during the period 14 July-8 August 1958. The general objective of the exercise was to provide training for unconventional warfare personnel and concurrently to test concepts outlined in current theater plans. From the USAREUR standpoint, the exercise revealed that the base of operations established at St. Andre de L'Euse in France was incapable of supplying the communications and logistical needs of the forces depending on its support. As a result of the exercise, US EUCOM and USAREUR made every effort to achieve the desired capability. USACOMZEUR was directed to plan for and prepare, in coordination with SOTFE, a wartime operating base for US EUCOM unconventional warfare activities. This would include providing the necessary administrative, logistical, transportation, and communications support for SOTFE and giving storage and logistical support to the 10th Special Forces Group. The communications potential was increased with Department of the Army approval in March 1959, when US CINCEUR requested that the 10th Special Forces Group be augmented even though other USAREUR units faced cuts. The Department of the Army approved a manpower increase of 8 officers and 58 enlisted men, consisting almost entirely of communications personnel, for the 10th Special Forces Group.⁸⁸

c. Berlin Planning. At the height of the Berlin crisis the 10th Special Forces Group sent a cadre of communications specialists to their operations base at St. Andre de L'Euse to establish the necessary communications facilities for any eventuality. On 30 June 1959 US EUCOM observed that this communications facility proved highly satisfactory; it had materially improved the unconventional warfare capability and at the same time provided excellent communications training over realistic distances.

⁸⁷(1) Cable, US Emb Rome sgd Zellerbach to US EUCOM, 20 May 59. USAREUR SMC IN 7564. (2) Cable EC-9-2819, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 25 May 59. USAREUR SMC IN 7483. (3) DF, G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Jun 59, subj: Relocation of 10th Special Forces Group to Camp Darby (S). AEAGC-PL 250/17. (4) Cable SX-4204, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 2 Jun 59. (5) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col H. E. Knapp (USMC), USAREUR G3 War Plans Sec, 24 Sep 59. All SECRET.

⁸⁸(1) Ltr, Hq SOTFE to US CINCEUR, 18 Sep 58, subj: Summary of Major Lessons Learned from FTX 58-2. In USAREUR G3 War Plans Sec. (2) Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Sep 58, subj: US CINCEUR's Capability to Conduct UW Operations (S). ECJC-S 385. (3) DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 13 Oct 58, same subj. AEAGC-PL. (4) Ltr, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 22 Nov 58, subj: Assignment of Responsibilities and Missions in Support of UW Operations. AEAGC-PL. All SECRET. (5) Cable, 10th Sp Forces Gp to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Apr 59. USAREUR SMC IN 360. CONF. (6) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Col Knapp, 24 Sep 59. SECRET.

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Moreover US EUCOM desired that this operation be continued and that USAREUR make the necessary arrangements.⁸⁹

After having studied the role of special forces teams in the Berlin area, US EUCOM questioned the validity of current planning for use of these teams. As a corollary, US EUCOM proposed that the special forces personnel be withdrawn from Berlin and assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group to augment the inadequate forces available for unconventional warfare operations. In reply, USAREUR cited the necessity of keeping special forces teams in Berlin and recommended that plans be prepared for their utilization in the Berlin area after they had completed their initial emergency missions. US EUCOM concurred and directed that the applicable operations plans be revised accordingly. As a result, the U.S. Commander, Berlin, published the Berlin Operations Plan Number 2 on 1 July, and the SOTFE commander published his Operations Plan 3-2 on 9 July 1959.⁹⁰

⁸⁹(1) Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Jun 59, subj: US Communications Base Station (C). ECJC-S 4500. (2) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Col Knapp, 24 Sep 59. Both SECRET.

⁹⁰(1) Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Sep 58, subj: Planned Utilization of Special Forces Teams in the Berlin Area (C). ECJC-S. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 4 Nov 58, same subj. AEAGC-PL 250/H5.3 GC. (3) Cable EC-9-6189, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 20 Nov 58. USAREUR SMC IN 4839. (4) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Col Knapp, 24 Sep 59. All TS.

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CHAPTER 4

Training

By mid-1958 national and international training aims of USAREUR/CENTAG had become virtually identical. Although each member nation of NATO retained control over the training of its forces, the major effort of all nations concerned was the achievement of international (NATO) aims. This was facilitated by the fact that NATO headquarters conducted all major exercises and maneuvers.

16. Higher Training Aims

The higher training aims specified by LANDCENT for calendar year 1958 included the wartime acquisition of intelligence and its dissemination throughout the Central European Command, with emphasis on obtaining information that would enable NATO forces to reap the maximum benefit from SAC-EUR's interdiction program. Also to be emphasized were tactics and procedures for the employment of atomic weapons by ground forces, particularly during the early stages of the land battle, with a view to establishing a common doctrine. In addition, higher command and control on the nuclear battlefield and inter-allied communications, with emphasis on both speed and flexibility, were to be studied along with the broader aspects of the fallout problem and the control of damage, casualties, and refugees.¹

In December 1958 COMLANDCENT issued the new training directive for 1959. USAREUR/CENTAG was to strengthen its ability to parry cold war attacks by

¹Ltr, Hq LANDCENT to COMCENTAG, COMNOCTHAG, 3 Dec 57, subj: COMLANDCENT Higher Training Directive for 1958. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Admin, ALFCE ltrs 57.

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which the enemy continued to pursue unceasingly his subversive and psychological aims. The NATO forces would have to keep their minds open to all possible aspects of warfare, whether it be total and nuclear--as foreseen in their current emergency plans--local or limited, or again, simply subversive. In all their activities they would have to work closely with the air forces. They should not allow themselves to be deviated from their common objective--the destruction of the enemy. All exercises would have to take into account the mobility and speed of the enemy, particularly during the first hours of hostilities. The NATO forces should not rely on the enemy's alleged rigidity of maneuver, since in his regular units this rigidity might contain a high degree of Asiatic cunning. Also, exercises would have to be based on situations resulting from the forward strategy. The following aspects were to be emphasized:

- a. Actions to counter a surprise attack were to be practiced;
- b. Friendly fires and the procedures necessary to warn friendly troops of impending strikes were to be coordinated and properly timed;
- c. Maneuver and atomic fire plans were to be interpreted with emphasis on the predominance of atomic firepower exploited by ground maneuver;
- d. The organization of the nuclear strike information centers (NUSIC's) was to be perfected so that these centers would be capable of operating at short notice and would be integrated with the Air Force system;
- e. The concepts and procedures for dealing with limited wars, the threat of limited wars, and frontier incidents within Central Europe were to be studied. In this connection, special attention was to be given to cooperating with territorial forces and avoiding that the over-all defense plan be jeopardized if the enemy started a general offensive; and
- f. Mobile warfare methods were to be studied and practiced, to include the employment of forces in an air-transported role using either helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft.²

17. Marksmanship

Emphasis on good marksmanship was intensified throughout the Army during FY 1959. Encouraging results were achieved in the international marksmanship competition conducted at Moscow in early 1959, when the Army provided the best marksmen for the United States teams. General Bruce C. Clarke--the commander of USCONARC, who had previously commanded Seventh Army--commented that although the U.S. teams won no team events, 5 first and 6 second places made a creditable showing and one of the best to date in international competition. However, increasing emphasis would have to

² COMLANDCENT's Higher Tng Dir for 1959, 11 Dec 58, NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Cmbt Dev Off.

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be placed on international shooting if the United States was to overcome the lead held by the Soviet Union in this field. If the U.S. Army was to achieve national preeminence in the field of marksmanship, all components would have to make maximum contributions. The U.S. Army Advanced Marksmanship Unit, established three years before at Fort Benning, had provided a very necessary focal point for the competitive marksmanship program in improving competitors, instruction, and training.

The over-all success of the program, however, would depend upon a concentrated effort to discover shooting talent, beginning at the lowest level, and to develop this talent by training and competition at all echelons. While success in competition was the immediate aim, of equal importance were the benefits accruing to the over-all training of the Army in marksmanship. The prestige derived by individuals and units as well as the skill and confidence obtained through training and competition, if effectively used, could bring about an immeasurable increase in combat effectiveness.²

USAREUR's efforts to improve the quality of marksmanship in general and the performance of representative teams in specific competitions paid off in the Prix Le Clerc matches conducted on 22 August 1958. In these matches the representative team chosen from subordinate tactical units placed first for the fourth time in eight yearly matches.⁴

The organization of a composite USAREUR team was the subject of a conference held at USAREUR headquarters on 9 October 1958. At this conference the scope and objectives of the marksmanship program were defined and specific topics, such as the size of the teams, travel limitations, and the scope of the matches to be attended, were discussed.⁵

During the next months intratheater matches were conducted at all levels to select candidates for the USAREUR championship matches to be held at the Grafenwoehr training center. Early in February 1959 USAREUR representatives attended a USCONARC conference on marksmanship. Through the guidance obtained at this meeting, the program was completed for the USAREUR championship matches conducted at Grafenwoehr in April 1959. Potential members of the USAREUR rifle and pistol teams were selected from the best shooters at these matches, and after an additional training period

³Ltr, Gen B. C. Clarke, CG USCONARC to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINUSAREUR, 11 Feb 59. UNCLAS. In USAREUR SGS 250/H5.3.

⁴LANDCENT Handbook, Le Clerc Prize, Small Arms Competition, 1959. UNCLAS.

⁵USAREUR Rifle and Pistol Teams final Rept, n.d. UNCLAS. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br.

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at Grafenwoehr, the teams were prepared for competition. On 20 May 62 men departed for Fort Benning.⁶

Of all the teams participating in the U.S. Army matches held from 25 May through 6 June 1959 at Fort Benning, the USAREUR teams enjoyed the greatest advantage in having the largest number of personnel from which to draw talent. Despite this advantage, the USAREUR representatives placed only sixth.

In consequence, more emphasis was placed on marksmanship, and USAREUR was considering the organization of an Army marksmanship unit at the conclusion of the reporting period.⁷

8. New Equipment

a. Integration of Light Aircraft. During the reporting period there was an increased emphasis on integrating light aircraft into ground battle training. In this respect the H-34 helicopter was utilized to assist with engineer work, particularly in the construction of floating and panel bridges. This aircraft was of special value in pulling anchor cables across rivers and in replacing bridge equipment at inaccessible locations in water gaps. Air movement and resupply were integrated into battle group and battalion training wherever possible.⁸

On 10 November 1958 the Seventh Army Helicopter Program was officially opened at Bad Kreuznach. Twelve helicopters were equipped with 30-cal machine guns, and all participating pilots were given proficiency flight checks with emphasis on low-level autorotations. The training program stressed contour flying, low-level navigation, and formation flying.⁹

b. SS-10 and SS-11 Missiles. Throughout the reporting period USAREUR assisted in the Army effort to develop an improved antitank weapon. Of these endeavors the primary interest centered around the French SS-10 and SS-11 antitank missiles.¹⁰

⁶Ibid. UNCLAS

⁷(1) Integrated Rev of USAREUR Ops Prog, 3d Qtr, FY 59. CONF. (2) Tab 4, to DE, USAREUR G3 to CofS, n.d., subj: Organization of an Army Marksmanship Unit (AMU) at Hqs USAREUR. ELGC-TT 268/4. UNCLAS

⁸USAREUR 3d Qtr Tng Status Rept, 1958, 27 Oct 58. CSGOP-127. SECRET.

⁹USAREUR Qtrly Tng Status Rept Rev, 4th Qtr, 1958, 22 Jan 59. SECRET.

¹⁰Intvw, Capt J. L. Begley, USAREUR G3 Hist Sec, with Maj W. D. Wary, 34 Adv Wpns Br, 7 Oct 59. SECRET.

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The United States had placed the first contracts for these missiles in February 1958. Most of the missiles contracted for at that time were used for stateside tests; however, Seventh Army was given enough missiles to equip three assault-gun platoons. These were deployed in 1 battle group in each of 3 infantry divisions. The platoons conducted limited field tests in August, September, and October 1958. The results of these test firings were considered good, since the composite first-round-hit score on moving tanks was over 60 percent. No additional missiles were made available for training until 1959.¹¹ However, during the summer and early fall of 1958 a war reserve of such missiles was stockpiled and this reserve was maintained throughout the reporting period.

Before June 1959 two more contracts were concluded with the French to provide SS-10 and SS-11 missiles for United States forces and for delivery to various MAP countries, respectively. The U.S. forces' contract called for enough missiles to give an antitank missile capability to each of 15 battle groups in Seventh Army, to STRAC, and, to a limited degree, to the Eighth Army in the Far East. The delivery of these missiles was scheduled for late September 1959.

Technological improvement between the first and the second series of contracts was made to the extent that, when the first missiles were ordered, separate launchers were necessary for each type of missile. By the time the two later contracts were concluded, both types of missiles could be fired from the same launcher. Seventh Army and stateside gunners were initially trained by the French. The SS-11 missile--a larger weapon than the SS-10, packing a bigger punch and having a considerably wider range--was originally designed for use from helicopters, but it was subsequently used from vehicular mounts; at shorter ranges it proved less accurate than the SS-10. At the close of the reporting period these missiles had not been issued to the armored divisions. The final decision on the selection of a standard antitank weapon was to be made by January 1960.¹²

19. Training Areas

a. Shortages. The problem of providing sufficient training areas remained acute throughout FY 1959. In June 1958 LANDCENT had directed that the most efficient use of training areas be achieved by scheduling all major training areas centrally, with COMCENTAG allocating time in accordance with bids made by the national armies concerned. This was to insure the full employment of all areas. They were to be used at night and on weekends and holidays. Moreover, each area was to be examined with a view to improving its facilities by construction. Since the training areas concerned did not belong to NATO but were held on bilateral agreements between

¹¹ 3d Qtrly Tng Status Rept, cited above. SECRET.

¹² Intvw, Capt Begley, with Maj Wary, cited above. SECRET.

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the defense authorities of the user nation and the German Federal Ministry of Defense, negotiations would have to be conducted between COMCENTAG and the defense ministry concerned. NORTHAG was already using a similar system.¹³

To facilitate comprehensive and conclusive analysis of the LANDCENT proposals, CINCUSAREUR formed a training area survey committee to make a ground reconnaissance of major training areas and consult with interested military authorities and subordinate commands. The USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, was designated as the committee coordinator and certain CENTAG staff sections were to appoint appropriate representatives.¹⁴

On 22 July 1958 Brig. Gen. Pierre Renault, the CENTAG Deputy Coordinator, who had been appointed Committee Chairman, submitted an informal report of his initial investigation on surveying the major French training areas. He found that the French would not permit such a survey; instead they recommended that negotiations on training areas should be arranged through diplomatic channels.¹⁵

On 31 July 1958 General Hodges informed General Hans Spödel, COMLANDCENT, that the procedures concerning training areas in West Germany were regulated by the Bonn Conventions on Rights and Obligations of the Forces. These conventions had not been negotiated between the defense ministries of the nations concerned, but between their governments. Subsequent ancillary bilateral agreements between American, French, and German military authorities had been made for the Baumholder, Munsingen, Stetten, and Daaden training areas. Although CENTAG was unable to assess training area utilization in its sector, this limitation did not preclude mutual cooperation and effective use of training areas. Direct agreements between French and German authorities had granted the German forces exclusive use of the Daaden area and had given them priority periods at the remaining portion of Munsingen and at Stetten. The French, German, and U.S. forces had their respective priority periods at Baumholder. All other major training areas in the CENTAG zone were available to German forces on a space-available basis. It was doubtful that central scheduling and NATO control would afford more desirable features. The acquisition of additional land was to be made the subject of negotiations between the highest NATO authority and the government concerned.¹⁶

In West Germany negotiations concerning maneuver rights were continuing meanwhile with disappointing results. The Land (State) governments concurred with only 24 percent of USAREUR's training area requirements,

¹³Ltr, COMLANDCENT to COMCENTAG, 24 Jun 58. SGS 6102/1-OPT/T529. NATO SECRET.

¹⁴DF, USAREUR Dep CofS to G3, G4, Engr, & Ord Divs, 15 Jul 58, subj: LANDCENT Proposals Concerning Major Training areas in the CENTAG Zone (U). AEAGC-TR 295/16 GC. SECRET.

¹⁵DF, USAREUR G3 to Dep CinC, 26 Jul 58, subj: Land Training Areas (U). AEAGC-TR 285/16 GC. NATO SECRET.

¹⁶Ltr, COMCENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 31 Jul 58. AEAGC-GC 285/17. NATO SECRET.

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and the Federal Government failed to develop any new solution. USAREUR therefore established the Training Area Survey and Negotiations Board to overcome the impasse created during the negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁷

The difficulty revolved around the interpretation of German legislation governing the usage of national territory by military forces. According to this law, certain training areas, large enough to accommodate up to a division could not be used more than once every six months. The position of the Federal Government was initially that these recurrent-use restrictions would have to apply to U.S. as well as to German forces.¹⁸

In line with the suggestions made by the USAREUR board, American and German negotiators used an entirely new approach to solve the problem. They agreed to set aside the recurrent-use restrictions and to regulate maneuver rights of U.S. forces by Article 19 of the Bonn Conventions. USAREUR accepted this solution on 24 January 1959; the Training Area and Survey Board, having accomplished its purpose, was dissolved the following month.¹⁹

At the LANDCENT annual training conference held on 25 February 1959 the conferees agreed that in 1960 the demand for training areas would greatly exceed availabilities, particularly in the CENTAG area. Among the solutions proposed was a suggestion to increase the capacity of existing training areas by infrastructure improvements, subject to SHAPE approval and support. Because of the difference in range regulations, training methods, and training requirements, it was decided to study the methods and procedures employed by each nation to determine whether changes in policy could be made, that would benefit other nations participating in the survey.

For this purpose, a team of officers representing the interested agencies and headquarters was to be organized. The team would survey the major training areas in Western Germany, exchange ideas for the most efficient arrangement of facilities by the user army, and prepare recommendations for infrastructure or national programs to improve the use potential of these major ranges and training areas.²⁰

¹⁷(1) Integrated Rev of USAREUR Op Prog, 3d Qtr 1959. CONF. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Brig Gen J. K. Wilson, Pres, USAREUR Tng Area and Negotiating Board, 12 Feb 59. UNCLAS.

¹⁸Intvw, Capt Begley, with Mr. J. Cotter, USAREUR CA Div, C/Govt Affairs Br, 30 Sep 59. CONF.

¹⁹(1) Integrated Rev of USAREUR Op Prog, cited above. CONF. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Gen Wilson, cited above. UNCLAS.

²⁰Cable LC/OPT-10948, COMLANDCENT to COMCENTAG, et al., 1 Apr 59. USAREUR SMC IN 174. NATO CONF.

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In General Speidel's opinion, the land training problem could be solved only at the ministerial level. Since the quickest way to present this subject to the NATO Council was through the annual review procedure, he made the appropriate recommendations to SHAPE. The basis of submission of the LANDCENT case for more training areas was to be the need for revising the national requirements so that the annual review committee would become aware of the grave deficiency of training areas.

The two army groups were therefore asked to revise their parts of the training area study by stating the minimum training area requirements based on forces planned to be in existence in their areas as of 31 December 1959 and 31 December 1960. Both the requirements and availability of the areas were to be stated in battalion-days. The study was to be closely coordinated with the Federal Ministry of Defense insofar as the buildup of German forces was concerned. Finally, maximum practicable use of the training area was to be assumed for the purpose of this study.²¹

While this study was being prepared, an incident occurred that clearly demonstrated the urgency of solving the training area problem.

b. The Grafenwoehr Incident. On 30 May 1959 General Eddleman was unofficially informed that a German tank battalion was to be activated at the U.S. Army training center at Grafenwoehr. According to the information available, the cadre was to arrive on 1 June, the fillers were to follow during the month of June, and individual training was to begin on 1 July. No date was indicated for the eventual move of this battalion from this area to a permanent home station.

In a talk with the German liaison officer at his headquarters, General Eddleman expressed his surprise that this topic had not been mentioned during his meeting with top-level German defense officials at Bonn a few days earlier. Whereas the German Army was habitually allocated training space at the major training areas on a space-available basis, at no time had the use of Grafenwoehr to activate and station German units been authorized. In fact, both as Seventh Army commander and as CINCUSAREUR, General Eddleman had consistently opposed any troops other than the housekeeping detachments being stationed permanently at major training areas. The liaison officer was to inform his superiors in Bonn that the German cadre was not to move to Grafenwoehr on 1 June and that a written request should be submitted before any action was contemplated. Requests for training time would continue to be honored at whatever major training area could be made available after USAREUR's own requirements had been satisfied.²²

²¹ Cable LC/OPT-10962, COMLANDCENT to COMCENTAG, et al., 2 Apr 59. USAREUR SMC IN 605. NATO CONF.

²² Memo for rec, Brig Gen H. K. Johnson, USAREUR ACoFS G3, 30 May 59, subj: Armored Battalion at Grafenwoehr. In USAREUR G3 Tng Sec. UNCLAS.

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Nevertheless, the German tank battalion moved into the Camp Algiers portions of the U.S. training center at Grafenwoehr. General Eddleman thereupon informed the American Ambassador in Bonn that the German Army had deliberately moved a unit into Grafenwoehr without permission to do so. Since a firm U.S. stand seemed essential to preclude any further attempts to gain control of American training areas, the Ambassador was asked to speak with the Federal Minister of Defense.²³ At the same time, General Eddleman requested that the 124th Tank Battalion, consisting of approximately 400 men and 30 tanks, be withdrawn from Grafenwoehr not later than 20 June 1959.²⁴ An information copy of both messages was sent to higher headquarters.

Upon seeing the above message, General Norstad immediately summoned the German national military representative at SHAPE. He showed him the message, saying he considered the facts reported to be incredible and that there must be a misunderstanding. General Norstad expressed the hope that Federal Defense Ministry officials would contact USAREUR immediately and remove the reasons for such a misunderstanding.²⁵

As a result, on 11 June 1959 Brig Gen H. K. Johnson, the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, met Brig. Gen. H. T. Krantz, representing the Federal Ministry of Defense. After explaining that this subject had not been discussed with General Eddleman on 26 May 1959 at Bonn, because Minister Strauss and General Hausinger had not considered it sufficiently important, General Krantz pointed out that this omission was in no way intentional. He added that the two officials had believed that the German forces were authorized to use the Grafenwoehr area. While he knew the difficulty of obtaining troop facilities for both armies, he agreed with the principle of not stationing tactical units permanently at training centers. In an effort to reach a solution, he preferred to leave the legal aspects of the problem aside and to arrive at an understanding between soldiers.

When questioned about suggestions to solve the problem, General Krantz enumerated three possibilities. First, the battalion could stay there with the understanding that it would not interfere with the training of U.S. units. Second, the unit could be disbanded, but this solution would present disadvantages to both armies. Third, U.S. assistance could be requested for relocating the battalion elsewhere. If the third solution was acceptable, the Germans would relocate the battalion to any place selected by the U.S. Army with the shortest possible delay.

²³Cable SX-4221, CINCUSAREUR to Am Emb Bonn, personal for Bruce, 3 Jun 59. SECRET.

²⁴Cable SX-4220, CINCUSAREUR to Min of Def Bonn, 3 Jun 59. SECRET.

²⁵Cable EC-9-2984, US CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Jun 59. SECRET.

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General Johnson replied that the Germans had completely disregarded the U.S. position when they moved their battalion into the Grafenwoehr training center. Therefore, the first thing to be done was to order the 124th Tank Battalion out of Grafenwoehr, and then a common solution of the problem could be sought. Asked whether he was authorized to order the removal of this battalion, General Krantz replied that he could do so providing the battalion could be relocated somewhere else.

General Johnson then brought out that the U.S. forces had modified their entire training program to provide the German forces with full-time facilities at Hohenfels and Wildflecken. He reiterated that the German battalion could not remain at Grafenwoehr. As a possible solution he suggested that the battalion be broken up and its elements sent to sister-type units for the initial period of training. This would provide a period of several months during which another area could probably be found for the later portion of the training. In any event, on 1 June 1960 the battalion could move to its permanent station at Amberg as scheduled. Meanwhile, USAREUR could not take any action until the order to withdraw the battalion had been given. General Eddleman considered the activation of this battalion at Grafenwoehr as a direct intrusion into his area of responsibility and could not agree with the German action. When General Krantz asked whether the battalion would have to be withdrawn by 1 July, General Johnson replied that the battalion would have to be out of Grafenwoehr by 20 June. At the end of the conference General Krantz indicated that he regretted the incident and considered it imperative to find a solution; however, General Johnson's proposal did not seem to present such a solution.

After having received this information, General Eddleman decided to see General Krantz. During the discussion General Eddleman agreed that the German authorities could transfer their battalion before 20 June from Grafenwoehr to Hohenfels, where it could remain during the period that was exclusively reserved for the Germans. He also agreed to provide a location at which the battalion could complete its training after it moved from Hohenfels on 13 August 1959. The Germans would be informed of the exact location before 1 July.²⁶

The 124th Tank Battalion was removed from the Grafenwoehr training center and relocated temporarily at Hohenfels. In August it was moved from Hohenfels to its designated home station at Amberg; a German supply unit stationed at Amberg was transferred to Regensburg to a caserne where space was provided by U.S. forces.²⁷

²⁶ Brief of Memo for Rec, unsd [USAREUR G3], from a transcript of conf held in USAREUR G3. UNCLAS. In G3 Op & Tng Br.

²⁷ Intvw, Capt Begley with Col W. B. Richardson, USAREUR G3 XO, 23 Sep 59. NATO CONF.

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20. Maneuvers and Exercises

While the two main exercises of FY 1959, BOUNCE BACK and TOP WEIGHT, are described in detail, the less important exercises, which involved both subordinate and lateral commands, have been incorporated in the Chronology (Appendix B).

a. BOUNCE BACK. Exercise BOUNCE BACK was a CENTAG-directed exercise that was conducted during the period 10-12 December 1958. The exercise had a D-5 setting and was based on a hypothetical war between NATO and aggressor forces, with no direct relation to actual war plans. It was built around a situation designed to exercise rear area security and damage control. The purpose of the exercise was to train the commanders and staffs in their duties pertaining to rear area security and damage control under wartime conditions with the aggressor forces having extensive conventional, nuclear, CBR, infiltration, and guerrilla warfare capabilities. Moreover, current plans were to be tested, and improved procedures for rear area security and area damage control were to be developed.

(1) Concepts. Enemy nuclear strikes were simulated on tactical units in forward areas as well as upon logistical complexes in army rear areas and in the communication zone. Situations were created that forced logistical and tactical commanders to protect and salvage their personnel and to move and maneuver their resources. They also had to take cognizance of devastated and contaminated areas so as to retain maximum integrity and combat efficiency of the tactical units as well as their combat and logistical support.²⁸

The field armies within their sectors, and CENTAG for the part of Germany west of the Rhine in its zone, were responsible for the defense of the rear area of the combat zone. All combat forces were required for employment in the forward area; therefore, the rear area security forces could not be reinforced by CENTAG reserve units, with the exception of the German 1st Airborne Division, which, in an emergency and when not previously committed, could be made available for rear area security tasks. Field army commanders were authorized to use all resources within their own means and those of the German military districts (Wehrbereichskommando) for all aspects of rear area defense when operational necessity so dictated.²⁹

(2) Critique. The exercise was especially valuable for German participants, who could thus study cooperation between national and NATO staffs and gain many experiences. The problems that arose were solved on

²⁸DP, USAREUR Cofs to distr, 10 Sep 58, subj: Exercise BOUNCE BACK. NATO CONF. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br.

²⁹CENTAG Dir Nr 1, Exercise BOUNCE BACK, 10 Oct 58. UNCLAS.

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the army headquarters-military district level; cooperation on lower levels was not possible, for the military districts participated with three officers only. However, in an emergency many contacts involving the utilization of national resources in the rear area would take place on the lower level, that is to say, at the Kreisgruppen (garrison group headquarters) and territorial defense headquarters. Only major problems would have to be solved on the army-military district level.

In the rear area, clear-cut, simple command relationships and channels without overlappings would be of special import. The lateral employment of various headquarters for the same task would have to be avoided. Clear command relationships would guarantee execution of security orders, the number of headquarters being of secondary importance.

Operating agencies in the rear area would have to fill both national and NATO requirements. The continuous mission of guaranteeing the operational freedom of NATO forces would devolve upon national headquarters of the territorial defenses and would have first priority. Commitment of NATO forces for this task would have to remain the exception, since their function was frontline duty.³⁰

b. TOP WEIGHT. During the period 13-17 April 1959, USAREUR/CENTAG participated in the SHAPE-sponsored joint atomic air defense exercise TOP WEIGHT. For USAREUR and its subordinate commands this exercise was divided into two phases, the alert and the operational phase. In addition, the field training exercise QUICK SERVE II was conducted simultaneously as a subordinate exercise. The operational phase of TOP WEIGHT was subdivided into two exercises whose aims were as follows:

HEAVY WEIGHT was a command post exercise designed to practice and perfect within the limits of peacetime conditions the procedures involved in the swift and efficient execution of all aspects of SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan and those actual plans that were related directly thereto. It was not intended to resemble a war game and was not considered as such.

BALANCE WEIGHT was an air defense exercise designed to exercise the over-all air defense organization within Allied Command, Europe, and to give NATO and national commanders the opportunity to test local air defense plans against the raid sorties generated by TOP WEIGHT. Moreover, the coordination of the various air defense plans within Central Region was to be exercised.

QUICK SERVE II was a field training exercise to test United States advanced weapons logistical capabilities and procedures by activating the advanced weapons support system on a wartime basis.

³⁰ DF, Ger Ln Stf to CENTAG and USAREUR to USAREUR G3 Tng Br and CENTAG Plans Stf, 22 Dec 58, subj: BOUNCE BACK. NATO CONF. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br.

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(1) Concepts. The intelligence portion of the exercise saw a constant buildup of international tension that brought about the declaration of a state of Military Vigilance on 9 April 1959, Simple Alert on 12 April, and Orange Alert later that same day. The exercise itself was triggered with the announcement of GAO and the all-out attack by aggressor land, sea, and air forces on 13 April 1959.³¹

(2) Conduct. The exercise was preceded by a check of the communications system. It began with the announcement of General Alert/R-hour by SACEUR and covered a 3-day wartime period. In the CENTAG area, tactical operations consisted primarily of delaying and defensive actions.

(3) Critique. Some of the major areas for improvement noted during this exercise were as follows:

(a) Communications were not used properly, particularly by staff officers. General Eddleman therefore decided that telephone communications would be cut during certain portions of the next exercise;

(b) Missiles were not used as fully as possible, and, in addition, some of the personnel in the controlling agencies did not know the capabilities of the missiles;

(c) The Army depended too much upon the Air Force for the acquisition of fleeting targets; and

(d) Many problems arose with regard to rear area security and damage control.

Although the exercise was generally satisfactory, there was a noticeable hesitancy on the part of the participants due to the infrequency of exercises of this scope. More exercises on this level were to be planned.³²

21. Operational Readiness

In his annual operational readiness report, prepared in May 1959, General Eddleman reiterated the declaration of his predecessor that the United States Army, Europe, was capable of performing its assigned operational mission. He also pointed out some of the factors that had an adverse effect on the operational readiness status, which were as follows:³³

³¹(1) USAREUR Dir Nr 1, Exercise TOP WEIGHT, 10 Feb 59. SECRET. (2) CENTAG Dir Nr 1, Exercise TOP WEIGHT, 30 Jan 59. (3) CENTAG Cont Dir Nr 1, Exercise TOP WEIGHT, 20 Feb 59. Both NATO SECRET.

³²Critique of Exercise TOP WEIGHT 1959, 28 Apr 59. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Tng & Maneuver Sec.

³³USAREUR Op Readiness Rept (U), 23 May 59. USAREUR AG 3853. TS.

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a. The Concentration of Supplies in the Kaiserslautern Complex. The congested logistical installations in the Kaiserslautern area offered a very lucrative target for a nuclear strike. During the reporting period the following three major actions were taken to alleviate this situation:

(1) The Cut and Cover Plan. This project, initiated during the previous year, was to effect the peacetime dispersion of various supplies and installations into blast-resistant buildings spread over a 120-square-mile area. It was expected that the effectiveness of enemy atomic blasts would thus be greatly reduced. According to the original plan, a large number of the natural caves located in the area surrounding Kaiserslautern were to be used for this projected dispersed storage. However, after a survey of these areas, it was determined that the floor space was in no way adequate and that expansion and reinforcement construction would be at a prohibitive cost. The erection of new buildings was therefore considered as more advisable. In 1958 Congress appropriated more than \$8 million for the construction of these facilities, but little progress was made because of the difficulty of obtaining the necessary real estate. Since the proposed buildings were to be located in draws and valleys over such a large area, the purchase of the ground involved many detailed negotiations. At the close of the reporting period only four of the necessary sites had been obtained.³⁴

(2) The Movement of the Seventh Army Engineer Depot. The transfer of the engineer depot from the Kaiserslautern complex to the Mannheim area was planned during FY 1959, and at the close of the reporting period final approval of this move was pending.

(3) The Use of Prestock Points. Large quantities of supplies and materials were moved from the Kaiserslautern area to various prestock points east of the Rhine River. The dispersal of barrier materials was of particular importance, for these materials were moved to prestock points in the vicinity of the areas in which they were to be used in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.³⁵

b. Peacetime Stationing of Units and Installations. As in previous years, the availability of housing and support facilities greatly influenced the peacetime stationing of units and installations. Many units therefore had to be stationed at some distance from their initial wartime positions, which precluded their rapid dispersal to the tactically proper positions at GAO. In the event of an attack without warning, the enemy might overrun a portion of the initial defensive positions before the responsible

³⁴(1) Ibid. (2) Intvws, Capt Begley with Capt P. A. Jordan III, G4 Instl Br Proj Sec, Lt Col C. E. Pister, G4 Plans Br, Col W. M. Linton, Engr Div, Mil Ops Br, 5 Oct 59. All TS.

³⁵Intvw, Capt Begley with Col Linton, cited above. TS.

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Seventh Army units could arrive. Another facet of the peacetime stationing problem was the vulnerability of the atomic delivery units. The concentrated stationing of these units offered the enemy extremely lucrative targets for nuclear attacks.

c. The Lack of Adequate Antiaircraft Defense. The ground forces lacked adequate antiaircraft defense against high- and low-level air attacks; this was especially evident in the antiaircraft defense of Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR.

d. Inadequate Close-In Air Force Support Planning. There was no plan for conventional close-in Air Force support until the completion of SACEUR's atomic interdiction program. Field training during the reported period pointed up the importance of having such a plan.

e. Diversion of Atomic Capability. A large fraction of the Seventh Army atomic capability would have to be diverted to support NORTHAG on order of CINCEUR/SACEUR. In addition, a lesser amount was to be diverted to the assistance of French First Army on order of COMCENTAG.

f. Quantity-Distance Restrictions for Nike Max Basic Loads. Another deficiency was the inability to have full basic loads of missiles in a ready condition at the temporary sites--occupied by 21 of the 24 Nike batteries in the command--because of quantity-distance restrictions. The completion of all permanent sites, contemplated by January 1961, would eliminate this problem. As an interim measure, some increases were authorized for the temporary sites at which required quantity-distance factors could be reduced by the minimum construction of barricades.

g. Insufficient Support for Noncombatants. Particularly in BAFEC, USACOMZEUR's capability to support the noncombatants who would be evacuated from France, Italy, and Germany remained marginal. Any further personnel reductions in this area would seriously jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.³⁶

³⁶(1) USAREUR Op Readiness Rept, cited above. (2) Intvws cited above. All TS.

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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the integrity of the financial system and for the ability to detect and prevent fraud.

2. The second part of the document outlines the specific requirements for record-keeping. It states that all transactions must be recorded in a timely and accurate manner, and that the records must be maintained for a minimum of five years. It also discusses the importance of ensuring that the records are accessible and can be easily reviewed.

3. The third part of the document discusses the role of the auditor in verifying the accuracy of the records. It states that the auditor must conduct a thorough review of the records and must report any discrepancies or irregularities to the appropriate authorities. It also discusses the importance of the auditor's independence and objectivity.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the consequences of failing to comply with the record-keeping requirements. It states that individuals or organizations that fail to maintain accurate records may be subject to fines, penalties, or even criminal prosecution. It also discusses the importance of ensuring that the records are protected from loss or destruction.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the importance of transparency and accountability in the financial system. It states that the public has a right to know how the system is operating and that the records must be made available to the public in a timely and accessible manner. It also discusses the importance of ensuring that the records are used for their intended purpose and that they are not misused.

6. The sixth part of the document discusses the importance of ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the record-keeping system. It states that the system must be regularly reviewed and updated to ensure that it remains effective and efficient. It also discusses the importance of ensuring that the records are kept up-to-date and that any changes are properly documented.

7. The seventh part of the document discusses the importance of training and education for those involved in the record-keeping process. It states that individuals must be properly trained and educated to ensure that they are able to maintain accurate records and that they understand the importance of the system. It also discusses the importance of ensuring that the records are protected from unauthorized access and that they are stored in a secure and reliable manner.

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PART THREE

Administration and Logistics

CHAPTER 5

Personnel Policies and Problems

22. Military Personnel

a. The Troop Basis. Plans of the Department of Defense for the worldwide reduction of U.S. armed forces contemplated the stabilization of USAREUR military strength during FY 1959 at about 225,000.¹ Accordingly, at the beginning of FY 1959 the Department of the Army established a troop basis, or ceiling, of 225,100 as USAREUR's goal for 30 June 1959. Near the middle of the year the ceiling was raised to 225,325, and finally it was fixed at 226,649 (15,322 officers, 2,690 warrant officers, and 208,137 enlisted personnel), a reduction of about 5,000 from FY 1958's year-end ceiling.

With this ceiling as a guideline, USAREUR headquarters authorized a year-end command strength of 226,039 (15,774 officers, 2,670 warrant officers, and 207,595 enlisted personnel).²

b. Actual Strength. At the end of the year the total assigned strength of the command was 229,643. This included 2,936 personnel en route from USAREUR units to ports for return to the United States, 1,171 who had embarked for return to the United States, 163 patients, and 22

¹(1) Cable DA-926599, DA from DCSPER sgd BOOTH to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 57. USAREUR SMC IN 5634. UNCLAS. (2) USAREUR Memo 1-20-29, Bimthly Amb-Cmdrs Conf Notvs, 13 Jan 59, pp. 11-12. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

²(1) USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Summary Data, 30 Jun 58, 31 Dec 58, 30 Jun 59, pp. CSD-10, CSD-12. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, p. 52. Both SECRET (info used CONF).

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students. Excluding the en route and patient personnel as nonavailables, the command's chargeable actual strength was 225,373³ (15,222 officers, 2,526 warrant officers, and 207,625 enlisted personnel), less than one percent under the planned figure.⁴ Approximately 70 percent of military personnel were in Seventh Army. That organization, USASETAF, and the 32d Artillery Brigade showed slight overstrengths. While the overstrengths in Seventh Army and USASETAF were expected to be eliminated by September 1959, some overstrength was expected to remain in the 32d Brigade until completion of the conversion program from Nike-Ajax to Nike-Hercules.⁵

c. Enlisted Strength by Components. Principally because of the larger number of Regular Army personnel being sent to combat units in Europe under the gyroscope program, the decrease in Regular Army enlisted strength that had begun in FY 1957 reversed itself significantly, as shown by the following tabulation:⁶

	<u>Strength</u>		<u>Percent RA</u>
	<u>RA</u>	<u>Non-RA</u>	
30 June 1958	123,639	80,786	60.5
31 December 1958	131,428	72,297	64.5
30 June 1959	146,975	60,645	70.8

At the end of FY 1959 64 percent of Seventh Army enlisted personnel were RA, as against 55.4 percent at the beginning.⁷

d. Enlistments and Reenlistments. Enlistments and reenlistments totaled 8,417, as against 12,110 in FY 1958.⁸

³See Appendix A, Table 1, which gives chargeable actual strength plus embarked personnel and patients. CONF.

⁴See Appendix A, Tables 2-3, for military personnel by grade. CONF.

⁵Cmt 2, USAREUR G1 to G3, 3 Dec 59, to DF, G3 to G1, 4 Nov 59, subj: Review of Draft Annual Historical Report, Hq USAREUR, FY 1959. AEAGA-PO 250/56. TS (info used CONF).

⁶USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Sum Data, 30 Jun 58, 31 Dec 58, 30 Jun 59, p. CSD-26. CONF.

⁷USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, p. 58. SECRET (info used CONF).

⁸Data from USAREUR AG Div Mil Pers & Proc Sec. UNCLAS.

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Quarters of FY 1959

	<u>Total</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>2d</u>	<u>3d</u>	<u>4th</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>8,417</u>	<u>2,594</u>	<u>2,468</u>	<u>1,550</u>	<u>1,805</u>
AUS	<u>740</u>	156	236	157	191
First-term RA	<u>2,949</u>	932	874	504	639
Career RA	<u>4,353</u>	1,406	1,252	814	881
USAR and NG	<u>375</u>	100	106	75	94

They constituted 11 percent⁹ of the potential pool, as compared with the 19.5 percent who reenlisted in FY 1958.

The rather sharp drop, especially marked during the third quarter, might have been traceable to two changes in Department of the Army policy that had the anticipated adverse effect upon reenlistments.¹⁰ Under the first change, effective 1 July 1958, reenlistment leave travel to the United States had to be made by ship rather than by aircraft, as was permissible before. Under the second, effective in December 1958, temporary-duty travel was discontinued so that a reenlistee's travel time by water, in both directions, would count as leave time. As a result, the number of days the reenlistee could spend at home was severely reduced. The discontinuance of TDY travel was vigorously protested by USAREUR,¹¹ but to no avail.

e. Alien Enlistment Program. The twice-extended Lodge Act,¹² permitting the recruiting and enlistment of Iron Curtain nationals, expired on 30 June 1959 and was not reenacted. The final enlistment under its provisions was made on 31 May. During the operation of the act 12,855 aliens had applied for enlistment, but because of very stringent screening only 1,669 had been accepted.¹³

⁹Some 52 percent of the career Regular Army potentials reenlisted, as compared with 15.4 percent 1st-term RA's and 1.7 percent AUS's. UNCLAS.

¹⁰(1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 59-60. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) Intvw, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR G3 Hist Sec, with Capt N. B. Eldred, AG Div Mil Pers Proc Sec, 27 Oct 59. UNCLAS.

¹¹Cable SC-54417, USAREUR sgd Hodes to DA for DCSPER, 17 Dec 58. UNCLAS

¹²PL 597, 81st Cong., 30 Jun 50. UNCLAS.

¹³Intvw, Mr. Lane with Capt Eldred, cited above. OFLUSE.

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f. Career Management.

(1) Officers. Following the intensive drive for the integration of selected reserve officers into the Regular Army that had brought about the integration of 1,115 USAREUR officers during FY 1958,¹⁴ the time limit for submitting applications was extended indefinitely. As a result, the applications of 256 additional officers assigned to USAREUR were approved during FY 1959.¹⁵

At the same time, the number of voluntary unqualified resignations of Regular Army junior officers in USAREUR dropped to 60, a decrease of one-third from the FY 1958 figure of 90. Although this trend was undoubtedly influenced by the cost-of-living pay raises that had become effective on 1 July 1958, the non-mandatory program of counseling by senior officers instituted in 1958 had proved its effectiveness.¹⁶

(2) Enlisted Men. FY 1959 was the first full year of the proficiency testing and pay program and the revised grade structure devised to make Army service more attractive and rewarding to career personnel and at the same time to reduce shortages in critical MOS's.¹⁷ Pending the formulation, distribution, and administration of the proficiency tests and the full operation of the program, interim procedures were introduced in October 1958 authorizing proficiency pay of \$30 a month to selected personnel in the 10 most critical MOS categories. Approximately, 1,750 USAREUR personnel were awarded interim pay, its retention being contingent upon the achievement of qualifying scores in the subsequent tests.

The first series of tests began in January 1959 and continued through May, with emphasis upon electronics, communications, and combat arms MOS's. Of 11,904 individuals tested, 6,888, or 58 percent, made qualifying scores.

The military Pay Act had also authorized the appointment of 1 percent of the active enlisted strength to the new grade E-9 and 2 percent to the new grade E-8. During the year 125 USAREUR NCO's were promoted to E-9 and 567 to E-8. During the first half of the year promotions to E-8 were awarded only to first sergeants and sergeants major, but thereafter eligibility requirements were modified so that NCO's in other MOS and duty positions might be so promoted. The first actual E-9 appointment quotas were received from Department of the Army during the last quarter of FY 1959.¹⁸

¹⁴(1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 61-62. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) PL 737, 84th Cong., 20 Jul 56. UNCLAS.

¹⁵Info from USAREUR AG Div Mil Pers Proc Sec. UNCLAS.

¹⁶(1) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Lt Col J. P. Forsyth, G1 Mil Pers Br Off Sec, 27 Oct 59. UNCLAS. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 61-62. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

¹⁷DA Cir 35-22, 20 May 58, subj: Military Pay Act of 1958. UNCLAS.

¹⁸Cmt 2, G1 to G3, 3 Dec 59, cited above. CONF.

23. Civilian Personnel

a. Strength and Trends. The decrease in the number of civilian employees of the command continued. Its heaviest impact was upon the labor service and on local wage rate (LWR) employees in Germany and Italy. (See Appendix A, Table 5.) Except for reductions in the size of USAREUR headquarters, however, the employment of U.S. civilians tended to level off.¹⁹ Moreover, in France both the U.S. and the indigenous civilian staff were enlarged slightly, notwithstanding forced reductions in some agencies, because of the continuing shift of technical service agencies and responsibilities to USACOMZEUR.

b. Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) Employees.

(1) Reduction in the Size of Headquarters, USAREUR. As pointed out earlier, the reduction in the size of Headquarters, USAREUR, instituted in FY 1957,²⁰ continued. During the second quarter space authorizations were reduced by 34, but through special action a lead time of 6 months was allowed and the actual number of reduction in force (RIF) actions was kept to a minimum through reassignment and reduction by natural attrition.²¹

(2) The Federal Merit Promotion Plan. The Federal Merit Promotion Plan, designed to enable and require agencies to fill vacancies, as far as possible, through the promotion of qualified individuals within an area or agency, instead of from without, became effective on 1 January 1959 as an extension of the civil-service competitive system. At a preliminary conference in Heidelberg it was pointed out that the automatic application of the plan, based as it was upon governmental employment conditions in the United States, would probably meet with difficulty in an overseas area. In USAREUR, for instance, the work force, though comparatively small, was widely dispersed, clerical jobs were uniformly of low classification, and a relatively large number of positions in the higher grades were highly specialized, sometimes with only one or two of a kind existent. It was also feared that the program would tend to encourage employees with long residence overseas to remain abroad even longer, handicapping interchanges, which had increased significantly, and preventing the development of a home leave and rotation system.²²

In practice, reorganizations and retrenchments, such as the absorption of WACOM by NACOM and later readjustments in NACOM, necessitated the

¹⁹Intvw, Mr. Lane with Mr. W. O. Jacobson, C/USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, 16 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

²⁰USAREUR Ann Hist Repts, FY 57, pp. 37-38; FY 58, pp. 51-52. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

²¹USAREUR Qtrly Summary of Comd Civ Pers Prog Status (hereafter cited as USAREUR Qtrly CP Sum), US Cit Narr, 3d Qtr, FY 59, p. 10. AEAGA-C 250/22. UNCLAS.

²²Ibid., 2d Qtr FY 59, p. 3. UNCLAS.

placement of a number of surplus employees elsewhere in the command and reduced the promotion possibilities. Moreover, filling a vacancy under the new plan required a longer processing time and more paperwork than formerly. However, before the end of the fiscal year career plans in the civilian personnel, troop education, and recreation fields were formulated and incorporated into the merit promotion system, and a career plan in the repairs and utilities field was under consideration. General satisfaction was being expressed over the fact that a larger number of eligible personnel were being afforded the opportunity to apply and be considered for promotion to vacant positions.²³

(3) Employment Restrictions. As an economy measure primarily, USAREUR announced in February 1959 a command-wide policy restricting the employment of Department of the Army civilians to jobs of a basically civilian nature that involved policy-making or which, for security or other reasons, should be filled by U.S. citizens only.²⁴ The policy's ultimate objective was the creation of an "irreducible hard core" of graded U.S. employees who were necessary to the accomplishment of the USAREUR mission and whose essentiality could be defended budgetwise. It was to be achieved by attrition and by appointing indigenous personnel to appropriate vacancies.

A somewhat related Department of the Army policy initiated in May 1959²⁵ required that vacancies in DAC jobs classified GS-9 and above be filled with career personnel only. In some areas of the command this policy was deprecated and flexibility was recommended, because it closed two appointee sources that had been of considerable value: military personnel being separated locally, and local employees of other Federal departments who had been surplus to the overseas needs of those departments.²⁶ At the end of the year, however, the policy was still in effect.

Commenting on the implementation of the foregoing policies, some areas reported that American tourists applying for emergency employment created a serious problem. As an extreme example, in the Berlin Command, with less than 80 DAC positions, an average of 2 tourists daily, all year around, made applications of this kind, usually pleading shortage of funds. Many hours were spent in explaining to such applicants why emergency employment could not be proffered, why indigenous personnel were preferred, and why the German authorities, as was usually the case, would not issue them labor permits.²⁷

²³ Ibid., 3d Qtr FY 59, pp. 1-2; 4th Qtr FY 59, p. 1. UNCLAS.

²⁴ USAREUR ltr, 18 Feb 59, subj: Statement of Policy Pertaining to Employment of U.S. Civilians. AEAGC-OE 262/7. UNCLAS.

²⁵ Ltr, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 28 May 59, subj: Filling Certain Civilian Vacancies in USAREUR. AGAO-CC 260. UNCLAS.

²⁶ USACOMZEUR Qtrly Rev & Anal, Civ Pers Prog, 4th Qtr FY 59, p. 1. AEAGA-C 250/22. UNCLAS.

²⁷ USAREUR Qtrly CP Sum, US Cit Narr, 4th Qtr FY 59, p. 1. AEAGA-C 250/22. UNCLAS.

(4) Survey of Civilian Personnel Management. The biennial Department of the Army survey of civilian personnel management was made in May-June 1959.²⁸ Its most important recommendation was that USAREUR manpower control functions should be more closely integrated.²⁹ As a result, general staff responsibility for the civilian personnel control function--along with troop programming--was transferred from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, effective 1 September 1959;³⁰ supervision of the performance award, length-of-service, and non-Federal awards portions of the USAREUR Incentive Awards Program was similarly transferred from the Comptroller to G1.³¹

(5) Mobilization Planning. During the second quarter of FY 1959 emergency pay cards were issued to all Department of the Army civilians and their dependents. During the fourth quarter plans for the retention of DA civilians on a voluntary basis were developed, but were abandoned in favor of directed retention, for which details were to be worked out.³²

(6) Proposal to Withdraw Family Housing From Certain Civilian Employees. After USAFE announced the withdrawal of family housing authorizations from civilian employees who had occupied Government quarters at the same post for more than four consecutive years, effective 30 June 1959, USAREUR considered and studied the advisability of taking similar action.³³

It was found that approximately 540 USAREUR employees would be affected by such a policy. Of this number, 412 were paid from appropriated funds and 128 from nonappropriated funds. The rental allowances that would have to be paid to the former, in lieu of quarters, would approximate \$742,000 annually, and to the latter \$232,000. Payment to

²⁸(1) DF, USAREUR ACoFS G1 to CofS, 30 Apr 59, subj: Civilian Personnel Management Survey by DA and OSC. AEAGA-O 262/7. (2) Rept prepared by DA Ofc Civ Pers, DCSPER Sv Team, n.d., subj: Command Survey of Civilian Personnel Management, USAREUR, May-June 1959. Cy in USAREUR SGS 262/7 (RP) Civ Pers Mgt. Both UNCLAS.

²⁹(1) DF, USAREUR Compt to Dept CincG, 9 Jul 59, subj: Report of Survey of Civilian Personnel Management Team. AEACO-M 250/26. (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to same, 13 Jul 59, subj: Assignment of Staff Responsibility Within Headquarters USAREUR for Manpower Control. AEAGO-TP 250/15. Both UNCLAS.

³⁰USAREUR Stf Memo 10-5-5, 26 Aug 59, subj: Manpower Control and Troop Programming. AEAGC-TP. UNCLAS.

³¹USAREUR Wkly Dir 33, 14 Aug 59, Sec VIII. AEACO-M. UNCLAS.

³²USAREUR Qtrly CP Sum, US Cit Narr, 4th Qtr FY 59, p. 9. AEAGA-C 250/22. UNCLAS.

³³DF, USAREUR G1 to CofS, 11 Dec 58, subj: Withdrawal of Family Housing from DA Civilians, with cmt 2, SGS to G1, 19 Dec 58. AEAGA-P 285/30. UNCLAS.

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nonappropriated fund employees could be administered without difficulty, but extra appropriated fund expenditures would involve an arbitrary reduction of approximately 135 appropriated-fund employees. The policy of authorizing family housing for both appropriated- and nonappropriated-fund U.S. civilians, irrespective of the number of years of consecutive service at the same station, was therefore continued. On the other hand, housing for Air Force employees residing in Army areas of responsibility would be administered in accordance with Air Force policy.³⁴

c. Continental Wage Scale (CWS) Employees. There were no significant changes in the status of Continental Wage Scale employees.³⁵

d. Local Wage Rate (LWR) Employees.

(1) Wages and Benefits. During FY 1959 a number of cost-of-living increases in the pay of LWR employees became effective, together with fringe benefits and adjustments in the length of the work week in consonance with local trends.

(a) Germany. In Germany, after protracted negotiations during which trade-union representatives asked for a second increase, of from 5 to 6 percent, in the wages of retail sales personnel, increases approximating 3 percent were granted, effective 1 January 1959.³⁶ This grant increased European Exchange System (EES) payrolls by approximately \$152,000, quartermaster clothing and sales store wages by \$26,900, and class VI store payrolls by \$5,000, for 1959.³⁷ In addition, the work week of metal workers, printers, drivers, boilermen, firemen, and other employees aggregating 1,200 was reduced, in most cases to 44 hours, without changes in pay.

In the most far-reaching change, concluded after 15 months of negotiation, a group insurance contract between the Allied forces and the German Ministry of Finance, on behalf of German LWR employees of the forces, became effective on 1 January 1959.³⁸ This was the last of four "fringe benefits" that had been promised by the Allied High Commissioners in 1955.³⁹ USAFEUR would have preferred to grant an easily administered annual cash payment to each employee, as a vacation bonus. Bonuses of this kind were finding favor in German industry and were generally acceptable to both

³⁴Ibid. UNCLAS.

³⁵Intvw, Mr. Lane with Mr. Jacobson, cited above. UNCLAS.

³⁶Amendment No. 17, to Collective Tariff Agreement of 28 January 1955. UNCLAS.

³⁷DE, USAFEUR ACoFS G1 to CoFS, 3 Feb 59, subj: Tariff Negotiations for German National Employees. AFAGA-G 262/7. UNCLAS.

³⁸USAFEUR Memo 600-310-20, 9 Apr 59, subj: Additional Insurance for LWR Employees in Germany. UNCLAS.

³⁹USAFEUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 74-75. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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employees and trade unions. The German Ministry of Finance, however, insisted on an insurance plan, apparently because the forces' annual contribution of \$6 million would be paid to firms underwriting the insurance and would be invested by them. Under the contract, subject to review after a year, the forces agreed to pay the entire premium--2.5 percent of each employee's pay--on group life and endowment policies, with specified face values payable at death or age 65.⁴⁰

(b) France. In France, following joint labor-management surveys begun in FY 1958,⁴¹ wage and salary increases up to 3 percent for monthly paid employees and up to 5 percent for hourly paid employees were granted, effective 1 August 1958.⁴² In accord with local practice, the work week was adjusted upward in some localities to increase employees' take-home pay.

(c) Italy. In Italy wage increases ranging from 3½ to 5 percent had become effective on 1 June 1958.⁴³

(2) The Problem of Employment Stability. In many localities in Germany and France where the command employed sizeable numbers of local citizens, local agencies and authorities on various levels expressed concern, at one time or another during the year, over the instability of employment with the U.S. forces. From the American point of view this problem was basically financial: increasing wages and decreasing budgets made reductions in the work force inevitable. On the other hand, discharges on a large scale or in repetitive series not only caused personal hardship to many people but fostered unsatisfactory community relations and created ill feeling, directed against Army policy, on the part of labor organizations. Frequent reductions in force also made necessary recruiting difficult.

Cases in point may be cited. During the first quarter of FY 1959 the Southern Area Command (SACOM), in Germany, reported disruptions:⁴⁴

"It is expected that the morale damage [caused by recent reductions in force (RIF)] cannot be easily undone and will be felt in the retention and recruiting problems in the future. The drain of qualified and valuable personnel by yearly reductions can hardly be offset by replacements at a later date

⁴⁰USAREUR Qtrly CP Sum, Ger Narr, 3d Qtr FY 59, AEAGA-O 250/22. UNCLAS.

⁴¹USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, p. 76. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁴²USACOMZEUR Civ Pers Rept, 3d Qtr FY 59, p. 6. CSGPA-539. UNCLAS.

⁴³USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, p. 6. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁴⁴Cited in USAREUR Qtrly CP Sum, Ger Narr, 1st Qtr FY 59, p. 5. AEAGA-C 250/22. UNCLAS.

and is bound to result in the loss of the better work force and the retention of less efficient employees. Since German RIF procedures protect age and long service, such yearly reductions will eventually result in an overaged, underskilled work force."

The 28-29 November 1958 issue of Sud-Ouest, a Bordeaux newspaper, carried an article criticizing the dismissal of 120 French LWR employees at a U.S. installation in Bussac 3 months before the end of the year and near the beginning of winter, when "it would appear that the decisions could have been avoided if the U.S. military had taken measures beforehand." While it was realized that the dismissals were not the outgrowth of enmity or ill will, it was regretted that funds had not been spread over 12 months.

French civilian personnel offices reported that community relations had deteriorated in some areas because of the adverse effects of reductions in force. This was especially true in rural areas where American installations were the only large-scale employers and where many workers who had moved there to accept employment had later found themselves jobless. The USACOMZEUR Base Section civilian personnel office reported:⁴⁵

"Until the RIF and its consequence are forgotten by the affected community, all efforts to recreate and maintain good community relations will achieve but superficial results. Unfortunately, the trade unions will utilize all available propaganda channels to see to it that the reductions in force are not soon forgotten."

Another civilian personnel officer in France said:⁴⁶

"While [the reductions in force (RIF)] may have been administratively justified, the French employees and the French population see only that LWR's are RIF'd in large numbers and that in the very same installation a few months later some employees are reemployed in the same skills. Common thinking among French people is that the U.S. authorities are using RIF excuses when they want to get rid of someone without cause. The unfavorable reaction is of course exploited by trade unions. . . . The situation has been further aggravated by some operating officials who have emphasized, in order to maintain their production at a normal level, that no RIF would take place and unfortunately, a few days after,

⁴⁵USACOMZEUR Qtrly Rev & Anal, Civ Pers Prog, LWR Employees, 3d Qtr FY 59, pp. 11-12. AEAGA-C 250/22. UNCLAS.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 12. UNCLAS.

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most of their employees were RIF'd. The last RIF is causing considerable concern to the French authorities directly or indirectly concerned with the employees."

Suggestions for remedying or improving the situation included a policy of achieving lowered LWR ceilings gradually, and as far as possible through attrition, rather than by reductions in force; better advance planning and earlier predischARGE notifications should reductions in force become necessary; and consultations with other installations and with local labor offices, before impending reductions, concerning possible employment elsewhere. In this connection, Italy, where the situation was not so grave, reported successful programs of transfer and out-placement.⁴⁷ At the close of the fiscal year the general problem was largely unsolved.

e. The Labor Service. Continuing a 6-year trend, budgetary limitations brought about a reduction of about 11 percent in the personnel strength of labor service units, composed of German and displaced non-German civilians employed as guards and for technical-service support of U.S. forces in Germany and France, as shown below:⁴⁸ The reduction was

	<u>30 Jun 58</u>	<u>30 Jun 59</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>15,608</u>	<u>14,056</u>	<u>1,752</u>
<u>Nationality</u>			
German	a/8,632	b/7,397	1,235
Polish	a/4,244	b/3,986	258
Latvian	940	904	36
Lithuanian	473	437	36
Yugoslavian	326	292	34
Estonian	244	231	13
Czechoslovakian	250	199	51
Hungarian	213	179	34
Ukrainian	148	134	14
Bulgarian	152	133	19
Albanian	89	82	7
Russian	63	57	6
Romanian	4	8	1
Other	25	c/17	8

a/1,833 in France

b/1,775 in France

c/By nation of birth: Arabia 1; Austria 1; France 2; Greece 2; Holland 1; Italy 1; Israel 2; Spain 1; Turkey 2; undetermined 4.

⁴⁷USAREUR Qtrly CP Sum, Narr for Italy, 4th Qtr FY 59, p. 7. RCS CSGPA-495 (R1). UNCLAS.

⁴⁸USAREUR Lab Svc Div, Table of Labor Service Strength by Nationalities, 30 Jun 58 and 30 Jun 59. UNCLAS.

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in guard units primarily and was accomplished partly through replacing labor service guards by contract guards, partly by returning certain guarded installations to the German Government, and partly through more stringent limitation of guard posts to sensitive positions.⁴⁹

USAREUR plans for the phaseout of German labor service technical support units and their replacement by units of the Bundeswehr⁵⁰ were abandoned at least temporarily because of the insistence of the German armed forces that an agreement for the United States to take such a step would bring about requests for similar action, of unpredictable scope, by other NATO nations employing German labor service units.⁵¹

There were no general pay raises during the year. However, a wage tariff for German civilian labor groups, made necessary by the discontinuance of the former German labor service units in 1957 in accordance with Article 45 of the Bonn Conventions,⁵² became effective on 1 July 1958. This agreement did not increase pay rates directly, but established a 45-hour work week for most categories of personnel and substituted a payment of DM 80 monthly--minus DM 15 monthly for quarters maintenance and DM 2.17 daily for rations--for free quarters and subsistence.⁵³

There was no change in the status of Polish labor service workers in France.⁵⁴

In March 1959 General Hodes expressed his concern over the status and future of the approximately 7,000 non-German labor service employees in the USAREUR area if further budget cuts or other contingencies should necessitate the rapid or sudden elimination of the service. He felt that the United States was morally and politically obligated to give as much assistance as possible to displaced persons from behind the Iron Curtain with long and faithful service, and he suggested the possibility of special legislation to permit discharged non-German labor service

⁴⁹Intvw, Mr. Lane with Lt Col H. R. Bangs, C/USAREUR Lab Svc Div Plans Br, 9 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

⁵⁰See USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 78-79. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁵¹Ltr, Gen A. Heusinger, Ger Armed Forces, CofS, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 28 May 58. CONF. In USAREUR Lab Svc Div Plans Br.

⁵²See USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 60-62. SECRET (info used CONF).

⁵³(1) USAREUR Qtrly CP Sum, 1st Qtr FY 59, Ger Narr, p. 8. AEAGA-C 250/22. (2) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Mr. R. J. Populaire, C/USAREUR Lab Svc Div Lab Rel Br, 9 Sep 59. Both UNCLAS.

⁵⁴Intvw, Mr. Lane with Col Bangs, cited above. UNCLAS. See also USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 78-80. SECRET.

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personnel to emigrate to the United States without the usual restrictions.⁵⁵ Soon after assuming command in April, General Eddleman submitted corroborative data pointing out, among other things, that although the command was currently able to find employment at USAREUR depots and similar installations for many routinely separated employees, this possibility would not be open to large numbers of discharged personnel or as a long-range program.⁵⁶

The Department of State advised against an attempt to obtain special legislation for the benefit of labor service personnel. It indicated, however, that the Executive Branch of the Government was proposing amendments to the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act that would permit the Attorney General to parole up to 68,000 refugees into the United States each year and to relax, in their cases, many of the normal immigration restrictions. The term "refugee" was defined to include persons displaced from their usual places of abode through a natural calamity, military operations, or a political upheaval. At the close of the fiscal year the State Department was reviewing the amendments to determine whether they would provide a solution to the USAREUR problem.⁵⁷

24. Morale, Welfare, and Health

a. The Family Housing Shortages.

(1) The Problem. At the end of the annual Inspector General visit in September-October 1958, the Department of the Army inspection team reported that the principal factor having an unfavorable influence on morale, throughout the command, was the shortage of family housing.⁵⁸

This was by no means a new story. Ways and means of providing more housing for the increasing number of dependent families had long been

⁵⁵(1) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Hon D. K. Bruce, US Amb Bonn, 17 Mar 59.
(2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen M. D. Taylor, CofSA, 18 Mar 59. (3) Memo, Col F. T. Berg, C/USAREUR Lab Svc Div, to CoGS, 16 Mar 59, subj: Labor Service Problems. All AEALS 245/6 LS. All CONF.

⁵⁶(1) Ltr, Gen Taylor to Gen C. D. Eddleman, CINCUSAREUR, 20 Apr 59.
(2) Ltr, Gen Eddleman to Gen Taylor, 6 May 59. (3) Memo, Col Berg to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Apr 59, subj: Long Range LS Problem in USAREUR. All AEAGX. All CONF.

⁵⁷(1) Ltr, Maj Gen F. J. Brown, USAREUR CofS, to Mr. C. H. Timberlake, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Am Emb, Bonn, 7 May 59. (2) Ltr, Mr. Timberlake to Dept of State, 10 May 59, subj: USAREUR Request for Special Immigrant Visa Legislation to Benefit Members of USAREUR LS Companies. (3) Ltr, Mr. Timberlake to Maj Gen Brown, 30 May 59. All CONF. All in USAREUR Lab Svc Div Plans Br.

⁵⁸Annex A, to USAREUR Stf Memo 20-20-13, 13 Oct 58, subj: Exit Interview Notes of DA IG's. SECRET.

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one of the command's principal concerns. Moreover, and although the situation was considerably more critical in Germany than elsewhere, in April 1958 a USAREUR staff study of probable family housing requirements for the period 1960-1963 had predicted that the trend of the modern Army toward the inclusion of larger numbers of married personnel would create a long-range shortage of 7,364 housing units in Germany, 2,844 in France, and 600 in Italy, unless anticipatory steps were taken.⁵⁹

(2) Solutions Attempted in Germany. Early in the second half of FY 1958, when General Hodges had set the goal of 95-percent concurrent travel for dependents of personnel assigned to Germany, it had been realized that the main obstacle to achieving this objective was the critical shortage in dependent housing. A program for constructing 5,194 family units with funds generated from the sale of surplus commodities had been approved by the Department of the Army but rejected by the Department of Defense.⁶⁰ The shortage was expected to rise even higher within the next 3 or 4 years, perhaps to as many as 14,000 units.⁶¹

When the Department of the Army's efforts to have the Defense Department's disapproval reconsidered had proven unsuccessful,⁶² USAREUR had suggested that the possibility of obtaining housing in exchange for military and economic aid be explored.⁶³ As a stopgap measure, several hundred maids' quarters and playrooms were being converted into family housing units for temporary occupancy.

One hope of overcoming this shortage on a long-range basis seemed to lie in a rental-guaranteed housing program. By the beginning of FY 1959 USAREUR had drawn up such a program, but the U.S. Embassy preferred to delay negotiations with the German Government until after a status of

⁵⁹(1) Memo, Maj Gen J. M. Williams, USAREUR CofS, to ACofS G1, 17 Mar 58, subj: USAREUR Family Housing Requirements for Period 1960-63. (2) DF, USAREUR G1 to CofS, 5 Apr 58, same subj. Both AEAGA-M 285/30 GA. Both UNCLAS.

⁶⁰(1) Staff study, unsgl (USAREUR G4), 17 Feb 58, subj: Commander in Chief's Visit to Department of the Army. CONF. In G4 Instl Br Real Estate Sec 285/10-3. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 256-57. SECRET (info used CONF).

⁶¹Briefing for SA by USAREUR G4, 10 Apr 59, subj: Rental Guarantee Housing, Germany. UNCLAS. In file above, 285/35 Rental Guarantee Housing--Germany.

⁶²(1) Cable DA-939076, DCSLOG sgd TAG to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, 7 Apr 58. USAREUR SMC IN 8515. (2) Cable EC-9-1645, US CINCEUR to DA for CofSA for DCSLOG, 28 Mar 58. USAREUR SMC IN 8517. Both CONF.

⁶³Cable SX-3107, CINCUSAREUR to DA for Lemitzer, 14 Apr 58. CONF.

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forces agreement was signed.⁶⁴ Since the signing was expected to take place around 1 November 1958, the rental-guarantee housing program was held in abeyance.⁶⁵

When a status of forces agreement had not been signed by January 1959, USAREUR presented the proposed rental-guarantee housing program to the Federal Republic of Germany. It consisted of a first increment of 4,200 units for the Army and 832 for the Air Force. The units would be built, presumably, by private German firms, and the United States would guarantee 95-percent occupancy for 5 years.⁶⁶ In March financial discussions with representatives of German banking interests took place,⁶⁷ and by the end of the fiscal year additional discussion with representatives of the German Federal Ministries of Finance and Housing Construction, the Association of Housing Enterprises, and several prospective sponsors of the project had led to broad areas of agreement. Principles of design and floor-space requirements had been established to the satisfaction of all concerned, and the German Federal Government had indicated its willingness to approve an over-all contract that would treat the program as a single transaction, which would greatly simplify contract administration by the U.S. forces.⁶⁸

But even if a rental-guarantee housing program was established, about 1-1/2 years would elapse before any of the units would be ready for occupancy. In May 1959 General Eddleman, therefore, informed the Department of the Army that the actual shortage in Government housing for all authorized grades was then in excess of 8,000 units. Moreover, experience indicated that even if troop strength remained relatively stable the dependent population would increase by 6 percent annually. Within its available means, USAREUR had taken all possible actions to provide additional housing and school facilities by converting other facilities to these uses. He therefore asked, among other things, for Military Construction, Army (MCA), funds for the construction of

⁶⁴(1) DF, USAREUR SGS to G4, 24 Jun 58, subj: Rental Guarantee Housing Program, Germany. AEAGD-G 285/10. (2) Memo, Col L. E. Roth, C/USAREUR G4 Instl Br, to Maj Gen H. R. Westphalinger, ACofS G4, 12 Aug 58, same subj. In G4 Instl Br Real Estate Sec 285/35 Rental Guarantee Housing-Germany. Both CONF.

⁶⁵Memo for rec, Mr. W. M. Pool, USAREUR G4 Instl Br Real Estate Sec, 10 Sep 58, subj: Rental Guarantee Housing, Germany. UNCLAS. In file above.

⁶⁶(1) Briefing for SA, 10 Apr 59, cited above. UNCLAS. (2) DF, USAREUR SGS to G4, 24 Jun 59, cited above, w/Incl 1. CONF.

⁶⁷For details, see Aide Memoirs, Mr. W. M. Pool, 19 Mar 59, subj: Conference with German Banking Interests in Mannheim, 1400 hours, Thursday, 19 March 1959, with inclosures. UNCLAS. In G4 Instl Br file cited above.

⁶⁸Briefing for USAREUR ACofS G4 by Col L. E. Roth, 10 Jul 59, subj: Rental Guarantee Housing, Germany. AEAGD-I 285/26-7. UNCLAS.

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additional family housing. If these funds were not granted for FY 1960, concurrent travel would have to be limited thenceforth in accordance with the availability of Government-owned or Government-controlled housing. Notwithstanding the probable further adverse effect upon troop and family morale, the Department of the Army, on a long-range basis, would have to require numbers of married individuals to come to Germany unaccompanied, reduce their tours to 18 months, increase the number of bachelor personnel assignments, and discontinue the allocation of blocks of family housing to gyroscope units.⁶⁹ At the close of FY 1959 the family housing problem in Germany remained unsolved.

(3) Surplus Commodity Housing in France. Whereas the Department of Defense had rejected the surplus commodity program for Germany in FY 1958, it had approved the program for France.⁷⁰ After this auspicious start, however, negotiations proceeded slowly. By October 1958 USAREUR had developed a specific program that included 298 units for Army personnel and 102 for the Air Force. The program, with a cost ceiling of \$6 million, was approved by the Department of the Army, and on 15 October USAREUR directed the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France (USACAF), to initiate designing.⁷¹

The development of plans and specifications proceeded apace. Simultaneously, negotiations for the acquisition of land were begun with French governmental agencies.⁷² During the second half of FY 1959, however, questions of contracting methods and the tax status of the proposed housing program arose,⁷³ and at the end of the fiscal year negotiations were completely deadlocked on the issue of taxes.⁷⁴

⁶⁹Ltr, Gen Eddleman to CofSA, 8 May 59, subj: Funding to Support Dependent Populations. AEAGA-P 285/48. OFLUSE.

⁷⁰(1) Stf Study, USAREUR G4, 17 Feb 58, cited above. CONF.
(2) Cable DA-936809, DA from DCSLOG/T4 to US CINCEUR, 10 Feb 58. USAREUR SMC IN 4819. Both CONF.

⁷¹(1) Ltr, USAREUR to Dir USACAF, 15 Oct 58, subj: Authorization--Design of Surplus Commodity Housing, France, Second Increment. AEAEN-RC 285/16 H5.1 EN. (2) MRS, Col Roth to ACofS G4, 15 Oct 58, subj: Construction of Surplus Commodity Housing in France, atchd to ltr above. Both UNCLAS.

⁷²Cable AEUFC-E-658, USACAF to USACOMZEUR, 21 Nov 58. USAREUR SMC IN 5176. UNCLAS.

⁷³(1) Cable AEZEN-5-1910S, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Dec 58. USAREUR SMC IN 7901. UNCLAS. (2) Cable EC-9-2131, US CINCEUR to DA for CofEngr, 15 Apr 59. USAREUR SMC IN 4727. CONF. (3) Cables EC-3-2517, EC-3-3075, same to CINCUSAREUR, 8 May & 5 Jun 59. USAREUR SMC IN 2358 & 2040. UNCLAS.

⁷⁴Briefing notes, Col Roth, 10 Jul 59, subj: Second Increment, Surplus Commodity Housing, France. AEAGD-I 285/26-3. UNCLAS.

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(4) The Start of Housing Construction in Italy. Simultaneously with the approval of the French surplus commodity housing program, the Department of Defense had authorized the construction of 371 units for USASETAF.⁷⁵ In this case negotiations had progressed rather smoothly, and a contract agreement with a private sponsor was reached soon after the start of FY 1959. In August 1958 an intergovernmental agreement permitting work to begin was reached. The construction contract was signed about a week later, and groundbreaking ceremonies for the project took place at Vicenza on 3 September.⁷⁶ The 371 units were scheduled for completion by July 1960.⁷⁷

b. Means of Reducing the Dependent Population in Europe. Even the mounting Berlin crisis had brought no appreciable increase in requests for the early return of dependents to the United States. In March 1959 specific measures were therefore examined for arbitrarily reducing the number of dependents in Europe should such action become advisable at any time before 31 December 1959.⁷⁸

Approximately 178,600 Army dependents, comprising 73,800 families, were in Europe. Of this number of families, 1,200 were stationed in Berlin and 5,600 along the eastern borders of the USAREUR area. By 30 June 1959 normal rotation, not including the movements of dependents who were overseas without official authorization, would reduce the total number of families by only about 2,040, since 4,320 were scheduled to depart and 2,280 to arrive. To obtain more drastic results, 11 specific measures were suggested, which were based on the primary assumption that the plan for rapid phaseout of dependents (RAPOD) would not be executed unless hostilities seemed imminent. It was also assumed that any special measure taken before that time would be unilateral and covert, so as to avoid war scare and international complications, and that the Department of the Army would cooperate.⁷⁹

CINCUSAREUR put five of the suggested measures into effect at once. The movement of dependents to local economy housing in Germany--the supply of privately owned rental housing was critically short--was

⁷⁵ Cable DA-936809, cited above. CONF.

⁷⁶ (1) DF, USAREUR ACofS G4 to CofS, 16 Aug 58, subj: Surplus Commodity Housing Construction, Italy (U). AEAGD-I 285/10 GD. CONF.
(2) DF's, same to same, 26 & 29 Aug 58, subj: Family Housing--Vicenza. AEAGD-I 285/H5.3 GD. UNCLAS.

⁷⁷ Instl Const Prog Rept, Surplus Commodity Housing--Vicenza, Italy, 24 Nov 58. UNCLAS. In USAREUR G4 Instl Br Real Estate Sec.

⁷⁸ DF, USAREUR CofS to G1, 23 Mar 59, subj: Courses of Action to Reduce Dependent Population in Europe (U). AEAGA-P 285/48. SECRET.

⁷⁹ DF, USAREUR ACofS G1 to CofS, 13 Apr 59, subj: Limitations on the Movement of Families and Dependents to Germany. AEAGA-P 285/48. SECRET.

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discontinued. Concurrent travel to Germany under circumstances in which dependents would live in commercial hotels was also discontinued; such travel to France was permitted only if the hotel residence was to be for a short time. A more liberal policy of shortening the overseas tours of accompanied military personnel for compassionate reasons was instituted. The unauthorized movement of dependents to Europe was discouraged through a strongly-worded directive pointing out the substandard nature of many of the privately owned quarters available and the expensiveness of others. Moreover, the Department of the Army was asked for authority to provide Government transportation for the voluntary early return of such "unauthorized" dependents all the way to their places of residence in the United States.⁸⁰ However, some suggested measures of a more drastic nature were either disapproved or held in abeyance because they could not be put into effect covertly. Among these were curtailment of the overseas tours of accompanied military personnel with less than 12 months remaining, encouragement of the voluntary return of dependents to the United States before the departure of their sponsors, the interchange of married personnel in Berlin and on the border with bachelor personnel in rear areas, and the complete suspension of the movement of dependents to Europe and Berlin.⁸¹

As a general result, in April 1959 concurrent travel to Germany dropped to 58.4 percent from an FY 1958 average of 70 percent, the number of dependent families in Germany decreased during the same month by 482 for the first time in a year, but remained virtually constant thereafter.⁸²

c. Dependents' Schools. Four new high schools and six elementary schools--including one in Addis Adaba, Ethiopia, the first in Africa--were activated during the year. (See Appendix A, Table 6.) As anticipated, average daily enrollments were almost 20 percent over school year 1957-58.⁸³

	<u>1957-58</u>	<u>1958-59</u>	<u>Increase</u>	
			<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>45,516</u>	<u>54,160</u>	<u>8,644</u>	<u>18.9</u>
Grades 1-12	40,725	47,905	7,180	17.4
Kindergartens	4,791	6,255	1,464	30.9

⁸⁰ Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CofSA, 8 May 59, subj: Funding to Support Dependent Populations. AEAGA-P/48. OFLUSE.

⁸¹ DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to CofS, 13 Apr 59, cited above. SECRET.

⁸² (1) DF, USAREUR G1 to CofS, 2 Jun 59, subj: Family Housing Statistics, April 1959. AEAGA-P 285.48. (2) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Lt Col M. E. McDaniell, USAREUR G1 Pers Svc Br Const & Hsg Sec, 28 Oct 59. Both UNCLAS.

⁸³ (1) USADEG Sch Enrollment Rept as of 5 Jun 59, pp. 17-19, 20. (2) Fonecon, Mr. Lane with Mr. M. E. Armitage, USADEG, 15 Oct 59. Both UNCLAS.

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The peak enrollment in grades 1-12 was 48,388, reached in January 1959; in kindergartens it was 6,533 in February.

Since appropriations available to elementary and high schools were based upon enrollment, and supplementary nonappropriated funds were obtained for kindergarten and special instruction as far as feasible, the command was able to employ additional teachers to keep pace with enrollment. The number of U.S. citizens employed in the system rose from 1,813 to 2,211--an increase of about 22 percent. Of this number, 2,000 were teachers, principals, and librarians in grades 1-12, 150 were nonappropriated-fund instructors in kindergarten and special subjects, and 61 were central and regional administrators and supervisors. Local nationals numbered 453, including 166 language teachers and 23 librarians. The ratio of pupils to teachers dropped from 28.6:1 to 27.9:1 in grades 1-8 and rose slightly, from 19.1:1 to 19.3:1, in grades 9-12.⁸⁴

To keep USAREUR curriculums and instructional methods abreast of those of leading public school systems in the United States, and as the outcome of a staff review made during FY 1958,⁸⁵ the policy-making staff at USADEG headquarters in Karlsruhe and the supervisory staffs in the field were reorganized and enlarged at the beginning of the year. Curriculum specialists in foreign languages, health and physical education, mathematics and science, music, arts and crafts, and audio-visual aids were established at the central headquarters. The number of superintendents' areas was increased from 4 to 6, and instructional specialists in music and library-audio-visual-aids were added to the supervisory staffs of each of the four largest areas.⁸⁶

Excessive turnover of teaching personnel continued to be a problem. A special facet of the problem was emphasized in May 1959 by the civilian personnel office, USACOMZEUR Advance Section, after intensive exit interviews with teachers. With few exceptions the teachers interviewed agreed not only that their primary reason for coming overseas was to visit as much of Europe as possible, but that this objective could be accomplished best by transferring to a new location at the end of each year.

"Many of the teachers interviewed stated that they thoroughly enjoyed the past year....but still desired to see Germany, Italy, or Paris before returning to CONUS. Although the Department of the Army is not losing the services of these employees when they

⁸⁴ USADEG Sch Enrollment Rept, cited above, pp. 2, 4. UNCLAS.

⁸⁵ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, p. 93. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁸⁶

Fonecon, Mr. Lane with Mr. S. G. Hergenroeder, USADEG, 16 Oct 59. UNCLAS.

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transfer, the effectiveness of the school here is seriously hampered by this almost 100% turnover each year, and the administrative cost and time spent in reassignment and the processing of new teachers is tremendous.... It is believed that this is a serious problem that cannot be solved at this level."⁸⁷

At least a partial solution was expected to result from proposed legislation that would not only remove the principal handicaps under which overseas teachers worked,⁸⁸ but would also enable the command to control their assignment and reassignment.⁸⁹

Meanwhile the Department of the Army was informed through US EUCOM that USAREUR had reached the limit of its efforts to alleviate schoolroom shortages through the conversion of buildings, the use of prefabs, and minor new construction. Measures of that kind could not possibly meet, in entirety, the forecast requirements for the school year 1959-60 and thereafter. If a definitely funded and progressive long-term program of construction was not developed soon, substitute crash actions would not keep the schools concerned from falling short of the North Central Association's accreditation criteria.⁹⁰

d. Character Guidance and Religious Activities. The number of USAREUR chaplains fluctuated between 264 and 277. On 30 June 1959 66 percent were protestant, 30 percent Catholic, and 4 percent Jewish. Although this denominational distribution was numerically equitable, adequate service was made difficult in France by the large size and increasing needs of the USACOMZEUR area and in Germany by the emphasis on Seventh Army combat readiness, which necessitated extensive field training and exercises. A welfare fund allocation of \$86,000 financed the employment of a limited number of civilian clergymen in localities where uniformed chaplains were not available. This step, however, was only a temporary expedient that did not completely solve the problem of providing chaplains

⁸⁷USACOMZEUR Qtrly Rev & Anal, Civ Pers Prog, 4th Qtr FY 59, p. 16. AEAGC-C 250/22. UNCLAS.

⁸⁸USAREUR Ann Hist Repts, FY 55, pp. 135, 220; FY 56, pp. 117-118; FY 57, p. 55; FY 58, p. 93. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁸⁹Public Law 86-91, 86th Congress, The Defense Department Overseas Teachers Pay and Personnel Practices Act, signed by the President on 17 July 1958, authorized revisions in salaries and conditions of employment expected to be operative at the beginning of the second semester of school year 1959-60. UNCLAS.

⁹⁰USAREUR SGS Summary of Actions for 26 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

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in field and community simultaneously.⁹¹

In addition to conducting regular church services, personal consultations, and the character guidance program for military personnel, chaplains emphasized the religious education of dependent children, the continued development of laymen's auxiliaries, and the cultivation of helpful relations with local parishes and religious agencies.

A Department of the Army character guidance team from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains visited USAREUR from 21 April to 8 May 1959 and demonstrated the committee method of presenting a topic throughout the command. The monthly character guidance lectures were also improved through the use of Vu-graph transparencies and "open-end" films designed to stimulate discussion, although the supply of both was insufficient.

Sunday, catechism, and Sabbath schools enrolled 35,600 children weekly, taught by 2,900 volunteers, most of whom were trained by chaplains, but many of whom attended special education conferences, catechetical institutes, and workshops conducted on an area basis. Because of the lack of appropriate facilities in the chapels, many Sunday and Sabbath schools were held in youth centers and dependents' school buildings.

The activities of laymen's societies and auxiliaries were correlated through newly established area councils. The Military Council of Catholic Women and the Military Council of Catholic Men held their first conventions in September 1958 and April 1959, respectively. Rallies of the Protestant Men of the Chapel were conducted at 18 locations during April 1959; the organization's annual convention was held in Berchtesgaden, 2-5 October 1958. Similarly, 16 Protestant Women of the Chapel rallies were held in that same month, followed by a women's convention in May 1959. The annual teenage convention of the Protestant Youth of the Chapel was held in July 1958, and a Jewish Torah Convention in June 1959. All in all, 74 retreats and conventions, attended by 14,790 persons, met in Berchtesgaden during the year.

Definite progress was made toward more helpful relationships with indigenous religious groups and agencies. During the USAREUR-sponsored German-American Friendship Week, German ministers and laymen participated in American chapel services, and vice-versa. On other occasions American congregations worked out successful programs of cooperation with neighboring parishes and sponsored assistance to local churches, orphanages, and homes for the aged. In some instances conferences with German clergymen constituted the first occasions on which the clergymen

⁹¹(1) USAREUR Chpln Div, Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 Jul 58-30 Jun 59, pp. 1-11. This summary is the principal source of information contained in this section. (2) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Chpl (Lt Col) F. A. Evans, Dep USAREUR Chpln, 20 Oct 59. Both UNCLAS.

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of different denominations had met to discuss problems of mutual interest.

e. The Armed Forces Recreation Center. Programs of special services, recreation, and entertainment continued as in previous years. The principal question arising during the year concerned the financial support of the Armed Forces Recreation Center at Garmisch, Chiemsee, and Berchtesgaden. During FY 1959 USAREUR contributed \$1,286,000 in appropriated funds to its support, but budgetary restrictions made the finding of other sources of future income a matter of serious concern.

Two possibilities were considered: charging higher rates to Air Force and Navy personnel on the ground that neither service contributed any appropriated funds to the activity, or making the center self-supporting through across-the-board rate increases to all patrons. The first alternative was considered to be contrary to Department of Defense policy. It was feared that the second would merely cause patrons to use the center for shorter periods and to make fewer purchases. Moreover, while the facilities were used at virtually peak capacity during holidays, weekends, and the summer months, no practicable way had been found for keeping patronage from falling off sharply during midweeks, the early fall, and the late spring. Raising prices, therefore, would not be likely to increase annual income.⁹²

General Eddleman decided to make the center a nonappropriated welfare fund activity, beginning 1 July 1959, and to ask the Air Force to contribute a pro rata share.⁹³ At the end of June 1959 USAFE had not indicated its position.⁹⁴

f. The Encouragement of Thrift through the USAREUR Savings Program. The encouragement of thrift through the purchase of U.S. Savings bonds by all USAREUR personnel and the use of the Soldiers' Deposits system by enlisted personnel continued throughout the year. Beginning with January 1959 attempts to compute total sales and deposits were discontinued, partly because major stress was upon wider participation, with 65 percent as the Department of the Army goal, and partly because neither bond purchases nor Soldiers' Deposits were funneled through a single channel. As nearly as could be ascertained, however, participation in one or both parts of the program, which had widened from 38.27 percent

⁹²DF, USAREUR G1 to CofS, 27 Feb 59, subj: Support of the AFRC. AEAGA-P 265/50. UNCLAS.

⁹³(1) DF, USAREUR Compt to CofS thru G1 & G4, 27 May 59. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 4 Jun 59, subj: Financial Support, AFRC. Both AEAGO 255/6 CO9B. Both UNCLAS. Normal use of the center by Air Force personnel was 20.8 percent of the total; utilization by Navy personnel was comparatively negligible.

⁹⁴Fonecon, Mr. Lane with Maj W. T. Cound, USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br, 28 Oct 59. UNCLAS.

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of all personnel during the fourth quarter of FY 1957 to 46.6 percent during the fourth quarter of FY 1958, reached 57 percent during the fourth quarter of FY 1959.⁹⁵ The higher interest rate on savings bonds purchased on and after 1 June 1959 was expected to result in significant increases in sales.⁹⁶

Meanwhile the attention of the appropriate stateside authorities was called to certain conditions affecting the USAREUR savings program. One was the inevitability of slumps in participation during the overseas Christmas shopping months of October and November. The other was the necessity of sending out literature well ahead of overseas savings drives that were supposed to coincide with similar drives in the States.⁹⁷

⁹⁵(1) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Maj F. Piriano, Jr., USAREUR Ofc of Compt, 19 Oct 59. UNCLAS. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 82-83. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁹⁶DA Cir 608-21, and DA Pam 355-200-6, Program Support Series, both 22 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

⁹⁷Intvw, Mr. Lane with Maj Piriano, cited above. UNCLAS.

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CHAPTER 6

Funding

25. Financial Resources

USAREUR's financial resources consisted of appropriated and non-appropriated dollar funds and Deutsche Marks contributed for the support of Allied forces stationed in Berlin.

a. The Appropriated Dollar Budget. Appropriated dollar funds allocated to USAREUR for FY 1959 totaled \$600,715,437, of which \$580,728,818 was obligated by 30 June 1959, as shown in the tabulation below:¹

	<u>Allocated</u>	<u>Obligated</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$600,715,437</u>	<u>\$580,728,818</u>
Operations and Maintenance, Army	527,630,100	526,860,088
Military Construction, Army	47,584,051	33,175,656
Research and Development, Army	1,091,243	928,202
Reserve Personnel, Army	282,000	248,167
Procurement, Equipment, & Missiles, Army	24,128,043	19,516,705

¹Status of Funds Repts (RCS CSCAB-19(R3)), Op Agencies 81 & 89, 30 Jun 59. UNCLAS.

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The Operations and Maintenance, Army, portion of the budget was further distributed among 8 budget programs and 4 categories of miscellaneous expenses, as follows:²

Program		<u>Availability</u>	<u>Obligations</u>
2000		\$258,522,000	\$258,259,399
2100		6,730,000	6,701,119
2200		130,104,800	129,892,062
2300		49,629,000	49,562,189
2400		28,333,000	28,266,527
2500		47,455,500	47,345,774
2600		36,000	35,927
2700		5,255,000	5,240,424
Miscellaneous Expenses	.012	19,000	18,856
	.014	500	423
	.015	8,300	7,164
	.017	1,537,000	1,534,844

b. Nonappropriated Dollar Funds. In addition to the monies appropriated by Congress, the profits from the world-wide activities of the Army exchanges and motion-picture service--plus certain locally generated funds--were used to contribute to the welfare and morale of Army personnel. USAREUR's total welfare fund availability for FY 1959 was \$17,100,000. Of this sum, \$12.6 million was received from the Department of the Army on a per-capita distribution basis. A carry-over of some \$2.5 million from the previous fiscal year, plus locally generated class VI profits of \$1.6 million, Stars and Stripes profits of \$200,000, and miscellaneous income of another \$200,000 rounded out the total.³

Almost \$14 million of the total was distributed to the normal welfare program. The major portion--over \$4 million--went to the service clubs, and almost \$2 million was paid into unit funds, with libraries--\$1.4 million--and the sports program--\$1.36 million--being the next largest recipients from the program. Among the other beneficiaries were craft shops, the dependents' education program, music and entertainment, the

²(1) Ibid. (2) Cmt 2, USAREUR Ofc of Compt to G3, 23 Nov 59, subj: Review of Draft Annual Historical Report, Hq USAREUR, FY 1959. AEMCO-A 250/56 (4 Nov 59). Both UNCLAS.

³Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAREUR G3 Hist Sec, with Mr. J. M. Knopp, G1 Welf Sec, 26 Oct 59. UNCLAS.

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Armed Forces Network, unit newspapers, scouting programs, troop education, hunting and fishing, American Youth Activities, the USAREUR competitive marksmanship program--mostly for trophies--chaplains' activities, and community relations projects.⁴

In addition, it was possible to provide approximately \$2.2 million to USACOMZEUR for urgently needed welfare construction projects. The carry-over at the end of the Fiscal year was slightly over \$1 million.⁵

Toward the end of the fiscal year a realignment of functions moved the responsibility for custodianship of welfare funds from the USAREUR Office of the Comptroller to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. This placed custodianship and operating policy in the same staff division--a logical combination of functions--while the Comptroller retained the accounting responsibility. The change was made effective on 1 June 1959.⁶

c. The Berlin Deutsche Mark Budget. Contributions of Deutsche Mark funds for the support of U.S. forces stationed in Western Germany had been stopped by the Federal Republic of Germany in FY 1958. However, since Berlin continued to be occupied, the West Berlin civil government still provided funds for the support of the U.S., British, and French garrisons stationed in that city.⁷

For the German fiscal year 1959--1 April 1958 through 31 March 1959--the Berlin budget for the support of the U.S. Army garrison included the equivalent of \$114,524 for claims; \$3,121,333 in Military Construction, Army; and \$10,682,462 in Maintenance and Operations, Army, for a total of \$13,918,319. The O&M funds were distributed among the following budget programs:

		<u>Dollar Equivalent</u>
	<u>Total</u>	<u>\$10,682,462</u>
Program	2000	6,778,092
	2100	4,400
	2200	1,671,860
	2400	734,670
	2500	1,493,440

⁴ Army Welfare Fund, Germany-Italy-France, "Programmed Expenditures by Major Activity, FY 1960," n.d. UNCLAS In G1 Welf Sec.

⁵ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Knopp, cited above. UNCLAS.

⁶ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col J. R. Lamar, Ofc of Compt Fin & Acct Br, 27 Oct 59. UNCLAS.

⁷ For details of the Berlin situation and funding procedures, see USAREUR Ann Hist Repts, FY's 1956-58, passim.

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All funds were fully obligated.⁸

26. Financial Management

a. The Army Command Management System (ACMS). During FY 1958 this system had been installed as the approved, command-wide operating method.⁹ The ACMS assistance teams that had helped the subordinate commands in adopting the system in their finance and accounting offices and operating agencies had been discontinued at the end of FY 1958. However, the many problems encountered by the subordinate commands in applying a complicated system such as this induced them to request USAREUR for continued advisory service through the assistance teams. Accordingly, the ACMS teams resumed their visits to subordinate commands and thus provided on-the-spot assistance in the correction of discrepancies or the solution of specific problems. There was not an inspection-type function, for no reports were rendered of corrections required. The program was entirely of a service nature, and was considered to have provided valuable guidance in improving the over-all efficiency of ACMS operations throughout the command.¹⁰

b. Transfer of the Accounting Function. As a part of the program to meet the commander in chief's desire to eliminate all operating functions from USAREUR headquarters, on 1 June 1959 the U.S. Army Accounts Office was moved from Heidelberg to Paris, with its primary functions remaining unchanged.¹¹

c. Formalization of Internal Review Regulations. The concept of internal review and designation of that function as a command responsibility originally had been briefly covered in Army regulations governing audit policy and procedures (AR 36-5). Detailed guidance from the Department of the Army had been received in letter and pamphlet form, and USAREUR had instituted the internal review program on this basis without the issuance of a separate regulation formally directing command implementation.

This situation was corrected with the publication of AR 37-10, "Internal Review and Systems Improvement," in April 1959, which clarified the concept and formalized the program. Since the new regulation to a large extent confirmed original guidance, USAREUR continued to carry out internal review program requirements.¹²

⁸(1) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Maj H. A. Rosenberger, USAREUR Ofc of Compt Bud Br, 29 Oct 59. (2) Cmt 2, Compt to G3, 23 Nov 59, cited above. Both UNCLAS.

⁹USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 31-33. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

¹⁰Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col J. R. Lamar, USAREUR Ofc of Compt Fin & Acct Br, 27 Oct 59. UNCLAS.

¹¹Ibid. UNCLAS.

¹²Cmt 2, USAREUR Ofc of Compt to G3, 23 Nov 59, cited above. UNCLAS.

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d. Recoupment of U.S. Dollar Currency. After the conversion of MPC to U.S. dollar currency that had taken place in late FY 1958, an undetermined amount of dollars was finding its way into the German banking system. Plans were discussed with the Deutsche Bundesbank to recoup these funds. Beginning with August 1958, the U.S. banking facilities--the American Express Company, Inc., and The Chase-Manhattan Bank--recouped U.S. dollars; by the end of FY 1959 recoupment stood at \$7.5 million per month.¹³

e. Completion of the Reorganization Program for USAREUR Finance and Accounting Offices. This program, which called for all TD finance offices to be reorganized as TOE disbursing sections with a peacetime personnel augmentation under a TD, had been initiated in late FY 1958 and had progress as far as the detailed planning stage.¹⁴

During FY 1959 the five finance and accounting offices of NACOM and SACOM were converted from TD to TOE finance disbursing units. Action to convert finance and accounting offices from TD to TOE was programmed for USACOMZEUR and USASETAF for FY 1960. Seventh Army finance offices did not have to be converted because they were TOE organizations.¹⁵

¹³ Ibid. UNCLAS

¹⁴ For details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 37-38. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

¹⁵ Cmt 2, Compt to G3, 23 Nov 59, cited above. UNCLAS.

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CHAPTER 7

Logistics

27. Planning

The preparation of logistical support plans and annexes continued to be a function of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

a. Capabilities Plans. The USAREUR Capabilities Plans (CP) 1-56 (Basic) and (Alternate) were partially replaced during FY 1959 by the USAREUR Operations Plans (OPLAN) 301 and 302.¹ The logistical support portions of OPLAN's 301 and 302 were drafted as a single plan that would serve as Volume II of each of the operations plans. This was possible because logistical support would remain the same in both contingencies provided for by the two operations plans. The draft logistical plan spelled out in detail the emergency, one-time actions that would be taken during the transition from peace to war and established organizational relationships between the communications zone and the field army operating under USAREUR Theater Army. It assumed for a starting point that the line of communications being further developed under Concept "C", Revised (see below), would be the basis of logistical support in future combat operations. As of 30 June 1959 the draft was undergoing final coordination in anticipation of early publication.²

¹USAREUR OPLAN's 301, 4 Dec 58, USAREUR AG 3352; and 302, 22 Jun 59, USAREUR AG 3334. Both TS. OPLAN 301 covered Cold War situations, operation short of general war, and general war under NATO command; OPLAN 302 provided for operations of USAREUR units in a general war situation in which the NATO assumption of command was delayed. (Info used SECRET).

²(1) Draft Vol. II, to USAREUR OPLAN 301/302, n.d. USAREUR AG 3672. TS. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals (info used SECRET). (2) Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAREUR G3 Hist Sec, with Lt Col C. E. Pister, G4 Plans Br, 8 Oct 59. SECRET.

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b. Theater Army Field SOP. Closely related to OPLAN's 301 and 302 was the USAREUR (Theater Army) Field SOP, which was published in March 1959. Whereas the operations plans provided for one-time actions to accomplish the transition to a wartime situation, the standing operating procedures outlined continuing policies for wartime operations. As an integral part of the operations plans, the SOP specified the Theater Army would be responsible for the logistical support of all U.S. Army forces in the theater and, in addition, would provide common-user items and cross-service support to other U.S. forces in accordance with US EUCOM or JCS directives. Normal depot supply support of other services would consist of all class I requirements; all class III requirements, except for Air Force- and Navy-peculiar oils and lubricants; and all class II and IV support of common items, with the exception of quartermaster, signal, and medical items of supply.³

Since logistical support was a national responsibility, no such support was to be furnished to any NATO allies, except in emergency situations. Subordinate commands were to channel Allied requests for support to Theater Army headquarters, from whence they would be forwarded to US EUCOM. No routine requests would be honored without US EUCOM's approval. Theater Army would also be responsible for the control of critical items of supply. These would be issued either by means of an allocation system or on the basis of individual requests, whichever seemed to afford most effective distribution.⁴

c. Supply Dispersal Planning. The Theater Army SOP also established criteria for supply installations established by subordinate commands to achieve effective support of forward units. Maximum use was to be made of existing storage facilities as well as road, rail, and water transportation networks. A dispersal program was to minimize profitable atomic-weapons targets.⁵ The Soviet ultimatum on Berlin, issued at the end of November 1958, gave added impetus to planning for the dispersal of supplies under wartime conditions. At a logistical conference held in February 1959 the discussion was focused on alleviating the congested conditions in the Kaiserslautern depot complex. Kaiserslautern presented such a lucrative target that the outbreak of war would almost certainly result in immediate heavy heavy supply losses through an enemy atomic strike. On the dual assumption that the Department of the Army would provide the necessary additional funds and that the needed real estate would become available in time, the draft plan--Annex O--envisaged the establishment of balanced stockpiles at decentralized locations for 15 days' support of the operations of Seventh Army,

³Chap III, Logistics, to Part IV, USAREUR (Theater Army) Fld SOP (U), Mar 59, pp. 1, 10. CONF.

⁴Ibid., pp. 3, 7. CONF.

⁵Ibid., p. 8. CONF.

⁶DF, USAREUR G4 to distr, 2 Mar 59, subj: Dispersal of Depot Stocks (U), with incl, Draft Annex O, same subj, to CINUSAREUR OPLAN 301, Vol. II, Logistics. LEAGD-PL. SECRET.

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the 32d Artillery Brigade, and the 7th Engineer Brigade. The stocks for Seventh Army were to go into five divisional supply dumps that would be situated in the rugged terrain of the Rhineland Palatinate west of the river. If no U.S.-controlled property was available, the sites were to be leased for a 6-month period beginning around 15 April. Stocks for the artillery and engineer brigades would be positioned at or near sites their units occupied west of the Rhine.⁷ The line-item lists of materials to be included in the stockpiles were to be based on recommendations of the respective technical services, which were also to specify movement requirements, to include estimates of the time required to complete stock relocations.⁸ The technical services furnished the information desired, and with minor exceptions accepted the basic concepts of the proposed plan.⁹ The Engineer, however, indicated that the plan would not be practicable so far as the 7th Engineer Brigade was concerned. The units of the brigade had missions that often kept them away from their home stations for extended periods of time, and the small detachments that stayed behind would be incapable of establishing and maintaining prestock points at their unit sites.¹⁰

The draft Annex O and a proposed stockage list based on the recommendations of the technical services were forwarded to USACOMZEUR, with a request to provide the stocks, to select the prestock sites, and to prepare a movement plan. The selection of sites and development of plans were to be expedited, but reconnaissance was to be limited to public roads and aerial observation of areas not under U.S. control; host nations were not to be contacted, and no action aimed at the actual acquisition of real estate--as opposed to planning actions--was to be taken without specific direction from USAREUR headquarters.

Seventh Army, the 32d Artillery Brigade, and the 7th Engineer Brigade were requested to review the draft annex and the proposed stockage list and then comment on the plan and the list. Moreover, they were to assist USACOMZEUR in its planning.¹¹

⁷ Draft Annex O, cited above. SECRET.

⁸ DF, G4 to distr, 2 Mar 59, cited above. CONF.

⁹ (1) DF, USAREUR Ord Div to G4, 3 Mar 59, subj: Dispersal of Depot Stocks. AEAOR-PP 250/17. SECRET. (2) DF, QM Div to G4, same date & subj. AEAQM-PP 280/39 QM. (3) DF, Sig Div to G4, same date & subj. AEASC-SP-2 220/18c SC. (4) DF, Engr Div to G4, 4 Mar 59, same subj. AEAEN-MO 250/17. (5) DF, Trans Off to G4, 6 Mar 59, same subj. AEATC/PLN 250/17 GC. All SECRET.

¹⁰ DF, Engr Div to G4, 4 Mar 59, cited above. SECRET.

¹¹ (1) Annex O, cited above, pp. 2-3. SECRET. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to Seventh Army, USACOMZEUR, 32d Arty Bde, & 7th Engr Bde, 9 Mar 59, subj: Planning for Additional Prestocks (U). AEAGD-PL 250/17 GD. CONF.

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Acting promptly, USACOMZEUR established within 2 days a survey party--consisting of 4 officers from ADSEC, 2 from USACOMZEUR headquarters, and 1 from Seventh Army--to determine recommended storage sites for the dispersed prestocks.¹² While the survey proceeded, the 7th Engineer Brigade recommended, for essentially the same reasons as outlined by the USAREUR Engineer, that no prestocks be placed with its units. Rather, prestocks for the brigade should be positioned in all the other sites selected and made available as required. USACOMZEUR was therefore instructed to place the brigade's prestocks at the five divisional sites that were planned for Seventh Army.¹³

Five prestock points, with alternates, were selected and proposed to USAREUR;¹⁴ most of these were rejected because they were too close to existing military installations. The remaining sites were approved for planning purposes only.¹⁵ ADSEC was instructed to survey and recommend additional sites to replace those not acceptable to USAREUR and at the same time to prepare detailed storage plans for each primary site selected.¹⁶ At the end of April three sites, located in the high, rough terrain east and north of the axis Pirmasens-Kaiserslautern, were recommended. These were approved.¹⁷

In the meantime, however, international tension had eased considerably. Nevertheless, planning proceeded unabated, and at the end of June the draft of USACOMZEUR's detailed plan for the execution of Annex O to OPLAN 301 was under study.¹⁸

d. Logistical Support of Emergency Plans. Except as noted below the requirements for logistical support of USAREUR emergency plans remained unchanged during FY 1959.

¹² Memo for rec, Lt Col E. C. Holland, C/USAREUR, G4 Plans Br War Plans Sec, 11 Mar 59, subj: Planning for Additional Prestocks (U). SECRET. In G4 Plans Br 250/17 (RP), Annex O to OPLAN 301.

¹³ Ltr, 7th Engr Bde to CINCUSACEUR, 13 Mar 59, subj as above, with handwritten note, sgd Carl E. Pister, Lt Col /G4 Plans Br/. DEUEN-SO 250/17. USAREUR GD 39-47. SECRET.

¹⁴ Cable AEZLG-7-410, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Mar 59. USAREUR SMC IN 6088. SECRET.

¹⁵ Cable SX-3030, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 4 Apr 59. SECRET.

¹⁶ Cable AEZLG-7-573, USACOMZEUR to ADSEC, et al., 13 Apr 59. USAREUR SMC IN 3935. SECRET.

¹⁷ (1) Cable AEZLG-7-787, USACOMZEUR to USAREUR, 28 Apr 59. USAREUR SMC IN 8791. (2) Cable SX-4110, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 27 May 59. Both SECRET.

¹⁸ Ltr, USACOMZEUR to USAREUR, 29 Jul 59, subj: USACOMZEUR OPLAN "HAYSTACK" (U). DEZOT-P 250/17. USAREUR AG 69-290. SECRET.

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(1) Berlin Plans. The USAREUR Emergency Plans (EP) 101 and 102 were prepared as a joint document supporting the USAFE OPLAN 102-59, which called for unilateral action, and the Quadripartite Berlin Airlift Plan (QBAL)¹⁹ which called for 4-power action to support West Berlin by airlift.²⁰ Since USAREUR's ground support role would be essentially the same in either eventuality, only one plan was prepared. The concept of the plan was that the needs of the civil population could be met by airlift in the event that land access to the island city was denied. The air forces(s) of the United States and/or its Allies would furnish the lift capability, and the Federal Republic of Germany and the City Administration of West Berlin (CAWB) would provide the means to procure, pack, document, finance, and transport on the ground those commodities that were to be lifted to and from Berlin. USAREUR's role would be to assist the Federal Republic and the West Berlin agencies in their ground functions and to activate a U.S. Army Airlift Support Command (USASAC) for the supervision and control of ground operations. In addition, USACOMZEUR would attach to USASAC some transportation truck units, 3 transportation movement control teams, and 1 water purification team, which would insure the availability of needed personnel and equipment to maintain a steady flow of commodities into Berlin during the first 10 days of the airlift. Similarly, two transportation movement control teams would be attached to Berlin Command to facilitate operations at that end. As the Federal Republic and the West Berlin city administration became capable of assuming these responsibilities, USAREUR support would gradually be withdrawn until only the supervisory functions of USASAC were being performed by U.S. personnel.²¹

USAREUR EP 103--first issued in October 1958, and revised in May 1959--provided for five courses of action, progressively forceful, that could be used to test Soviet intentions and break a land blockade if access routes to Berlin were denied U.S. forces. The units involved in the various courses of action would carry their own TOE equipment upon deployment. In the four less forceful alternatives Seventh Army would provide resupply of all classes in addition to spare parts. In the fifth instance, however, which called for deployment of an entire armored division, Seventh Army would provide only class I, II and IV, and spare parts resupply; class III, IIIA, and related POL products, plus class V, would be provided by USACOMZEUR upon request of Seventh Army. All other logistical procedures would remain normal.²²

¹⁹The QBAL plan was essentially the same as the Tripartite Berlin Airlift Plan of 24 April 1958, except that the Federal Republic of Germany had become a full partner of the Allies in the implementation of the airlift.

²⁰(1) USAREUR EP 101/102, 5 Jun 59. USAREUR GC 69-16. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) USAFE OPLAN 102-59, 21 May 59. USAREUR AG 69-24. (3) Hq USAFE QBAL, 9 Apr 59. USAREUR AG 49-195. Both SECRET

²¹USAREUR EP 101/102, cited above. SECRET.

²²USAREUR EP 103, 29 May 59. USAREUR AG 2772. TS. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

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USAREUR EP 106 was designed to support an airlift to relieve the Allied garrisons in Berlin. USAREUR's ground-control mission, through USAASC, was essentially the same as in EP 101/102, except that the latter plan was designed to relieve the civilian population of West Berlin and relied on West German and West Berlin support. In EP 106, however, the operation would be paid for with U.S. funds, and both NACOM and Berlin Command were to furnish laborers for handling the cargo.²³

At the end of the reporting period another Berlin plan--USAREUR EP 107--was in the final draft stage and undergoing review preparatory to publication.²⁴ This plan was based on the assumption that the Soviets or the East German regime might initiate harassing actions that would restrict air access to West Berlin. In that event USAREUR would become responsible for providing surface movement capability--averaging 100 passengers and 40 tons of cargo in each direction weekly--that would normally be moved to and from West Berlin by air. The actual operation of the surface lift would be the responsibility of USACOMZEUR.²⁵

Finally, USAREUR EP 113 was prepared for a possible evacuation of U.S. personnel from Berlin. The logistical responsibilities of this plan largely devolved on NACOM, which was to receive, feed, shelter, and provide medical care for personnel in transit from West Berlin to safe refuges. If and when the evacuees reached France, USACOMZEUR would furnish them the same support.²⁶

(2) Middle East Plans. Although a great deal of effort had gone into revising USAREUR EP 201 after the Lebanon operation, the revised plan was not ready for publication by 30 June 1959.²⁷

Similarly, EP 202 was under revision, but in this case an interim plan was published. The logistical support portion of that interim plan called for USACOMZEUR to provide logistical support of Army elements deployed to Morocco as part of a joint task force, but only if the force was so large as to make this necessary. If small Army contingents were deployed, the commanders in the field would make cross-service agreements at the local level for all types of logistical support and service. Shipping requirements would thus be reduced to a minimum, and the operation

²³USAREUR EP 106, 5 Jun 59. AEAGC 250/17. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

²⁴Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Col Pister, cited above. SECRET.

²⁵Draft USAREUR EP 107, 3 Jun 59. USAREUR AG 3875. TS. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

²⁶USAREUR EP 113, 8 Oct 58. AEAGC 250/17. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

²⁷Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col J. E. Simmons, G4 Plans Br, 8 Oct 59. SECRET.

would cause the least possible impact on USAREUR theater stocks.²⁸

e. Implementation of Concept C, Revised. Concept C, Revised, remained in effect throughout FY 1959, the only changes since FY 1958 being minor ones of a technical nature.²⁹ In September 1958 USACOMZEUR published its stockage and depot organization plan, the basic tenet of which was that the line of communication was to be so organized as to facilitate a ready transition from peacetime to wartime operations. This was to be accomplished primarily by effecting an immediate dispersion of stocks. Since it would be difficult to transport supplies to ADSEC and Seventh Army in time of general war or during an atomic exchange, at least a 40-day supply of Theater Reserve Number 1 stocks--calculated at wartime consumption rates--would have to be positioned in the ADSEC-Seventh Army area, with at least 25 days' supply placed in ADSEC. That portion of Theater Reserve Number 1 not included in these forward stocks would be balanced between ADSEC and BASEC. Combat reserves were to go into at least 3 locations in ADSEC--2 in France and 1 in the Federal Republic of Germany--and at least 2 locations in BASEC.³⁰

These changes were to be accomplished by means of a reorganization of the depot system. With the exception of medical depots, class III and IIIA storage facilities under the control of the Quartermaster Petroleum Distribution Command, and certain supply facilities located east of the Rhine, all supply installations within the system would be converted to general depots³¹ or ammunition depots by the end of calendar year 1959.³² The program was an extension and continuation of one that had been initiated by USAREUR in March 1955 under the title of Multi-Service Storage and had been carried forward by USACOMZEUR under the title Outline Plan For Major Communications Zone Installations and Their Missions. Under these preceding plans permanent general depots had already been established and were operating at Bussac, Verdun, and Kaiserslautern. Provisional general depots at Nancy, Toul, Braconne, Chinon, Saumur, Nahbollenbach, Metz, Pirmasens, and Ingrandes, and provisional ammunition depots at Miesau, Trois Fontaines, and Captieux were to be phased in gradually as permanent depots by 1 January 1960.³³

²⁸ Cable SX-6767, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 20 Sep 58. TS.

²⁹ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Col's Pister & Williams, cited above. SECRET. For a detailed discussion of Concept C, Revised, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 183-88. SECRET.

³⁰ USACOMZEUR Communications Zone Stockage and Depot Organization Plan(U) (SADOP), 15 Sep 58, pp. 1-3. AEZLG-58-331. SECRET.

³¹ A general depot receives, stores, and issues supplies for more than one technical service.

³² SADOP, pp. 4-5. SECRET.

³³ (1) Ibid., pp. 7-8, and Annex B. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) Cmt 2, USAREUR G4 to G3, 28 Nov 59, subj: Review of Draft Annual Historical Report, Hq USAREUR, FY 1959 (U). AEAGD-MN 250/56 GD. SECRET.

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28. Support of Atomic Delivery Weapons for Non-U.S. NATO Countries

a. Missile Systems. The basic concept of the USAREUR support plan was that the NATO recipient countries would assume maximum responsibility in performing supply and maintenance functions themselves. Since this would be impractical initially, USAREUR planned to establish an inventory control point (ICP) to support the missile systems furnished to NATO nations under the Military Assistance Program (MAP).³⁴ The MAP ICP, as it came to be known, would perform supply and stock control as well as maintenance functions. The latter would include calibration of testing equipment and in-storage maintenance of spare parts and authorized floats of ground guidance, handling, and test equipment. Initially, funds and personnel spaces for the ICP operations would be furnished from MAP resources. As soon as the NATO Maintenance Supply Services Agency (NMSSA) developed the capability to accept the responsibility, these functions--together with the stocks held in the ICP--would be turned over to NATO control.³⁵

Meanwhile, the development of its improved European Logistics Program (IELP) enabled the Air Force, late in 1958, to contemplate significant reductions in the use of its facilities at Chateauroux. USAF indicated to the Department of Defense that portions of this installation pertaining to NATO logistical support of aircraft systems could be turned over to NMSSA. When the latter appeared interested, USAF proposed in December a plan for the gradual turn-over of specified facilities, stocks, and responsibilities at the Chateauroux complex.³⁶ In January 1959 the Department of Defense indicated general acceptance of the Air Force plan. Initially the Air Force would be responsible for the administration of the facility, while NMSSA would act in an advisory role concerning policy and procedures to be applied in NATO matters. However, NMSSA was to be self-sufficient in relations with NATO customers of the supply facility even during the initial 2-year period needed to establish its capability to operate alone.³⁷

³⁴USAREUR Spt Plan for Adv U.S. Army Wpns in Non-U.S. NATO forces (U) (Sup for ADUSW), 27 Oct 58, Vol. I, p. 19. USAREUR/GC 108-173/27 Oct 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

³⁵Ibid., Vol. II, p. 8. NATO SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

³⁶OASD (ISA) Rept, n.d., subj: DoD-USAF Conference on Logistical Support of the NATO Maintenance Supply Services Agency (Chateauroux Plan), 27-30 January 1959, Washington, D.C. CONF. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

³⁷Ibid. CONF. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

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At its January meeting the NMSSA Board of Directors appointed a working group to survey the Chateauroux site and make recommendations. The group findings, presented in February, favored acceptance of the site, and at the March meeting a 13-nation resolution was adopted indicating NATO's intent to develop a common supply facility at Chateauroux. The Plans and Policy Committee of NMSSA was authorized to contact the French and U.S. authorities to insure retention of the facility and was directed to submit draft agreements for the operation of the facility. It was assumed that the United States would operate the supply center for the first 1 to 2 years in NATO's behalf.³⁸

Simultaneously, USAREUR was preparing to establish the MAP ICP called for in the logistical support plan. In March a proposed table of distribution that had been prepared by USACOMZEUR was forwarded to the Department of the Army, followed by a budget estimate in April.³⁹ It was planned that the Army ICP and its attendant depot would also be located at former Air Force facilities at Chateauroux,⁴⁰ where they would later become a part of NMSSA. The missile support portion of the NMSSA complex--initially to be the MAP ICP established by USAREUR--was to have an ultimate storage capacity for some 50,000 line items of repair parts, or the equivalent of 5,000 tons; annual shipments and receipts would probably be about 3,000 tons each. The ICP and depot were to become operational on 1 July 1959 under the command of USAGOMZEUR, with a proposed staffing of 85 U.S. civilian and 224 indigenous personnel. The total cost for FY 1960--including USACOMZEUR's operational expenditures and the costs of reimbursable support furnished by the Air Force--was estimated at \$2,426,034.⁴¹

In preparation for this activation, USACOMZEUR requested late in May that a 120-day supply of repair parts for the support of atomic delivery weapons furnished to the NATO countries be shipped from the United States in two 60-day increments to arrive in Europe by 1 August and 1 October 1959. However, two important problems remained to be solved before the MAP ICP plans could be completed and executed: NMSSA had not yet formally agreed to

³⁸Incl 1, Outline Plan for Development of Chateauroux as a Common NATO Supply Facility, to Memo, US Log Ln Gp, USRO, to CINCUSAREUR, 20 May 59, subj: Outline Draft Plan for Operation of Chateauroux. D-3-11558/9. UNCLAS.

³⁹Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. G. W. A. Beyer, USAREUR NATO Adv Wpns Div Msl Sys Br, 29 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

⁴⁰Memo, US Log Ln Gp, 20 May 59, cited above. UNCLAS.

⁴¹(1) MAP Bud Est, FY 1960, 1961, & 1962--USA-NATO Fld Svc Activ, n.d. May 59, CONF. (Regrade UNCLAS by USACOMZEUR cable, 6 Sep 59, USAREUR SMC IN 1658.) (2) Sum Sheet, Lt Col W. A. Hawkins, Jr., DCSLOG Mil Sec Div, 17 Jun 59, subj: MAP Inventory Control Point, Europe (MAP ICP Europe). X-54147. CONF. Both in NATO Adv Wpns Div Msl Sys Br.

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take over the facility, and French governmental authorities had not approved an agreement for the establishment of a NATO supply center at Chateauroux.⁴²

Thus, the Department of the Army established an interim supply procedure that would be used until the MAP ICP was approved and established. Under this concept, the MAAG of the recipient country would requisition repair parts from USACOMZEUR. These requisitions would be filled from available theater stocks or, if that was not possible, the Oversea Supply Agency in New York would be advised within 48 hours so that shipment from the United States could be expedited.⁴³

Although NMSSA approved a draft agreement for the operation of the supply center,⁴⁴ and the Department of the Army issued a policy directive governing the operation of the planned MAP ICP,⁴⁵ the absence of formal agreements with the French Government permitted no further progress before the end of June. The interim supply procedures remained in effect at the end of the fiscal year, with the hope that the ICP would operate by 1 September.⁴⁶

b. Warhead Custody. Atomic warhead support was an exception to the NATO principle that each member nation was responsible for the logistical support of its military forces; because of the requirements of Federal law, atomic materials had to remain in U.S. custody.⁴⁷ In addition, to the actual custodial units that would hold the warheads in each country, agreements with the recipient countries had to be reached before the weapons could be delivered or the custodial units deployed. First, a so-called 144-B government-level agreement, negotiated by a State-Defense Department team and subject to Senatorial approval, would have to be signed to permit the release of information and equipment protected under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; if none already existed, a status of forces agreement would be a part of this negotiation. Second, a government-level stockpile agreement, negotiated with State-Defense Department supervision, would be

⁴²Sum Sheet, Col Hawkins, cited above. CONF.

⁴³Cable DA-960596, DA from DCSLOG/D3 to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 4 Jun 59. USAREUR SMC IN 1520. CONF.

⁴⁴See Note by the Chmn, NMSSA, Plans & Ploy Comm, 11 Jun 59, subj: Plans and Policies Directive No. 142--Establishment of the NATO Supply Center as a part of the NATO Supply Services System. NM(59)-WP/35. UNCLAS. In NATO Adv Wpns Div Msl Sys Br.

⁴⁵See DA ltr, 12 Jun 59, subj: Policy and Procedures for the Operation of a European MAP Inventory Control Point and Depot Complex, AGAM-P(M) 323.3 (11 Jun 59) DCSLOG. UNCLAS.

⁴⁶(1) EC-9-3369, US CINCEUR to OSD(ISA), 19 Jun 59. USAREUR SMC IN 6275. (2) Sum Sheet, Col Hawkins, cited above. Both CONF.

⁴⁷USAREUR Sup for ADUSW, Vol. I, p. 11. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.

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required to establish cost-sharing and construction criteria; provisions for custody, security, and release of atomic weapons; provisions for maintenance and movement of the weapons; and provisions for the logistical support of U.S. forces in the host country. Finally, so-called technical arrangements, covering the detailed aspects of technical and administrative arrangements--such as standing operating procedures, division of responsibilities, troop and dependent housing, messing facilities, and the like--would have to be negotiated at the service-to-service level: for example, between USAREUR and the West German Army. No State or Defense Department approval was needed for the technical arrangements.⁴⁸

(1) Status of Agreements. During FY 1959 144-B government-level agreements became effective with West Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. By the end of June an agreement with Belgium was under negotiation; a draft had been furnished to the Italian Government, but discussions had not yet begun; early agreement with Greece was expected; and lengthy discussions with France had led to no progress.⁴⁹ The difficulty in France was occasioned by the fact that the French Government insisted upon relating the stockpile negotiations to such other problems as the question of furnishing a nuclear reactor for a French submarine and France's voice in determining the use of weapons.⁵⁰

Stockpile agreements were signed with Turkey on 20 November 1958 and with Germany on 27 March 1959. At the end of the fiscal year negotiations were in progress with Belgium, Greece, and the Netherlands, and negotiations with the Italian Government were about to start. As in the case of the 144-B agreement, negotiations with France were relatively deadlocked. The other Allies had not been approached.⁵¹

Service-to-service technical arrangements with the Turkish armed forces were ratified by USAREUR on 12 March 1959 and by USAFE shortly after the close of the fiscal year. As of 30 June both USAFE and USAREUR were working on drafts of arrangements with Germany, and a USAFE-Netherlands Air Force working group was preparing an arrangement for that country. The United Kingdom ratified an arrangement that applied only to its two Corporal regiments on 11 June, but one for Honest John deployment was still lacking.⁵²

⁴⁸US CINCEUR SUP SAMP. USAREUR AG 3854. TS. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals. (Info used SECRET.)

⁴⁹Cable EC-9-4054, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, et. al., 3 Aug 59. USAREUR SMC IN 399. SECRET. Discussions with the other NATO Allies had not been initiated.

⁵⁰US EUCOM ltr, 19 Dec 58, subj: NATO Special Ammunition Storage Program (U). EJJDD 092-2. US EUCOM Con Nr S-58-2154-48. SECRET.

⁵¹Cable EC-9-4054, cited above. SECRET.

⁵²(1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ltr, 29 Jul 59, subj: Warhead Support Plan (U). AEANA-PP 265/H52.6. Both SECRET.

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(2) U.S. Custodial Units. By the end of FY 1959 the U.S. custodial detachments that would support the two Italian Honest John battalions were activated, and both their administrative facilities and the operational sites were occupied and in use. The detachment for the support of one Italian Nike battalion was also in Europe, but its site was not expected to be completed before September. Support detachment for one Turkish Honest John battalion were also present and occupied a temporary administrative facility. The permanent site was in process of being designed, and the operational site, while completed, required some renovation. The U.S. support unit for one British Corporal regiment was occupying its administrative site, but permanent operational storage sites remained to be determined. Other U.S. units were to phase-in during FY 1960, as required.⁵³

c. Status of Non-U.S. NATO Atomic Delivery Units. During FY 1959 considerable progress was made in the delivery of both SSM and SAM equipment to NATO countries under MAP, and in addition a number of country cadres were trained--those for Nike units at Fort Bliss, and those for Honest John units in Europe.

(1) Nike Units. Equipment for 3 Nike battalions was delivered to Italy in April 1959, and that for 1 battalion each in Denmark, Norway, and France was expected to arrive soon after the end of the fiscal year.⁵⁴ The Italian cadre training was completed in January 1959; that of the Danish, French, and Norwegian cadres, in May; and the Belgian, German, and Turkish cadres were undergoing training at the end of the fiscal year and were expected to complete it in July.⁵⁵

(2) Honest John Units. Equipment for one Honest John battery was delivered to Germany in November 1958; for one battalion, to Italy in March 1959; and was expected to be delivered for one battalion each to Turkey, Belgium, France, and Italy shortly after the end of the fiscal year.⁵⁶ The training of cadres was completed as follows: Norway, June 1959; Denmark, expected to finish in July 1959; the Netherlands, May 1959; Belgium, April 1959; France, March 1959; Italy, May 1959; Greece June 1959; Turkey, December 1958. The German cadre was due to complete

⁵³(1) USAREUR NATO Adv Wpns Div Prog Rept, 30 Aug 59. SECRET.
(2) NATO Adv Wpns Div Prog Sum, 30 Sep 59. TS.

⁵⁴Appendix 1, to incl 2, to Sum Sheet, DCSLOG Mutual Sec Div Plans & Prog Br, 20 Aug 59, subj: Atomic Delivery Weapons Systems Military Assistance Programs (U). SECRET. In NATO Adv Wpns Div Msl Br.

⁵⁵NATO Adv Wpns Div Prog Rept, 30 Aug, & Prog Sum, 30 Sep 59, both cited above. TS.

⁵⁶Appendix 1, to incl 3, to DCSLOG Sum Sheet, 20 Aug 59, cited above. SECRET.

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training early in FY 1960.⁵⁷

29. Support of U.S. Atomic Weapons Delivery Systems

During FY 1959 the support of atomic delivery weapons became a routine matter except for a few specific problems that remained to be solved.

a. Storage Facilities. One of these problems concerned the storage of classified materials, both in terms of security and as a matter of safety. Early tentative plans in 1957 had called for establishing one special ammunition storage facility in ADSEC and another as part of the Captieux depot in BASEC, but it had later been decided to build two entirely separate and self-contained special weapons depots in ADSEC.⁵⁸ By the end of FY 1958 sites had been selected near Verdun and Vatry, the real estate had been secured--although final negotiations remained to be completed--and the planning-design contract had been signed with the architect-engineer firm that had been selected.⁵⁹

During FY 1959 detailed plans for the depots were developed and the storage structures so designed that they would have the capability of storing missile and rocket systems equipment, conventional ammunition, and nuclear ammunition. All storage structures and certain other critical buildings were to be of the "cut-and-cover" type--earth-covered steel-reinforced concrete that would be capable of resisting atomic-blast pressures of 25 pounds per square inch. Based on safety factors established by the Department of Defense and the guidance of the USAREUR Ordnance Division, the majority of the igloos were designed and located so that each of them would safely store the equivalent of 250,000 pounds of conventional high explosives.

Plans for the Vatry depot called for 272,000 square feet of net storage space at an estimated total cost of \$9.7 million, while the 212,000 square feet at Verdun were expected to cost about \$8 million. The "limited areas"--i.e., those sections of the depots that would have the tightest security precautions to permit the storage of nuclear components and the assembly of warheads--were to be completed by October 1960, and the remainder of the depots by February 1961.⁶⁰

The actual construction contracts for the two depots were approved by USAREUR and signed, for the U.S. forces, late in May 1959. It was not,

⁵⁷ NATO Adv Wpns Div Prog Sum, 30 Sep 59. TS

⁵⁸ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Maj A. L. Baker, USAREUR G4 Instl Br, 22 Oct 59. CONF.

⁵⁹ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. F. T. Kishaba, USAREUR Engr Div, 23 Oct 59. UNCLAS.

⁶⁰ (1) Info extracted from "Master Planning Folios," Vatry & Verdun Ord Class V Depots, by Mr. F. T. Kishaba. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Maj Baker, cited above. CONF.

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however, until mid-July that the French Government signed the contracts; work was scheduled to begin soon thereafter.⁶¹

b. Progress in Nike Site Construction. FY 1959 saw some progress in the construction of permanent sites for Nike firing batteries. At the beginning of July 1958 only 2 of the planned 24 sites had been complete, 2 more were under construction, and land for a further 6 had been acquired.⁶²

One year later, however, 5 sites were complete, 4 were under construction, 12 were in the designing stage preparatory to construction, and land remained to be acquired for only 3 of the permanent sites.⁶³

30. Issue of Late Model Equipment

In June 1959 the Department of the Army issued new instructions for the issuance of late model equipment to troops. Essentially the problem stemmed from the fact that the introduction of new equipment was normally phased over a period of years. Thus, at any given time 2 or even 3 models of a given piece of equipment might be in service. However, while the immediate issue of latest models would give troops the strongest combat posture, training would wear out this new equipment while older models were held in depot reserves. At the outbreak of hostilities older models of equipment therefore might be in better condition than the newest models.

Accordingly, new equipment having a standard counterpart already in service was to be held in mobilization reserve and issued only as older equipment became unserviceable. If no standard counterpart was in service, however, or if the new model offered a significant operational advantage over its standard counterpart, issue to troops would begin as soon as sufficient late model equipment was on hand to guarantee uninterrupted support.⁶⁴

Early in FY 1960 USAREUR disseminated these instructions and made them immediately applicable to all equipment that was to be newly introduced.⁶⁵

⁶¹(1) 1st Ind's, USAREUR to USACAF, 28 May 59, to ltrs, USACAF to USAREUR, 22 May 59, subj: Request for approval of Award for Construction of Class V Depot at Vatry (Verdun), France, Station Nr 9863 (9872). AEUFUC-P F-13-59 (F-14-59). (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Kishaba, cited above. Both UNCLAS.

⁶²USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 206-209. SECRET.

⁶³Info extracted from USACAG Const Prog Repts (RCS AEALN-139) by Capt A. C. Lehman, USAREUR G4 Adv Wpns Br. UNCLAS.

⁶⁴DA ltr, 24 Jun 59, subj: Issue of Late Model Equipment. AGAM-P (M) 400 (12 Jun 59) DCSLOG. UNCLAS.

⁶⁵1st Ind, USAREUR to distr, 14 Aug 59, to ltr cited above. AEAGD-SR 280/47 GD. UNCLAS.

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31. USAREUR's Theater Reserves

a. Effect of the Berlin Crisis. Efforts to eliminate shortages in authorized theater reserves were intensified in the face of Soviet threats over Berlin and the "ultimatum" set for 27 May 1959. For Theater Reserve Number 1--and for Theater Reserve Number 4, as appropriate--USAREUR was authorized to submit requisitions that the Department of the Army would honor on a priority basis insofar as the supplies were available in stateside depots or were scheduled for procurement. Wherever stock fund shortages existed, they were reported to the Department of the Army for remedial action. Numerous requisitions submitted by USAREUR were honored before the end of the fiscal year so that the more critical supply shortages could be eliminated.⁶⁶

b. Status of Stockage Levels.

(1) Theater Reserve Number 1. These combat reserves, consisting solely of items essential to combat operations, were located in USACOMZEUR depots and in Seventh Army prestock points. Of class I supplies, the authorized 60 days of supplies--at combat rates--were on hand at the end of the fiscal year. In October 1958 the authorized level of class II and IV priority items of supply was increased from 75 to 105 days for D-day forces, and from 30 to 45 days for the planned D/30 reinforcements, but by 30 June stocks on hand amounted only to approximately 30 days for all technical services. The class III and IIIA situation, however, was better, with supply on hand amounting to 65 of the authorized 75 days. Since the shortage of POL storage facilities had been a continuing problem, the improvements in the USACOMZEUR pipeline system contributed materially to easing the situation. The authorized 120 days of class V supplies were completely on hand.⁶⁷

(2) Project ARMY-EUCOM-GEN-102-50-OP. This special project consisted of supplies and equipment stockpiled to meet foreseeable wartime contingencies during the early phases of an emergency; 93 percent of the quantities authorized for the still-active sections of the project were on hand at the end of FY 1959.

(3) Theater Reserve Number 3 and 3A. Most of the resupply earmarked to sustain USAREUR's combat operations for the period D/30 to D/180 was stockpiled in stateside depots. The "A" portion--stocks authorized for prestockage in Europe against the over-all requirement--increased from

⁶⁶(1) Cable DA-955908, DA from DCSLOG to CINCUSACEUR, 6 Mar 59. USAREUR SMC IN 2234. (2) Intvw; Mr. Siemon with Lt Col B. A. Moses, USAREUR G4 Rqr & Sup Con Sec, 19 Aug 59. Both SECRET.

⁶⁷The material in this paragraph is based on briefing notes, Maj W. W. Brooks, G4 Rqr & Sup Con Sec, 21 Jul 59, subj: Operating Levels and Reserves. SECRET. In Rqr & Sup Con Sec.

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2,052 to 20,247 tons during the fiscal year.⁶⁸

(4) Theater Reserve Number 4. This in-place reserve of materiel was stockpiled in Italy for the immediate post-D-day support of USASSETAF until resupply from the United States could be established. Of the authorized 5,085 tons, 83 percent was on hand at 30 June 1959.

(5) Other Operational and Miscellaneous Special Projects. These were special, in-place theater reserves that were kept available for use in support of war plans or specific contingency plans. Some 91 percent of the 21,436 tons authorized was on hand on 30 June 1959.

(6) Critical Shortages. At the end of FY 1959 critical shortages existed in only three areas: ordnance class II and IV, with 45 percent of authorized reserves on hand; signal class II and IV, with 30 percent; and air transportation class II and IV, with 1 percent. However, in all cases the shortages were expected to be eliminated by the delivery of items from stateside sources or from USAREUR rebuild facilities.

c. Review of Theater Reserve Requirements. At the close of FY 1959 both USAREUR and the Department of the Army were reexamining the post-D-day logistical support program. This encompassed a critical review of each item stockpiled in the United States, France, Germany, and Italy to ascertain whether a real need existed and whether the reserves were in keeping with the ability to store, maintain, and use supplies within both current and projected troop strength ceilings. Only by eliminating non-essentials would the command be able to increase its capability to store essential items of supply.⁶⁹

32. The Modern Army Supply System (MASS)

On the basis of planning that had been developed during 1955, Project MASS had been implemented on a test basis in Seventh Army on 1 July 1956. The test had then been extended to include USACOMLEUR, the area commands, Berlin, and Bremerhaven port of embarkation in a separate MASS project on 1 April 1957. Although it had been planned to integrate the two systems in the fall of 1957,⁷⁰ the Department of the Army had directed instead that that the test project be continued until 30 June 1958, after which the desirable elements of the system would be extended to other oversea commands. USAREUR's evaluation and recommendations had been forwarded to the Department of the Army on 11 June 1958.⁷¹

⁶⁸ See also USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, p. 227. SECRET.

⁶⁹ Briefing notes, Maj Brooks, 21 Jul 59, cited above. SECRET.

⁷⁰ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 238-41. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). For further details, see cited pages, passim.

⁷¹ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, pp. 228-31. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). For further information, including the details of the USAREUR recommendations, see cited pages, passim.

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Based on the test findings, the Department of the Army prepared a draft regulation, which was to introduce the new system on a formal basis. In January 1959 a DA team came to Europe to discuss the details and refinements of the draft regulation with representatives of USAREUR, USACOMZEUR, and Seventh Army. The regulation was expected to take effect on 1 July 1959, but a number of changes and revisions were necessary.⁷² Moreover, because of the high fiscal-year-end workload that would certainly be imposed on the stock control agencies in the summer months, USAREUR requested in April that implementation be deferred until around 1 October 1959.⁷³ Detailed instructions would have to be issued to subordinate commands, and technical revisions--such as changes in punched-card formats and reprogramming the automatic data processing machines--would have to be effected.⁷⁴

In the meantime, however, the regulation--AR 730-30--was published on 14 May.⁷⁵ The regulation established basic policies and procedures to support organizational and field maintenance. These policies and procedures were based on experience gained in the 2-year MASS test.⁷⁶

The Department of the Army considered the USAREUR request for delay to be undesirable, but, recognizing the potential difficulties that could arise from the fiscal-year-end change-over, agreed that full execution of the new regulation might be deferred to 1 October. In the interim, however, USAREUR was to utilize a phased program to progress as rapidly as possible toward the ultimate goal of full implementation.⁷⁷

33. Petroleum

During the last quarter of FY 1958 improvements in the distribution of petroleum products to the U.S. Seventh Army had been under consideration. The inability to provide bulk POL delivery by means of pipelines to terminals east of the Rhine seriously weakened the petroleum distribution system. The first 30 days of hostilities would be critical because, according to the USACOMZEUR Emergency POL Pipeline Plan, construction of pipeline connections across the Rhine would not begin until after D-day so that the

⁷²Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col A. E. Nibbelink, G4 Sup Br Rqr & Stock Con Sec, 14 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

⁷³Cable SC-26565, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG, 27 Apr 59. UNCLAS.

⁷⁴Fonecon, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col T. L. Kerley, C/USAREUR G4 Rqr & Sup Con Sec, 23 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

⁷⁵The first copy was received by the USAREUR G4 on 19 June 1959.

⁷⁶(1) AR 730-30, 14 May 59, subj: Oversea Supply. Supply Support of Oversea Organization and Field Maintenance. UNCLAS. (2) Cmt 2, G4 to G3, 28 Nov 59, cited above. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁷⁷Cable DA-411070, DA from DCSLOG C to CINCUSAREUR, 18 May 59. USAREUR SMC IN 5309. UNCLAS.

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required facilities would not be immediately available.⁷⁸ To alleviate this situation, additional bulk storage facilities that could be connected to existing pipelines upon the outbreak of hostilities were to be provided east of the Rhine, river-crossing pipeline construction material was to be pre-stocked near the proposed crossing points, and additional storage facilities on the NATO pipeline complex were to be secured for U.S. use. The initial plans to achieve these objectives had been prepared before 30 June 1958.⁷⁹

a. The QUICKWAY Tank Project. The concept of QUICKWAY was that a number of bolted-steel, 10,000-barrel-capacity tanks would be erected east of the Rhine to provide bulk POL storage in amounts to meet the immediate post-D-day requirements of Seventh Army; the tanks would be readily accessible to tank trucks and at minimum distances from existing pipelines connections.⁸⁰ It was originally planned to erect 18 such tanks at 7 different locations with Theater Reserve Number 1 materials that were programmed for use in war-time POL construction projects.⁸¹ However, when the execution of the project was actually directed, only 14 tanks were to be erected: 2 each at Darmstadt, Sandhofen, Heilbronn, and in the Huttenheim area within 1½ miles of the swinging bridge over the Rhine (which carried a temporary pipeline); 4 at Camp Eschborn, near Frankfurt; and 1 each at Aschaffenburg and Karlsruhe.⁸²

The progress of the program was hampered by real-estate procurement difficulties and by objections to the presence of the tanks, which the Germans raised largely on the grounds that the tanks constituted safety hazards and/or possible sources of water contamination through leakage.⁸³

⁷⁸ Ltr, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSACEUR, 5 Mar 58, subj: Pipeline Distribution to Seventh Army (U). AEAQM-POL 280/84. SECRET.

⁷⁹ (1) 1st Ind, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 5 May 58, to ltr cited above. AEAQM-JAPO 280/84 QM. SECRET. (2) Memo for rec, Col L. E. Roth, USAREUR G4 Instl Br, 4 Jun 58, subj: "Quickway" POL Construction. OFLUSE. In QM Div Class III Br 250/17 Emergency Planning.

⁸⁰ Memo for rec, Capt P. A. Jordan, III, USAREUR G4 Instl Br, n.d., subj: Meeting on Operation Quickway, 28 July 1958. AEAQD-I 285/H5.3 GD. UNCLAS.

⁸¹ Memo for rec, Col Roth, cited above. SECRET. (2) Memo for rec, Capt Jordan, 24 Jul 58, subj: Operation Quickway. AEAQD-1 285/H5.3 GD. UNCLAS.

⁸² USAREUR ltr, 12 Aug 58, subj: POL Storage and Pipeline Construction (Operation Quickway). AEAEN 285/22. UNCLAS.

⁸³ (1) DF, USAREUR QM Div JAPO to G4, 8 Jan 59, subj: POL Storage and Pipeline Construction (Operation Quickway). AEAQM-JAPO 285/H5.3 QM. (2) DF, G4 to Engr Div, 6 Mar 59, subj: Projects for Operations Quickway. AEAQD-I 285/26. Both UNCLAS. For details of the German protests and the attendant negotiations, see QM Div Class III Br file 285/38 (RP) Operation Quickway, passim. Most often the problem was solved by building the tanks on U.S.-controlled real estate.

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By the end of June 1959 the tanks at Karlsruhe, Aschaffenburg, and Heilbronn were filled; those at Darmstadt and Huttenheim were ready to be filled; those at Sandhofen had leaked when tested and were under repair; and those at Camp Eschborn were awaiting the outcome of negotiations with German authorities on the question of delivery methods to begin filling.⁸⁴

b. U.S. Pipelines. The QUICKWAY tanks, of course, only solved part of the problem; effective means of quickly furnishing bulk POL to the storage areas were also required. To achieve a better wartime posture it was decided to prestock the necessary materials for immediate post-D-day construction of pipelines across the Rhine near the actual crossing sites. Also, to the extent possible, such crossings would be prepared in advance to preclude the delay attendant upon construction after the outbreak of hostilities.⁸⁵ Thus, pending completion of the permanent underground pipelines from Bellheim via Germersheim to Huttenheim, a light-weight, flexible, 6-inch pipeline was to be installed on the floating swinging bridge near Germersheim, with flexible lines stored near either end of the bridge to permit immediate tie-in to the permanent line at Bellheim, on the west side of the Rhine, and the tanks at Huttenheim, on the east side. These temporary arrangements were completed during the fiscal year.⁸⁶ Additionally, construction of the permanent underwater crossing of the Rhine between Bellheim and Huttenheim was begun in December 1958. By the end of June 1959 the crossing had been completed, and work on the connecting underground pipelines on both sides of the Rhine started soon after. This construction was to be completed by the end of 1959, at which time U.S. pipelines would permit through-shipment of bulk POL all the way from Donges, on the French Atlantic coast, to the Huttenheim storage facilities east of the Rhine.⁸⁷

c. NATO Pipelines and Storage. During FY 1958 USAREUR had concluded agreements whereby the U.S. pipeline capabilities had been extended by authorizing the U.S. Army and Air Force to use NATO facilities.⁸⁸ In FY 1959 efforts were made to carry out these agreements. For example, there existed a 10-inch NATO pipeline that ran between Zweibruecken and Mainz, but which could not be operated because of a lack of storage space at the northern terminus. In wartime this line would be of particular importance for the logistical support of CENTAG forces. Since a NATO project to furnish storage

⁸⁴(1) Memo for rec, Lt Col R. M. Dill, C/CM Div Class III Br, 18 Jun 59, subj: Quickway Tank Filling. AEAQM-JAPO 280/79 QM. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Col Dill, 18 Sep 59, Both UNCLAS.

⁸⁵Memos for rec, Capt Jordan, 24 & 28 Jul 59, cited above. UNCLAS.

⁸⁶(1) USAREUR ltr, 12 Aug 58, cited above. UNCLAS. (2) Sum Sheet, unsgd [Col Dill], n.d. [8 Sep 59], subj: POL Pipeline from Donges to Metz-Zweibruecken-Huttenheim. SECRET. In G3 Hist Sec historians' note files.

⁸⁷(1) Memo for rec, Mr. R. A. Freeman, USAREUR Engr Div R&U and Const Br, 20 Jan 59, subj: Status of Germersheim-Huttenheim POL Pipeline, Line Item A951.64-7-57. AEAEN-RC 285/34 H5.1. UNCLAS. (2) Sum Sheet, Col Dill, cited above. SECRET.

⁸⁸USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 58, p. 233. SECRET.

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facilities east of the Rhine near Mainz had already been delayed for two years because of real estate problems, USAREUR asked for US CINCEUR's assistance in getting the German government to initiate the project as soon as possible.⁸⁹ The desired NATO storage facilities east of the Rhine were not obtained during FY 1959, and moreover, no progress was made toward reaching an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany to operate the tank farm at Bedesbach, southwest of Mainz, as a joint U.S.-NATO facility. The U.S. portion of the project--two tanks--had been completed and ready for filling since 1956, but disagreements over safety standards prevented the tanks from being used.⁹⁰

In addition, in the fall of 1958 USAREUR successfully negotiated for the acquisition of additional storage space along the NATO pipeline systems, both for automotive gasoline (MOGAS) and for jet aircraft fuel (JP-4). At the beginning of December USAREUR had been allocated, and was preparing to fill, storage space at Cambrai, Bitburg, and Zweibruecken.⁹¹ By the spring USAREUR was also allocated storage space at Le Havre, Langres, and Metz.⁹² At the end of June 1959 U.S. petroleum products were actually stored in NATO facilities in the following quantities:

	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>MOGAS</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>64,639</u> mtr ³	<u>23,301</u> mtr ³
Bitburg	20,770 "	--
Cambrai	7,138 "	3,910 "
Langres	17,880 "	8,527 "
Metz (Vilcey)	9,292 "	7,535 "
Zweibruecken	9,559 "	3,329 "

It was anticipated that the U.S. storage allocations at Le Havre would be filled by mid-August, and that some additional space at Langres could be filled by November or December 1959.⁹³

⁸⁹ (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 12 Sep 58, subj: NATO POL Storage East of the Rhine (U). AEZQM-JAPO 280/84 QM. (2) Cmt 4, USAREUR G4 to CofS, 10 Nov 58, subj: Letter CINCEUCOM from General Hodes, subj: NATO POL Storage East of the Rhine (sic) (U). AEZQM-I 285/H5.3 GD (28 Oct 58). (3) 2d Ind, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 14 Nov 58, subj: NATO POL Storage East of the Rhine (U). AEZQM-JAPO 250/17 QM (12 Sep 58). All CONF.

⁹⁰ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Col Dill, 18 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

⁹¹ (1) Cable AEZQM-8-1910, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Nov 58. USAREUR SMC IN 5164. CONF. (2) Cable SX-8061, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 4 Dec 58. SECRET.

⁹² Cable SX-4106, CINCUSAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 26 May 59. SECRET.

⁹³ Cable AEZQM-7-1000, CG USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jun 59. USAREUR SMC IN 6883. SECRET. One cubic meter is equivalent to approximately 264 gallons.

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d. Tanks for Diesel Fuel Storage. During FY 1959 a requirement arose for additional diesel fuel storage facilities, mainly because diesel fuel could be used as a substitute for fuel oil in heating equipment. In addition to 11 million gallons of diesel fuel for vehicles, USAREUR units in Germany would need some 17-20 million gallons of contractor-supplied fuel oil in FY 1960. If, instead of relying on purchases from contractors in Germany and on moving diesel fuel by rail tank cars and trucks, the pipeline from Metz could be used as a transportation medium, a saving of almost \$27,000 could be realized in the coming fiscal year. Moreover, since the diesel requirements of the command were expected to rise sharply by FY 1962--largely as a result of the introduction of additional diesel-powered equipment--the savings would become even larger in the future.

When the use of the pipeline from Metz was found to be technically sound, the provision of storage space was the only remaining difficulty. For this purpose, in February 1959 the USAREUR Quartermaster recommended erecting four 10,000 barrel bolted-steel tanks, two each at the Hinterweidenthal and Bellheim tank farms.⁹⁴ The proposal was still in the planning stage at the end of the fiscal year, but it appeared that the German Government would also erect four diesel-fuel tanks at Zweibruecken, which the U.S. forces could use to supplement the facilities at Hinterweidenthal and Bellheim.⁹⁵

In the Spring the plan was extended to France, where it was estimated that some \$600,000 could be saved in FY 1960 by using diesel fuel supplied through pipelines to heat military installations in that country. Once again, the best solution was to use bolted-steel tanks from the theater reserve stocks. To erect 19 such tanks--6 at Chalons, 10 at Donges, and 3 at Metz--using troop labor, would cost only \$387,000--much less than the anticipated first-year savings. Construction was to begin in September 1959, with completion to be expected by December 1959.⁹⁶

e. Release of Rail Tank Cars. The continuous improvements in pipeline operations led USAREUR to initiate a study of rail tank car needs in August 1958. At that time 958 French and German leased tank cars and 615 Army-owned cars were in use. Static costs of these cars ran to approximately \$70,000 per month, of which over \$50,000 was for leased cars.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ DF, USAREUR QM Div to G4, 11 Feb 59, subj: Construction of Diesel Tankage at Hinterweidenthal and Bellheim. AEAQM-JAPO 280/79 QM. UNCLAS.

⁹⁵ (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Ger Fed Min of Def, 31 Jul 59, subj: Diesel Storage at Zweibruecken (U). AEAQM-JAPO 280/79 QM. (2) Memo for rec, Lt Col J. M. Willis, USAREUR JAPO, n.d., no subj, atchd to above. Both CONF.

⁹⁶ (1) DF, USAREUR QM Div to G4, 24 Apr 59, subj: Construction of Bulk Storage Tanks at Metz, Chalons, and Donges. AEAQM-JAPO 285/41 QM. UNCLAS. (2) Sum Sheet, Col Dill, cited above. SECRET.

⁹⁷ (1) Ltr, USAREUR QM to USACOMZEUR QM, 28 Aug 58, subj: Tank Car Utilization. AEAQM-JAPO 280/48 QM. (2) DF, USAREUR QM Div to G4, 13 Jul 59, subj: Reduction in Number of Leased Rail Tank Cars. AEAQM-JAPO 280/79 QM. Both UNCLAS.

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A study prepared at the beginning of October showed that tank cars averaged less than 2 trips each per month; that a number of Army-owned cars had been standing idle for 4 months at 1 location in France; that at other points over 225 cars had been standing idle for more than 30 days; that charges for leased cars averaged \$.80 per day more than costs of Army-owned cars; and, finally, that despite the number of idle cars, commercial trucking services were being used in some instances to transport bulk POL at costs running from 10 to 11 percent higher than rail shipping costs. On the basis of the above information USACOMZEUR was to determine the minimum number of rail tank cars actually required for current operations--the number of cars in use had been almost constant for over two years--and to release those that were surplus to needs.⁹⁸

USACOMZEUR replied in November that 200 leased cars could be released in 4 increments of 50 cars each, starting immediately and continuing through February 1959. Furthermore, utilization rates would be watched carefully and, as operations became more efficient, additional cars would be released later in the year.⁹⁹ The release of the 200 cars was expected to save some \$7,300 monthly.¹⁰⁰ As a result of continuing efforts, 573 leased tank cars were released by the end of the fiscal year, with a total monthly saving estimated at \$31,500.¹⁰¹

f. Status of Seventh Army POL Storage at 30 June 1959. Under the terms of the revised Concept "C" of February 1958, a 3-day supply of MOGAS was to be in the hands of Seventh Army troops, a 7-day supply was to be pre-stocked east of the Rhine, and an 8-day supply west of the Rhine.¹⁰² By 30 June 1959 all Seventh Army units had sufficient bulk carriers and cargo trucks to supply themselves with both bulk and packaged POL products. Moreover, recent improvements in pipeline operations and storage facilities permitted a complete revision of stockage concepts. Seventh Army was capable of storing 7.56 days of bulk MOGAS and of picking up and delivering with organic tank trucks a 1.8-day supply daily.¹⁰³ Thus, the required stockage was available, and the USAREUR and NATO pipeline systems were capable of furnishing 100 percent of Seventh Army's daily needs in addition to supplying Air Force bases in Germany.¹⁰⁴ As a back-up

⁹⁸ (1) Ltr, USAREUR QM to USACOMZEUR QM, 7 Oct 58, subj: Tank Car Utilization. AEAQM-JAPO 280/48 QM. (2) Ltr, same to same, 28 Aug 58, cited above. Both UNCLAS.

⁹⁹ Cable AEZQM-5-17657, CG USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Nov 58. USAREUR SMC IN 403. UNCLAS.

¹⁰⁰ DF, USAREUR QM Div to Cofs thru G4, 10 Nov 58, subj: Daily Report of Staff Action. AEAQM-EX. UNCLAS.

¹⁰¹ DF, USAREUR QM Div to G4, 13 Jul 59, cited above. UNCLAS.

¹⁰² DF, same to same, 22 Jul 59, subj: Staff Study--Storage Plan for Seventh Army Prestocks. AEAQM-JAPO 280/79 QM. SECRET.

¹⁰³ DF, same to same, 26 Jun 59, same subj and file. SECRET.

¹⁰⁴ DF, same to same, 22 Jul 59, cited above. SECRET.

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against these requirements, USAREUR had a 70-day supply of MOGAS in bulk storage at 26 tank farm locations along the pipeline systems, and--should the pipelines fail--sufficient rail tank cars and truck facilities were available to supply Seventh Army's needs.¹⁰⁵

Of the 7-day supply (8.6 million gallons) required to be prestocked for Seventh Army east of the Rhine, 6.4 million gallons could be stored in the QUICKWAY tanks that had been erected, and the rest could be placed in collapsible 10,000-gallon fabric tanks that were to be issued to Seventh Army's petroleum supply companies in the near future.¹⁰⁶ Pending the filling of these bulk storage facilities, Seventh Army had packaged prestocks of some 5.5 million gallons.¹⁰⁷

West of the Rhine 6.3 million gallons (5 days' supply) were stored in 5-gallon cans and 3.5 million gallons (3 days' supply) were in bulk storage at Bellheim and Hinterweidenthal.¹⁰⁸

Prestocks of MOGAS had been packaged in 5-gallon cans as an emergency measure before the pipeline systems were operational. With bulk handling facilities available, however, packaged prestocks were no longer required. Moreover, to permit the handling of Seventh Army's requirements solely by means of 5-gallon cans, USAREUR would have needed an estimated 5,100-man increase in its manpower ceiling. Since bulk POL stored anywhere along the pipeline complex could be considered as meeting theater reserve stockage objectives, the 70-day supply of MOGAS stored at tank farms was identified as back-up for Seventh Army. Packaged prestocks were to be eliminated as the gasoline approached its use limitation.¹⁰⁹

34. Port Operations

a. Shipment of Household Goods. During recent years two of the favored methods of shipping household goods had been the so-called Sea-Van-Tote and Van-Sea-Van methods. In both systems a commercial carrier picked up the goods at the old quarters and trucked them to the port, where they were packed and shipped overseas by water transportation. At the arrival port the goods were unpacked and then shipped by commercial carrier to the new quarters. The major difference in the two methods was that Sea-Van-Tote used MSTs vessels for the transoceanic shipment, while Van-Sea-Van required the commercial carrier to arrange for commercial sea transportation, thus

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. SECRET.

¹⁰⁶ DF, QM Div to G4, 26 Jun 59, cited above. SECRET.

¹⁰⁷ Memo for rec, Col Dill, 1 Jun 59, subj: Stock Status of Mogas (U) AEAQM-JAPO 280/79 QM. SECRET.

¹⁰⁸ DF, QM Div to G4, 26 Jun 59, cited above. SECRET.

¹⁰⁹ (1) DF, QM Div to G4, 22 Jul 59, cited above. (2) 1st Ind, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, n.d., subj: Recommended Changes in Emergency Class III Stocks (U). AEAQM-JAPO 280/79 QM (19 May 59). Both SECRET.

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removing the Government entirely from the shipment operation.

Both methods remained in use during FY 1959, but in October 1958 an improvement was introduced. Under the new system, known as Van-Pac, a commercial carrier packed the household goods at the old quarters into plywood containers, using so-called clean packing methods instead of shredded paper or excelsior. The goods were customs inspected while the packing proceeded, and the cases were sealed when full. The sealed cases were then trucked to the port, shipped commercially, and trucked to the new quarters upon arrival, at which time the cases were opened and unpacked. This door-to-door shipment of sealed containers considerably reduced loss, damage, and pilferage; coming into more general use, it gradually replaced the other methods by the end of FY 1959. By the beginning of June 1959 the Sea-Van-Tote method was dropped entirely in France and Germany because of its many disadvantages, such as repeated handling and split responsibility between the commercial carriers and the Government, which complicated claims procedures. It was kept in use in Italy, however, so that the Army could control all shipments by MSTs vessels through the port of Leghorn.¹¹⁰

b. Roll-On, Roll-Off (RORO) Ships. This method of shipping, in which trailers loaded with supplies for a single final recipient were driven onto the ship at the country of origin and off at the destination, was still in the test stage during the early part of FY 1959. Its most significant advantages were a saving on packing and crating costs while at the same time pilferage and cargo damage were reduced. Also, highway movement to the final destination was expedited, cargo handling was reduced, and a minimum of paper work was required for the processing of cargoes. Finally, since a RORO-type vessel could be loaded and unloaded simultaneously, ship turnaround time was reduced to a day and one-half.¹¹¹

Accordingly, starting in March 1959, RORO vessels were used on a regularly scheduled basis. In May the RORO ship USNS Comet was joined in this service by another, newer type RORO vessel, the USNS Taurus. With 2 ships, the regular service was increased to provide a schedule of 1 ship arriving every 10 days.

c. Assistance to "Unauthorized" Dependents. During FY 1959 it was discovered that the number of "unauthorized" dependents--that is to say, dependents of personnel not entitled to logistical support for their families--present in the command had reached significant proportions. A serious morale problem arose from this situation, for these dependents had to arrange for their own transportation to the United States at no expense to the Government. Although they were entitled to space-available transportation on Government ships, the lack of available space, in effect, completely nullified this entitlement.

However, under U.S. law there was a provision that permitted national airlines to charter aircraft to groups with a recognizable identity, such as the so-called Economy Wives' Clubs, which had been organized by "unauthorized" dependents in most communities in Europe. Since per-person charter rates were

¹¹⁰ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Maj W. F. Rapson, USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br, 2 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

¹¹¹ Ibid. UNCLAS.

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considerably lower than even the cheapest economy rates on regularly scheduled flights, USAREUR recommended to the Department of Defense--on the ground that alleviation of the travel-expense burden would have significant morale implications--that major national airlines be approached and asked to tender this service. Beyond this recommendation, USAREUR took no active part in the program. Two airlines contacted the dependents' groups directly or through the American Express Company and carried out 17 charter flights in the second half of the fiscal year, thus permitting over 1,500 dependents to return to the United States at minimum cost.¹¹²

35. The Army Aviation Program

The continuing trend toward employing more aircraft in the Army was reflected by the increase, during FY 1959, of USAREUR aircraft from 867 to approximately 1,030. By 30 June 1959 all TOE and TA allowances were filled for all types of aircraft but the L-20. Additional aircraft received in the theater--except the L-20--were used to fill authorized maintenance floats.¹¹³

a. Mobile Shop Vans. During FY's 1957 and 1958 user tests of the mobil shop-van concept for field maintenance of aircraft had been conducted by Seventh Army aviation maintenance support units. Three types of mobile shops had been tested--light, medium, and heavy--and in the tests of the light and medium shops, the TOE maintenance equipment of the units had been withdrawn to insure complete reliance upon the mobile equipment and thus establish the validity of the tests. The tests were continued during the early part of FY 1959, whereupon the Department of the Army Transportation Combat Development Group recommended--on the basis of the test findings--that mobile shop equipment be procured for all Seventh Army TOE field maintenance units. At about the same time, USACOMZEU recommended on the basis of its studies that heavy mobile maintenance shops, consisting of 13 vans each, be authorized as TOE equipment for each depot-type aviation support battalion.¹¹⁴ By the end of the fiscal year the initial increments of shop vans had been received, and the work of installing the necessary equipment in them was under way. All the required vans were expected to become available by early 1960.¹¹⁵

b. Standardization and Improvement of Electronic Equipment. Before FY 1958 many modifications of the electronic configurations of USAREUR aircraft had been performed without proper technical orders or manuals. This procedure had been adopted to obtain the minimal electronic capabilities that would permit the integration of the aircraft into a common system for tactical operations. At the same time, however, it had resulted in a number of different and nonstandard configurations for the same models and types of aircraft, which, obviously, complicated the logistical support task.

¹¹² Ibid. UNCLAS.

¹¹³ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Maj T. F. Begley, USAREUR Trans Div Materiel Br Avn Sec, 3 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

¹¹⁴ Briefing for Brig Gen R. D. Meyer, Dep CofT for Army Avn, by USAREUR Trans Div, 15 Nov 58. UNCLAS. In Trans Div Materiel Br Avn Sec.

¹¹⁵ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Maj Begley, 3 Sep 59. UNCLAS.

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Moreover, flight safety factors could no longer be fully determined because of the various combinations of modifications that had been performed.¹¹⁶

For these reasons the Department of the Army had agreed in FY 1958 to stabilize the situation in USAREUR by establishing approved "normal" modifications and procedures. However, in FY 1959 the scarcity of information on modification kits and the nonavailability of approved technical manuals prevented USAREUR from establishing a smooth-running modification program.¹¹⁷

(1) Revised USAREUR Configuration Plan. Accordingly, in November 1958 the USAREUR electronic configuration plan for aircraft was so revised as to give each aircraft type the configuration that would meet its specific operational requirements. Over a period of time--estimated at 2 to 3 years--all nonstandard equipment would be eliminated in 2 ways: the equipment already installed in USAREUR's in-service aircraft would be replaced by approved technical-order type modifications, while new aircraft shipped to USAREUR would be equipped with the approved configuration.¹¹⁸

In approving this plan, the Department of the Army specified that no further changes be made without mutual agreement. Thus, in effect, the revised plan became a joint policy document that ensured full standardization and simplified parts supply and maintenance.¹¹⁹

(2) FM Radio and Homing Devices. In February 1959 USAREUR initiated a program to equip all U.S. Army airfields in Germany with FM radio equipment and homing devices. Virtually all USAREUR aircraft were equipped with FM communications (AN/MRC-44), which permitted them to be netted with the FM radio communications of ground tactical units. The installation of FM equipment at the Army airfields was expected to be instrumental in reducing the number of violations of the Iron Curtain by U.S. fliers, for the FM voice network would permit transmissions over longer ranges than the standard VHF equipment, and the FM homing devices (AN/MRA-31) installed in Army aircraft would permit lost fliers to find their way safely to the nearest field.

¹¹⁶Incl 1, to DF, USAREUR Sig Div to G3, 20 Jan 59, subj: Army Aviation Program USAREUR. AEASC-AV 280/143 SC. UNCLAS.

¹¹⁷(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to DCSOPS, 27 Mar 59, subj: Aircraft Electronic Configuration Plan (USAREUR), Revised Nov 58. AEASC-AV 280/176. Both UNCLAS.

¹¹⁸Incl, Aircraft Electronic Configuration Plan (USAREUR), Nov 58, to ltr cited above. UNCLAS.

¹¹⁹(1) Ibid. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Maj. A. M. Krakower, USAREUR Sig Div, 20 Oct 59. Both UNCLAS.

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By 30 June 1959 a network of 51 stations, encompassing all the major Army airfields in the command, was completed and operating.¹²⁰

(3) Planned Improvements. During FY 1959 USAREUR also completed final plans for a VHF direction-finding (DF) network that was to cover the major USAREUR army airfields. Detailed plans for the installation of the required ground facilities had been completed, but actual installation of the DF stations could not be started before the end of June 1959 because the required equipment was not yet available. It was anticipated the plans could be executed early in FY 1960.

In addition, plans were developed for installing ground-controlled-approach equipment (AN/FPN-33) to permit all-weather operations at Coleman Army Airfield, near Mannheim. By 30 June the equipment was in place and operators were being trained in its use; operations, however, had not been officially initiated.¹²¹

36. Transfer of Theater Logistical Functions

a. The Joint Area Petroleum Office. Early in FY 1958 US CINCEUR had had delegated to USAREUR the responsibility for establishing and maintaining a Joint Area Petroleum Office (JAPO), which, as a staff agency of the commander in chief, would exercise jurisdiction over U.S. petroleum matters in West Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.¹²² By the end of June 1958 the transfer of this function to USACOMZEUR was under consideration. The USAREUR Quartermaster opposed this proposal because such a change would lessen CINCUSAREUR's influence in NATO pipeline and petroleum matters. Since the NATO POL infrastructure program was then nearing completion, it was anticipated that USAREUR's Joint Area Petroleum Office would, in the near future, be heavily involved in negotiations with other NATO partners concerning allocations for use of the pipelines. To delegate such responsibilities to USACOMZEUR would deprive USAREUR of its intimate knowledge of NATO petroleum affairs. Moreover, since long-range petroleum planning was conducted at the Theater Army-Theater Air Force level, delegating the JAPO responsibilities to a lower command echelon would automatically limit the amount of planning information available to the petroleum office.¹²³

¹²⁰ (1) Tabs A-E, to Incl, to ltr, USAREUR to DCSOPS, 27 Mar 59, cited above. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Maj Krakower, cited above. Both UNCLAS.

¹²¹ See note above. UNCLAS.

¹²² US EUCOM Dir 63-1, 29 Jul 57, subj: Petroleum Charter--US EUCOM Joint Petroleum Office System (US EUCOM JPO). UNCLAS.

¹²³ Memo, Col C. B. Henderson, USAREUR Dep QM, to Maj Gen H. R. Westphalinger, ACoFS G4, 30 Jun 58, subj: Relocation of Joint Area Petroleum Office. UNCLAS. In G4 Mgt Br.

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Some of these objections seemed valid. Nevertheless, because of the commander in chief's desire to eliminate operational functions from his headquarters, the Quartermaster was directed to prepare recommendations for the transfer of this activity, effective 1 January 1959.¹²⁴

The Quartermaster recommended that 4 personnel spaces--3 military and 1 Department of the Army civilian--be transferred to USACOMZEUR to carry out the JAPO functions; the only facilities required would be office space for these personnel and housing.¹²⁵ While the JAPO charter seemed to indicate that such a transfer could be made without further coordination,¹²⁶ US EUCOM's approval was sought in December, as was the concurrence of USAFE, since one member of the JAPO staff was an Air Force officer. USAFE objected to the transfer. Since the petroleum office had joint responsibilities that affected both headquarters, close coordination between USAREUR at Heidelberg and USAFE at Wiesbaden was essential. If the office was moved to USACOMZEUR headquarters at Orleans, however, visits would be time consuming and communications difficult.¹²⁷

Since a study to improve the petroleum operation in the US EUCOM area of responsibility was being prepared at that time, no decision on the USAREUR request was made in December.¹²⁸

In February 1959, presumably upon completion of the study, US EUCOM authorized the transfer, provided CINCUSAREUR retained over-all responsibility for performing the JAPO functions. The concurrence of USAFE was obtained, and USACOMZEUR made the necessary office space available. During the first week of June USAREUR announced the transfer would take place effective 1 August 1959.¹²⁹

¹²⁴(1) DF, USAREUR ACofS G4 to CofS, n.d., subj as above. AEAGD-MN 250/H5.3 GD. (2) DF, same to QM, 3 Nov 58, same subj. AEAGD. Both UNCLAS.

¹²⁵Cmt 2, USAREUR QM Div to G4, 14 Nov 58, to DF, ACofS G4 to QM, 3 Nov 58, cited above, w/atchd memo for rec, Col Dill, n.d., no subj. Both UNCLAS.

¹²⁶MRS, Maj W. F. Veaudry, G4 Mgt Br, to Gen Westphalinger, 19 Nov 58, subj: Transfer of Joint Area Petroleum Office, atchd to DF, G4 to CofS, cited above. UNCLAS.

¹²⁷Cable, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Dec 58. USAREUR SMC IN 2655. UNCLAS.

¹²⁸Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 2 Dec 58, subj: Proposed Transfer of USAREUR Joint Area Petroleum Office, w/1st Ind, US EUCOM to USAREUR, 24 Dec 58, AEAGD-MN 250/H5.3 GD. UNCLAS.

¹²⁹(1) Cable EC-9-935, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Feb 59. USAREUR SMC IN 4426. CONF. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 21 Apr 59, subj: Transfer of the Joint Area Petroleum Office, w/1st Ind, USACOMZEUR to USAREUR, 7 May 59. AEAGD-MN 250/H5.3 GD. UNCLAS. (3) Cable, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jun 59. USAREUR SMC IN 1037. UNCLAS. (4) Cable SC-33709, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, et al., 8 Jun 59. UNCLAS.

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b. Procurement Responsibility. As head of a procurement activity CINC-USAREUR had full authority and responsibility for the technical aspects of all procurement carried out under his jurisdiction. As early as February 1957 CINCUSAREUR had requested the Department of the Army that the commanding general of USACOMZEUR also be designated as head of a procurement activity. The Department of the Army had disapproved this request on the ground that potential conflicts in responsibility could arise from having one head of a procurement activity subordinate to another. As a result, additional procurement authority had been delegated to USACOMZEUR, but this action had not eliminated the need for a procurement staff at USAREUR headquarters. The experience of FY 1958 had shown that this procurement organization led to a certain duplication of effort and failed to meet the requirement for eliminating operational functions from USAREUR headquarters.¹³⁰

In November 1958 USAREUR made another recommendation that the designation of head of a procurement activity be assigned to USACOMZEUR. All functions pertaining to procurement except the legal ones--the USAREUR Board of Contract Appeals, responsibility for the suspension and debarment of contractors, and contract litigation--would be transferred to USACOMZEUR together with some 25 personnel spaces. USAREUR would retain responsibility for procurement for EES and other nonappropriated fund activities.¹³¹ This recommendation was approved to take effect on 1 July 1959.¹³²

c. Construction Responsibilities. Around the middle of FY 1959 the possibility of transferring construction responsibilities to USACOMZEUR was being considered at the same time as the realignment of over-all command relationships. During the preceding months as many construction functions as possible had already been delegated to USACOMZEUR, the U.S. Army Construction Agencies, Germany and France (USACAG and USACAF, respectively), the 7th Engineer Brigade, and the area commands. In February 1959 the USAREUR Engineer was asked to prepare a study concerning the transfer of construction responsibilities to USACOMZEUR with concurrent reassignment of USACAF and USACAG to that headquarters.¹³³

¹³⁰DF, USAREUR ACoFS G4 to CinC, 19 Nov 58, subj: Transfer of Procurement Authorities, Functions, and Responsibilities to COMZ. AEAGD-C 280/H5.3 GD. UNCLAS.

¹³¹(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG, 24 Nov 58, subj as above. AEAGD-C 280.12.1 GD. Both UNCLAS.

¹³²Ltr, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Mar 59, subj as above. AGAO-CC 120 (13 Mar 59) DCSLOG. UNCLAS.

¹³³DF, USAREUR Engr to CofS thru G4, 22 Jan 59, subj: Transfer of Construction Responsibility (U), w/cmt 2, G4 to CofS, 31 Jan 59; cmt 3, CofS to G4, 3 Feb 59; and cmt 4, G4 to Engr, 9 Feb 59. AEAEEN-MO 250/15. CONF.

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The Engineer Division staff study emphasized that the indirect methods of contracting under government agreements and the need for intimate liaison between U.S. construction agencies and the host nations made it desirable to keep separate organizations in France and Germany. Moreover, the size of the construction programs in these two countries justified the retention of separate agencies. The USAREUR G4 agreed with this viewpoint and added that, even with operational responsibility transferred to USA-COMZEUR, a need would still exist for a small construction staff within USAREUR headquarters to enable the Engineer to formulate theater policy. However, many functions--such as comptroller activities and technical engineering review--were common to both agencies and could easily be performed in a central office under one agency. Accordingly, it was recommended that USACAF be redesignated the U.S. Army Construction Agency, Europe, with USACAG functioning as a suboffice of this organization for Germany. Common functions would be performed by the new agency.¹³⁴

Upon consulting with USACOMZEUR it was determined that construction policy, programming, and policy responsibilities would remain with USAREUR, but that supervision and execution responsibilities could be assumed by USACOMZEUR if personnel and funding authorizations were increased to cover the additional workload engendered. Accordingly, construction responsibilities, to include the assignment of the two construction agencies, were transferred to USACOMZEUR, effective 1 July 1959; 5 personnel spaces were made available from the USAREUR Engineer Division and 8 from the construction agencies to augment the USACOMZEUR headquarters staff. In addition, in order that all construction elements in the command would be assigned to one headquarters, the 7th Engineer Brigade was also transferred to USA-COMZEUR effective 1 July.¹³⁵

d. Excess and Disposal Functions. Late in FY 1958 USACOMZEUR headquarters had recommended that USAREUR's property disposal responsibilities--to include the U.S. Army Property Disposal Detachment, Frankfurt, with personnel and space authorizations--be transferred to it.¹³⁶ A staff

¹³⁴ Cmt 5, to DF cited above, Engr to CofS thru G4, 27 Feb 59, w/incl; and cmt 6, ACofS, G4 to CofS, 13 Mar 59. UNCLAS.

¹³⁵ (1) DF, USAREUR ACofS G4 to CofS, 24 Apr 59, subj: Transfer of Construction to COMZ. AEAGD-MN 250/15 GD. (2) DF, same to Engr, 8 May 59, same subj and file. Both UNCLAS.

¹³⁶ Cable AEZQM-5-12805, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jun 58. USAREUR SMC IN 8387. UNCLAS.

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study prepared on this subject showed that some 72 percent of the excess property was located in France and that USACOMZEUR was adequately staffed and could easily assume USAREUR's disposal responsibilities.¹³⁷

Accordingly, the detachment, including its responsibility for technical supervision of the Army, Air Force, and Navy disposal activities in France, Germany, and the Benelux nations, was reassigned to USACOMZEUR, while the policy-making responsibility remained with USAREUR.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Stf Study, USAREUR G4, n.d., subj: United States Army Property Disposal Detachment, Frankfurt, APO 757, US Forces. UNCLAS. In G4 Mgt Br.

¹³⁸ (1) Ibid. (2) Cables SC-34890 & SC-35468, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 2 & 8 Jul 58. All UNCLAS.

Appendix A: Command Data

Commands and Units of the United States Army, Europe

Major Commands:

Seventh U.S. Army
 U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe
 U.S. Army Southern European Task Force
 Berlin Command
 Northern Area Command
 Southern Area Command
 U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven

The commander of each major command was responsible to the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, and administered, controlled, and supported the organic, assigned, and attached commands, installations, units, and activities of his command in accordance with applicable USAREUR directives, Army Regulations, and Joint Regulations.

Subordinate Commands (Reporting Directly to Headquarters, USAREUR):

Special Troops, Headquarters, USAREUR
 32d Artillery Brigade
 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group
 513th Military Intelligence Group
 549th Hospital Center
 U.S. Army Signal Command, Europe

Assigned Units:

a. Reporting Directly to Headquarters, USAREUR:

U.S. Army Element, American Forces Network, Europe
 U.S. Army Element, Stars and Stripes, Darmstadt
 U.S. Army Element, Armed Forces Institute, Europe
 U.S. Army Element, Air Passenger Center, Frankfurt
 U.S. Army Element, U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the
 Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
 U.S. Army Dependents' Education Group, Karlsruhe
 U.S. Army Engineer-Ordnance School, Europe
 U.S. Army European Exchange System, Nuernberg
 U.S. Army Intelligence, Military Police, and Special
 Weapons School, Europe
 U.S. Army Medical Service School, Europe
 U.S. Army Military District, Europe
 U.S. Army Quartermaster-Signal School, Europe
 U.S. Army Special Services Depot, Aschaffenburg
 26th U.S. Missile Detachment, Dortmund

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44th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation)
528th U.S. Army Artillery Group

b. Reporting directly to Headquarters, USAREUR, and to the
U.S. Ambassador to Germany on such functions as directed:

The Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin.

Source: USAREUR Cir 10-5, 20 Jul 59, subj: Organization and
Functions: Designation of Commands and Units of the
United States Army, Europe. UNCLAS.

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Table 1--USAREUR Command Personnel
(Chargeable Actual Strength)

	30 June 1958						30 June 1959					
	Total	Germany	France	Italy	Other	Total	Germany	France	Italy	Other	Total	Germany
Total	517,294	429,984	69,714	17,110	486	518,949	436,322	67,038	15,070	519		
U.S. Military Personnel a/	225,019	191,694	26,849	6,331	145	226,707	198,040	23,393	5,101	173		
Officer	19,879	16,592	2,507	760	20	17,984	14,992	2,297	664	31		
Enlisted	205,140	175,102	24,342	5,571	125	208,723	183,048	21,096	4,437	142		
U.S. Civilian Employees	5,738	3,993	1,411	312	32	5,900	3,961	1,626	290	33		
Appropriated Fund Employees	4,405	2,917	1,200	265	23	4,487	2,989	1,223	251	24		
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	1,333	1,066	211	47	9	1,413	972	403	29	9		
Dependents	157,824	131,664	19,623	6,460	78	163,564	137,641	19,952	5,877	24		
of Military personnel	126,085	101,213	18,652	6,154	66	157,815	133,899	18,296	5,529	91		
of Civilian Employees	3,468	2,179	971	306	12	5,742	3,742	1,656	348	3		
Not Occupying Government Quarters	28,271	28,271	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Continental Wage Scale Personnel	122	81	40	-	1	115	73	41	-	1		
Appropriated Fund Employees	85	46	38	-	1	80	40	39	-	1		
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	37	35	2	-	-	35	33	2	-	-		

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Table 1--USAREUR Command Personnel Continued
(Chargeable Actual Strength)

	30 June 1958					30 June 1959			
	Total	Germany	France	Italy	Other	Total	Germany	France	Italy Other
German Resident Personnel	88,559	88,559	-	-	-	84,293	84,293	-	- -
Mutual Aid Fund Employees	60,766	60,766	-	-	-	57,918	57,918	-	- -
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	27,793	27,793	-	-	-	26,375	26,375	-	- -
Other Foreign Nationals	24,195	-	19,958	4,007	230	24,281	-	20,251	3,812 216
Appropriated Fund Employees	19,568	-	16,345	3,156	67	19,895	-	16,901	2,922 72
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	4,627	-	3,613	851	163	4,386	-	3,350	890 144
Labor Service Personnel	15,837	14,004	1,833	-	-	14,089	12,314	1,775	- -

a/ Includes transients, patients, and pipeline out.

Source: USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Sum Data, 30 June 58, p. CSD-7;
30 Jun 59, p. CSD-7. SECRET (info used CONF).

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Table 2--USAREUR Military Personnel by Command
(Unit Actual Strength)^{a/}

	<u>30 Jun 58</u>	<u>30 Jun 59</u>			
	<u>Total Actual</u>	<u>Total Actual</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Warrant Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Personnel</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>224,092</u>	<u>225,351</u>	<u>15,206</u>	<u>2,525</u>	<u>207,620</u>
USAREUR Hq & Units	4,557	<u>3,907</u>	792	107	3,008
Seventh Army	144,305	153,619	7,899	1,289	144,431
USACOMZEUR	34,424	<u>30,696</u>	2,751	462	27,483
USASETAF	6,237	<u>5,033</u>	528	113	4,392
Area Commands	-	<u>13,044</u>	2,372	188	11,484
Other Commands	34,569	<u>19,052</u>	1,864	366	16,822

^{a/}Unit actual strength is chargeable actual strength minus trainees and other contingent personnel.

Source: USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Sum Data, 30 Jun 58 & 30 Jun 59, p. CSD-16. SECRET (info used CONF).

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Table 3--USAREUR Officers and Warrant Officers by Grade
(Chargeable Actual Strength)

	<u>30 Jun 58</u>		<u>30 Jun 59</u>	
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Over or - Under</u>
<u>Officers Total</u>	<u>16,961</u>	<u>15,222</u>	<u>15,774</u>	<u>-552</u>
<u>General Officers</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>-</u>
General	1	1		
Lieutenant General	3	3		
Major General	21	21		
Brigadier General	29	27		
<u>Field-Grade Officers</u>	<u>4,415</u>	<u>4,004</u>	<u>4,077</u>	<u>-73</u>
Colonel	435	392	411	-19
Lieutenant Colonel	1,438	1,303	1,305	-2
Major	2,542	2,309	2,361	-52
<u>Company-Grade Officers</u>	<u>12,492</u>	<u>11,166</u>	<u>11,645</u>	<u>-479</u>
Captain	5,834	5,799	5,832	-33
Lieutenant	6,658	5,367	5,813	-446
<u>Warrant Officers Total</u>	<u>2,740</u>	<u>2,526</u>	<u>2,670</u>	<u>-144</u>

Source: USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Sum Data, 30 Jun 58 &
30 Jun 59, p. CSD-16. SECRET (info used CONF).

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Table 4--Enlisted Personnel by Grade
(Chargeable Actual Strength)

	<u>30 Jun 58</u>	<u>30 Jun 59</u>	<u>Δ Increase or - Decrease</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>204,442</u>	<u>a/207,625</u>	<u>Δ3,183</u>
E-9 SMaj	-	112	Δ112
SP9	-	-	-
E-8 1st Sgt or MSgt	69	440	Δ371
SP8	1	-	Δ.1
E-7 SFC (PSgt)	7,720	6,962	-758
SP7	139	148	Δ9
E-6 SSgt	16,402	16,554	Δ152
SP6	576	689	Δ113
E-5 Sgt	14,344	16,641	Δ2,297
SP5	15,991	17,031	Δ1,040
E-4 Cpl	1,345	1,899	Δ554
SP4	46,026	49,353	Δ3,327

E-3 PFC	81,612	73,096	-8,516
E-2 Pvt	18,426	23,395	Δ4,969
E-1 Recruit	1,791	1,305	-486

a/ 2.4 percent under DA authorized strength.

Source: USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Sum Data, 30 Jun 58 &
30 Jun 59, p. CSD-16. SECRET (info used CONF).

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Table 5--Civilian Personnel

	<u>30 Jun 58</u>	<u>31 Dec 58</u>	<u>30 Jun 59</u>	<u>/ Increase or - Decrease During FY 59</u>	
				<u>Number</u>	<u>Pct</u>
<u>Total Employees^{a/}</u>	<u>138,451</u>	<u>132,660</u>	<u>128,678</u>	<u>-5,772</u>	<u>-4.3</u>
U.S. Civilian	<u>b/ 5,738</u>	<u>6,574</u>	<u>b/ 5,900</u>	<u>/162</u>	<u>/2.9</u>
Germany	3,983	4,522	3,961		
France	1,411	1,704	1,626		
Italy	312	316	280		
Other	32	32	33		
<u>Continental Wage Scale</u>	<u>122</u>	<u>116</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>-7</u>	<u>-5.7</u>
<u>German Local Wage Rate</u>	<u>88,559</u>	<u>85,843</u>	<u>84,293</u>	<u>-4,266</u>	<u>-4.8</u>
<u>Other Foreign Local Wage Rate</u>	<u>24,195</u>	<u>24,839</u>	<u>24,281</u>	<u>/66</u>	<u>/0.3</u>
France	19,958	20,638	20,251	<u>/293</u>	<u>/1.5</u>
Italy	4,007	3,978	3,812	<u>-195</u>	<u>-4.8</u>
Other	230	223	218	<u>-12</u>	<u>-1.8</u>
<u>Labor Service</u>	<u>15,837</u>	<u>15,288</u>	<u>14,089</u>	<u>-1,748</u>	<u>-11.0</u>

^{a/} Appropriated and nonappropriated funds.

^{b/} June figures do not include teachers in the dependents' school system who were not carried on the payroll during the summer.

Source: USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Sum Data,
30 Jun 58, 31 Dec 58, 30 Jun 59, p. CSD 7. CONF.

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Table 6--USAREUR Dependents' Schools, School Year 1958-59

	<u>Total</u>		<u>High Schools</u>		<u>Elementary Schools</u>		<u>Kindergartens</u>	
	<u>Schools</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Schools</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Schools</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>	<u>Schools</u>	<u>Enrollment</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>186</u>	<u>51,483</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>6,107</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>39,363</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>6,013</u>
Germany	141	41,760	13	4,676	71	31,765	57	5,319
France	36	7,414	4	1,180	22	5,826	10	408
Italy	8	2,165	2	242	3	1,637	3	286
Ethiopia	1	144	-	9	1	135	-	-

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Source: Hq USADEG, USAREUR Sch Enrollment Rept as of
5 Jun 59, pp. 1, 3. UNCLAS.

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Table 7--Contributions to National Charities

	<u>FY 1958</u>	<u>FY 1959</u>	<u>Increase</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$763,785</u>	<u>\$861,322</u>	<u>\$97,537</u> (12.8%)
Federal Service Overseas Fund Campaign	96,847	129,421	32,574 (33.0%)
Federal Service National Health Agencies Campaign	138,926	141,731	2,805 (2.0%)
American National Red Cross Drive	<u>326,225</u>	<u>373,173</u>	<u>46,948</u> (14.4%)
USAREUR	197,644	252,739	55,095 27.9%
Other	128,581	120,434	a/8,147 -
Joint AER-ARS Campaign	201,787	216,997	15,210 7.5%

a/ Decrease.

Source: (1) USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br ARC Ln Off. (2) USAREUR
AG Div AER, Coml Solicitation, and Bds Off. Both UNCLAS.

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Appendix B: Chronology

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
<u>1958</u>	
<u>Jul</u>	
1	Maj. Gen. E. F. Cardwell is announced as USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff for Advanced Weapons.
	Maj Gen. H. Hewett is announced as Deputy Commander in Chief, USAREUR.
	The U.S. Army Surveillance Unit, Europe, is established.
	The 11th Airborne Division is redesignated as the 24th Infantry Division.
	The wage tariff for German civilian labor groups becomes effective.
15	President Eisenhower decides to dispatch U.S. forces to Lebanon in response to a plea by the Lebanese Government.
16	USAREUR declares a state of "increased vigilance."
	Force ALPHA clears Fuerstenfeldbruck airbase for Adana.
19	Force CHARLIE begins departure for Adana.
23	Force ECHO initiates departure from Bremerhaven for Beirut.
26	First increment of Force DELTA departs from Bremerhaven for Beirut.
<u>Aug</u>	
1	Salary increases for French LWR employees become effective.
6	CINCUSAFE is assigned the air defense mission as it pertained to the U.S. European Command.
22	The Prix Le Clerc marksmanship matches are conducted.
<u>Sep</u>	
3	Groundbreaking ceremonies for the first surplus commodity housing construction in Italy take place at Vicenza.
13	Soviet Berlin Commandant declares the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as competent to deal with the Western Allies on all matters affecting Berlin and East Germany.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
15	Retraction phase of Lebanon operation is initiated.
<u>Oct</u>	
3	USAREUR publishes a new version of EP 103.
8	USAREUR EP 113 is published.
10	The 40th Missile Group becomes fully operational.
15.	Advance party of the 24th Airborne Brigade is airlifted from Beirut. U.S. Army Construction Agency, France, initiates designing of the second increment of surplus commodity housing in France.
19	The 7-day phased withdrawal from Lebanon of the 24th Airborne Brigade begins.
20-24	Exercise ROLL ALONG III tests the mobile communication centers of AFCENT and the relay procedures among the signal communication centers of CENTAG and NORTHAG. CENTAG personnel and equipment are moved to field locations and equipment is tested with dummy communications traffic.
25	Retraction by sea of troops and supplies from Lebanon is completed.
26	Last airborne elements return from Lebanon to Europe.
27	USAREUR publishes its support plan for advanced U.S. Army weapons in non-U.S. NATO forces.
28-30	CPX-FTX QUICK SERVE is held with CENTAG participation. The CPX portion of the exercise is limited to those players and control staff sections necessary to execute the FTX portion in a logical and realistic manner. The exercise has a D-day setting and is initiated by a crash GAO when aggressor forces launch an all-out attack without warning across the Iron Curtain.
29	East German regime questions the legality of the presence of Allied forces in Berlin.
<u>Nov</u>	
4-7	HOSTAGE BLEU, a study-type exercise under the direction of COMLANDCENT, takes place with participation of the

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Date

Event

Central Europe commanders or their representatives down to corps and equivalent levels. The exercise is a presentation and discussion of problems particular to the Central Region.

- 10 Seventh Army Helicopter Program is officially opened.
- 20 Stockpile agreement concerning NATO special ammunition is signed with Turkey.
- 27 Soviet Government abrogates all protocols and agreements with respect to Berlin, which is to be demilitarized and declared a "free" city. The Western Powers are to negotiate directly with the East Germans. If no agreement is reached by 27 May 1959, the Soviet Union will make unilateral agreements with the German Democratic Republic.
- 29 U.S. Commander Berlin instructs military convoy and rail commanders on actions to be taken if GDR representatives interfere at border check points.

Dec

1

The 8th Infantry Division is reorganized as a composite division.

- 11 COMLANDCENT issues the new training directive for 1959.
- 16 The United States, the United Kingdom, and France reaffirm their determination to stay in Berlin and to uphold their right to free access to the city.
- 17 North Atlantic Council declares that no state has the right to withdraw unilaterally from its international engagements.

1959

Jan

1

German retail sales personnel receive a 3-percent increase in salaries.

Group Insurance for German LWR employees becomes effective.

- 11-23 A joint USAFF-USAREUR site survey of bases in Turkey is conducted.

Feb

The United States patrols the Autobahn between Helmstedt and Berlin and puts armed guards on the trains to maintain the security of its communication routes.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
2-7	FREEPLAY is held as a Seventh Army winter maneuver, conducted by VII Corps. It is to permit maximum maneuver by small units and to encourage enthusiasm and aggressiveness by all participants. Major cross-country actions are limited to the Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr training areas, to reduce maneuver damage to German property to a minimum. The exercise includes a border violation by the aggressor forces and delay and channelizing actions by the NATO forces. The over-all objective is to enhance combat readiness.
5	The 24th Infantry Division is reorganized as a standard infantry division.
25	Annual training conference is held at LANDCENT headquarters.
<u>Mar</u>	USAREUR headquarters prepares plans for the activation of a special operations center for Berlin incidents.
2	Brig. Gen. W. F. Train is announced as USAREUR Comptroller vice Brig. Gen. A. J. Maroun.
5	Maj. Gen. P. F. Lindeman replaces Maj. Gen. P. A. Gavan as USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
12	USAREUR signs a service-to-service technical agreement with the Turkish Army.
26	ROADBOUND V, a NEO-MISEV exercise, is held. Some weaknesses are observed in communications, in the USAJOMZEUR service areas, and in the over-all lack of participation of military police. Subsequent ROADBOUND exercises will start with a USAREUR-wide alert.
27	Stockpile agreement for NATO special ammunition storage is signed with Germany.
<u>Apr</u>	
1	Gen. C. D. Eddleman assumes command of USAREUR, replacing Gen. H. I. Hodges.
	Brig. Gen. H. K. Johnson is announced as USAREUR/Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, vice Maj. Gen. T. L. Sherburne.
	Col. C. E. Reitzel is announced as Acting USAREUR Judge Advocate vice Brig. Gen. N. B. Rieger.
	Joint USAFE-USAREUR site survey report is submitted.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
2	General Eddleman amplifies instructions previously given to the U.S. Commander, Berlin.
5	USASETAF submits plans for its reorganization.
10	Brig. Gen. H. K. Johnson replaces Maj. Gen. T. L. Sherburne as Deputy Area Commander for Reserve Affairs, Europe.
22	General Eddleman recommends that gyroscope movements to Europe be discontinued as soon as possible.
27-30	SHAPEX is held as an indoor conference to study certain current and future problems of Allied Command, Europe, and national authorities. After a dress rehearsal from 21-23 April, the actual exercise takes place a week later.
<u>May</u>	
12	Brig. Gen. G. W. White replaces Brig. Gen. J. H. Weber as USAREUR Ordnance Officer.
20	USAREUR Board of Requisition Demand Appeals is discontinued, and all its residual functions, activities, records, and personnel are transferred to the USAREUR Judge Advocate Division. An outline plan for developing Chateauroux as a common NATO supply facility is drafted.
27	Berlin deadline given by the Russians passes without incident.
31	The 46th Missile Group achieves operational readiness.
<u>Jun</u>	
1	Joint Army-Air Force operations center is established at Langerkopf.
11	Col. H. D. Hoover replaces Col. G. P. Warner as Secretary of the General Staff.
19	Maj. Gen. J. P. Cooney replaces Maj. Gen. A. L. Gorby as USAREUR Chief Surgeon.
22	Col. F. C. Feil replaces Col. J. F. Freund as Chief, USAREUR Civil Affairs Division.
	Col. R. D. Johnston replaces Col. F. T. Berg as Chief, USAREUR Labor Services Division.

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Appendix C: Glossary

This glossary contains all foreign terms and abbreviations used in this volume except those found in AR 320-50, 29 October 1958, as changed. In cases where combining forms follow the natural pattern--as for example the commander in chief of USAREUR being CINCUSAREUR--only the basic abbreviation of the headquarters is given. However, in cases where the normal form is not observed--as in CINCENT for the commander in chief of Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT)--both forms are given.

<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ADIZ	air defense identification zone
ADSEC	Advance Section (USACOMZEUR)
ADUSW	advanced U.S. Army weapons
ADVON	Advance Operations (USAFE)
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AFCR	Armed Forces Recreation Center
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
AIRCENT	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
ALFCE	See LANDCENT
Am	American
Amb	Ambassador
AMLANFOR	American Land Forces (SPECOMME)
Ann	annual
ASOC	air support operations center
ATF	army task force
<u>Autobahn</u>	super highway (German)
AWASP	advanced weapons ammunition supply point
BASEC	Base Section (USACOMZEUR)
<u>Bundeswehr</u>	Armed Forces (German)
CATAC	<u>Commandant Aerienne Tactique</u> (Tactical Air Force)
CAWB	City Administration of West Berlin
CE ASP	Central Europe Atomic Strike Plan
CE JEDP	Central Europe Joint Emergency Defense Plan
CENTAG	Central Army Group (NATO command)
CG	commanding general
CINCENT	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe
comdr	commander
CP	civilian personnel; capabilities plan
CRC	command and reporting center
CWS	continental wage scale

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
DAC	Department of the Army civilian (employee)
<u>de facto</u>	in point of fact, actual, actually
<u>de jure</u>	from the law, by right
DM	<u>Deutsche Mark</u> (German monetary unit)
ed.	editor, edition
EDP	emergency defense plan
EES	European Exchange System (post exchanges)
EP	emergency plan
<u>et al.</u>	<u>et alia</u> ; and others
EUCOM	European Command (An Army command up to 1 August 1952, now designated USAREUR; not to be confused with US EUCOM, a joint command.)
Eur.	Europe(an)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
FOURATAF	Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force
GAO	General Accounting Office; General Alert Order
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
Ger	German(y)
HACOM	Headquarters Area Command (USAREUR)
<u>Ibid.</u>	<u>Ibidem</u> ; in the same place
ICP	inventory control point
IELP	Improved European Logistics Program
IRBM	intermediate range ballistic missile
JAPO	Joint Area Petroleum Office
JCOC	joint command and operations center
<u>Kreisgruppen</u>	garrison group headquarters (German)
<u>Land</u>	state (German)
LANDCENT	Allied Land Forces Central Europe (NATO command)
LANDSOUTH	Allied Land Forces Southern Europe

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
LOI	letter of instructions
LS	labor service
LWR	local wage rate
MASS	Modern Army Supply System
Min	Minister (Ministry)
MOGAS	automotive gasoline
MPC	military payment certificates
MRS	memo routing slip
NACOM	Northern Area Command (USAREUR)
Narr	narrative
n.d.	no date
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Order
NG	National Guard
NMSSA	NATO Maintenance Supply Services Agency
NORTAF	Northern Task Force
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
ORA	Order for Reinforced Alert
<u>passim</u>	here and there
QBAL	Quadripartite Berlin Airlift Plan
RAPOD	Rapid Phaseout of Dependents (plan)
RORO	roll-on, roll-off
R&U	repairs and utilities
SACOM	Southern Area Command (USAREUR)
SADOP	Stockage and Depot Organization Plan
SASP	Special Ammunition Storage Program
<u>sic</u>	thus
SMC	Staff Message Control
SOC	sector operations center
SOTFE	Support Operations Task Force, Europe
SPECOMME	Specified Command, Middle East
Sum	summary
TAOC	tactical army operations center
TWOATAF	Second Allied Tactical Air Force

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
U.A.R.	United Arab Republic
USAASC	U.S. Army Airlift Support Command
USACAF	U.S. Army Construction Agency, France
USACAG	U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany
USACOMZEUR	U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe
USADEG	U.S. Army Dependents' Education Group (USAREUR)
USAFE	United States Air Force in Europe
USCOB	U.S. Commander, Berlin
US EUCOM	United States European Command
USRO	U.S. Regional Organization (U.S. mission to NATO)
UW	unconventional warfare
WACOM	Western Area Command (USAREUR)
WBK	<u>Wehrbereichskommando</u> ; military district command (German)

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